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Abstract
In 1991 republics of Soviet Central Asia were reluctantly ‘launched’ into independence.The central puzzle of this dissertation is: “How has sovereign statehood been‘constructed’ in the post-independence period in the absence of history of anti-colonialstruggle?” This is an analysis of state sovereignty as a practice that is performative andinteractive through the examination of ‘discursive encounters’ between Tajikistan andUzbekistan. Such analysis traces temporal and spatial dimensions of dialogicalsovereign identity construction.In post-Soviet Tajikistan and Uzbekistan sovereignties have been performed in adialogue, through dynamic interactions with one another. The work of asserting statesovereignty is performed by various actors who claim to impersonate the state andspeak on its behalf. Multiple narratives of the self are articulated in relation to therelevant “interlocutor”, whose reactions and counter-articulations are “fed back” intothe narrative of the self. The right to existence of these states as agents of internationalrelations is justified through such ‘discursive encounters’ that simulate sovereignty. Ipropose the Möbius strip as a conceptual model for understanding the process ofsovereignty-assertion.Competing historiographies present two irreconcilable narratives: history of an ethnic
group and history of the territory of the current state. These are consistent with thenature of nationalisms in each state. While Tajik nationalists long for ‘historicalTajikistan’, Uzbek nationalism is inherently conservative and defensive of territorialsovereignty.The controversy surrounding the Roghun HPP is an example of the daily constructionand maintenance a state. Competing principles of water sharing contributed to anongoing crisis in Tajik-Uzbek relations. Sovereignty is simulated within the periods andzones of ‘exception’ via a Möbian mechanism of dialogical meaning-making, wherebyeach side strives to exploit the inherent ambiguity of signifiers in order to advance theirown narrative of the self and other.
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1Chapter One
Introduction
“Tajiks and Uzbeks are one people, speaking different languages” (President of Uzbekistan,
Islam Karimov)
“Tajiks were never the same people as Uzbeks!” (Rahim Masov, Tajik historian)
Thesis topic and rationaleAlmost twenty years ago, in autumn of 1991, fifteen new states came into being.Countries called ‘Tajikistan’ and ‘Uzbekistan’ were proclaimed among them as the newindependent states, seeking international recognition and sovereign equality with otherstates under the international law. While they were soon recognized by theinternational community and became members of international organizations such asthe United Nations, Central Asian states1 did not possess previous history of sovereignstatehood within their current borders and could not boast of anti-colonial struggleprior to their emergence. First created in 1920-30s as part of the Soviet Union’sfederative structure, the two former Soviet republics saw the second period ofexternally-propelled state-emergence in the decades following 1991. Both state-formation periods occurred on the waves of ‘forced’ decolonization following thebreakdown of two empires – the Russian and the Soviet, respectively.
This thesis examines the two periods of state-creation in Central Asia to trace theemergence of Tajik and Uzbek states. Under the condition of externally-imposed nation-statehood, whereby there was no clear struggle for independence, how did new states’representatives assert their sovereignty? In answering this question, this thesis turns tothe voices from the respective countries’ formal and informal representatives in order
1 For the purposes of this thesis, “Central Asia” is defined as the five republics of the former Soviet Union:Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. In the Soviet designation they were
labelled as ‘Srednĭaĭa Aziĭa i Kazakhstan’ [Middle Asia and Kazakhstan].  ‘Tsentral’naĭa Aziĭa’ [Central Asia] became popular after the republics gained independence in 1991, as a more inclusive term whichincorporated Kazakhstan firmly into the region.
2to see how the historical instability of identity and boundaries are stabilised andnaturalised through discourse and practice. In particular, this thesis analyses relationsand interactions between newly independent Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to trace theprocess of sovereignty-assertion and boundary-naturalisation.
From the very beginning of Central Asian statehoods in 1920-30s, the relationshipbetween designations ‘Tajik’ and ‘Uzbek’ have been characterized by inherent ambiguityand the notion that they stand in opposition. In this thesis this complex relationship isexplored through interactions among various actors claiming to represent the ‘Tajik’and the ‘Uzbek’. In the process of assertion of sovereignty of the newly-emergent states,each side engages in a constant dialogue with the ‘other’. Sovereignty therefore is foundin the dialogical process of articulation of the self and the other as coherent autonomoussubjects of international relations across history and within certain territorialboundaries.
Since both states first appeared on the world map, they have been connected asmutually defining opposites. The two states owe their emergence as political entities intheir current borders to the National Territorial Delimitation undertaken by theBolsheviks in 1924-1929. They were created as a single unit within the newlyestablished Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics, with Tajik Autonomous SovietSocialist Republic (ASSR) being a subordinate part of hierarchically superior formationof the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR). Five years later, in 1929, the Tajikautonomy was promoted to the status of a ‘soviet socialist’ republic and was granted apart of Ferghana valley (Khujand/ Leninobod region), which formerly belonged toUzbekistan. The ancient cities of great cultural and historical significance, Samarqandand Bukhara, with predominantly Farsi-speaking populations remained within theterritory of Uzbek SSR (Roy, 2000: 61). The short period between 1924 and 1929 thussaw the emergence of a separate Tajik national consciousness and claim to sovereignstatehood within the USSR among elites self-identifying with Tajikness as separate fromand opposed to Uzbekness. The second period of state creation in 1990s was similarlyaccompanied by the intensification and radicalisation of ‘othering’ of the neighbour,especially in Tajikistan’s historians’ revisionist view of the history of delimitation.
3When in March 1991 Mikhail Gorbachev called a referendum on preservation of theSoviet Union, Tajiks and Uzbeks went to the polls and expressed their overwhelmingsupport in favour of continuing to be citizens of the USSR.2 Thus, contrary to familiarnarratives of struggles for independence in the decolonisation context of the second halfof twentieth century, Central Asian states’ independence was not an achievementresulting from a long and bitter nationalist liberation struggle. Rather, the ‘Muslim’Soviet republics of Middle Asia and Kazakhstan were reluctant to let go of the Union anddeclared independence only after it became obvious that the dissolution was a historicalfact. The leaders of Central Asian republics worked with Gorbachev, until the very end,on the new Union treaty; ready to ratify it and to agree to less than full independence.However, once the ‘parade of sovereignties’ began, none of the former Union republicswere willing to settle on a lesser status than the rest of their peers. In short, Tajikistanand Uzbekistan did not struggle for independence.Rather, it just ‘happened’ to them.
The central puzzle of this thesis therefore falls in two parts: (1) how did the CentralAsian states justify their existence and claim to sovereignty given the circumstances oftheir independence, and (2) to what extent, in the case of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, wasthe ‘other’ important in assertion of the newly acquired sovereign status.
This study contributes to the knowledge of international relations by exploring aspecific case of post-colonial statehood and sovereignty. As such, it constitutes anaddition to our understanding of how post-Soviet decolonisation process differed fromthat of other regions’ and what forms post-colonial statehood in Central Asian assumed.The approach of this study is innovative in that it looks at sovereignty-assertion as adynamic process taking place within the context of ‘discursive encounters’ withrelevant others. We shall trace the ‘dialogical’ process of articulation of self as asovereign actor, whereby a narrative meaning is produced which connects the past, thepresent and the future.
2 Ninety six percent of Tajik population (with 94% turnout) and ninety four percent of Uzbeks (turnout95%) voted in favour of preservation of the Union. The overall result for those republics that took part inthe referendum (Azerbaijan, Estonia, Latvia, Moldova, Lithuania and Georgia boycotted it) was 76.4%with turnout at 80 percent in favour (Walker, 2003: 118).
4Discourse analysis is employed as an analytical and methodological strategy in order toidentify the areas of contested meanings, the battlefields where the matters of identity,security and sovereignty are disputed. By analyzing these areas of contestation we areable to observe how sovereignty was constituted in dialogues between various actorsspeaking on behalf of the ‘people’, the nation, the state at the turning junctures ofhistory. This dissertation, therefore, seeks to analyse how sovereignty was articulatedin Central Asia at different points in history. It also looks at history-writing itself as ameans of sovereignty-asserting narrative-making.
The other important aspect of the study is to examine the spatial dimension ofsovereignty assertion whereby the territorial boundaries of the new states were upheldor contested through discourse and practice. Partly, the contestations of territorialboundaries take place within the historiographical narratives that establish certainterritories as rightful ‘homelands’ for an ethnic group or a tradition of indigenousstatehood. The case of the ongoing controversy over the use of water resourcesbetween Tajikistan and Uzbekistan is another instance of how sovereignty is assertedterritorially, where the matter of contention is transboundary.
Two case studies are presented in the empirical part of this thesis. They are intended asthe case studies of ‘discursive encounters’ between Tajik and Uzbek academics andpoliticians over articulation of sovereign identity in ‘time and space’. In other words,the objective is to illustrate how sovereign statehood was justified during the state-creation periods in terms of history and what geographical parameters were advocatedfor actualisation of the sovereign identity of ‘the people‘. I argue that (1) both sidesplayed on the ambiguity of sameness and difference of Tajik and Uzbek identity, and (2)each side used this ambiguity in order to advance its vision of idealised state. The Tajikvision of the state that would incorporate the rightful ‘homeland’ is inherentlyrevisionist of the existing inter-state borders, while Uzbekistan’s is defensive andjustificatory of them. It is argued further that the space of ambiguity is the necessarycondition for development of political debate and the source of discursive encountersbetween the two sides.
5Ambiguity of boundary between ‘Tajikness’ and ‘Uzbekness’The former Politburo member, Nuriddin Muhitdinov, tells an illustrative anecdote in hismemoirs (1994). In 1955 on the way back from a state visit to India, the Sovietdelegation led by Nikita Khrushchev made a stopover in the capital of the Uzbek SovietSocialist Republic (UzSSR), Tashkent. It was the first time in almost a hundred yearsthat the leadership of the country visited this faraway province. Khrushchev decided toaddress the cheering crowds who had gathered at the capital’s main square to welcomethe delegation. “Good day, my dear Tajiks! We have brought you cordial greetings fromthe people of India, Burma, Afghanistan”, he started his speech. And then continued:“You, Tajiks, are hard workers; well done for producing such high wields in cottonharvests! As for your neighbours Uzbeks, they are not doing that great. First of all, thereare some among their leadership who oppose mechanisation...” (162-163). Muhitdinovhad to tactfully point out to the idiosyncratic Soviet leader that he was in Uzbekistan andthe Uzbek people were listening to him with great attention. After slightembarrassment, Khrushchev made light of the awkward situation by saying that theaudience shared his sense of humour and passed his ‘little test’ by listening attentivelyto the public criticism of the republic’s leadership.
The above anecdote is illustrative of several issues that are central to this thesis andthat are going to be main themes within this introductory chapter. These themes are:(1) an ambiguity, lack of clarity regarding identity and difference between thedesignations “Tajik” and “Uzbek”, despite which there exists (2) a “myth of ethnicanimosity” between the two groups thus designated, which in turn stems from (3) theconceptualisation of politics in Central Asia as located within a permanent “state ofexception”, whereby not issues, but “group interests” are perceived to be the drivingforce behind politics.
As the above anecdote about Khrushchev’s faux pas suggests, Central Asia occupied arather remote and obscure place in the ‘mental maps’ of world leaders. Even in theRussian imagination, the land conterminous with today’s Uzbekistan and Tajikistanoccupied peripheral position. Thus, in the aftermath of the Great October revolution inDecember 1917, Vladimir Lenin made an appeal to the “Muslim workers of Russia andthe East”, in which he addressed, among others, “Kyrgyz and Sarts” (Abashin, 2005).
6Both terms were Russian designations for locals and the meanings of these terms wouldundergo serious revision during the process of delimitation between 1924 and 1936, asdiscussed in Chapter 3 of this dissertation. “Kyrgyz” would be recognised as a misnomerfor “Kazakh”3 and the group formerly designated as “Kara-Kyrgyz” would be namedsimply “Kyrgyz” from then on. The “Sarts” as a category for classification of CentralAsian population would disappear altogether in 1926 (See Chapter 3 for a discussion ofthe case of “Sarts”). The people who used to be Sarts would be reclassified mainly as“Uzbeks”, although there continued to be serious doubts regarding whether “Sarts”were ‘really’ Tajiks rather than Uzbeks (Roy, 2000: 17; Bergne, 2007: 8).
We can see, therefore, that the identities in Central Asia emerged as a result of thecolonial encounter, an important part of which was the imperial power’s attempts toappropriately classify and catalogue the locals. This process was wrought due tocomplex patterns of settlement and migration, hybridity, fluidity and overlaps in theself- and other-designations used by the local populations. Since late Tsarist period tothis day, the lack of clarity regarding the exact configurations of identity and differencebetween Tajiks and Uzbeks persists.
Such ambiguity of the identity and alterity between Central Asian peoples is rooted inthe complex history of coexistence within the same territories, intermixing of culturesand economic co-dependence of the groups occupying mutually complementaryeconomic and environmental niches. The blurred boundaries between various groupsresult in resemblances in culture, language and way of life across the region.
In the Soviet ‘druzhba narodov’ [‘friendship of the peoples’] discourse Tajiks and Uzbekswere represented as brethren-peoples [bratskie narody]. Both the official diplomaticand popular discourses of Tajik-Uzbek relations make use of narratives, metaphors andphrases from this established repertoire. A good example of that is the brochureentitled O druzhbe tadzhikskogo i uzbekskogo narodov [On the Friendship between Tajikand Uzbek peoples] (Radjabov, 1968), which was dedicated to the Decade of Tajik
3 ‘Kazakh’ [or Qazaq, Kazak, Qozoq] from Turkic root for "adventurer, guerrilla, nomad", from qaz "towander" has the same root and sounds identical to the Russian ‘Cossack’ and was probably replaced with‘Kyrgyz’ to avoid confusion between these two distinct groups populating part of modern Kazakhstan(Roy 2000:7).
7culture in Uzbekistan. In the opening paragraphs the Tajik and Uzbek identity are firstconstructed as essentially the same (both in the class and ethno-folkloric understandingof the term “the people”) and then differentiated as distinct based on the linguisticprinciple:
Especially close relations have been established between Tajiks and Uzbeks. And this is notcoincidental. … Over the centuries their national traditions emerged and grew in strength. Theywore the same dress, cooked the same food, [and they] often intermarried [rodnilis’ semĭami].Their mores and customs were as close and resembled each other as much as two droplets ofwater do [kak dve kapli vody]. From the dawn of times, due to the force of the laws of historicaldevelopment [v silu istoricheskikh zakonomernosteĭ], these people spoke different languages.However, the overwhelming majority of the Tajiks of Ferghana, Samarkand, Bukhara, Leninabadknew Uzbek from early childhood. In essence both Tajik and Uzbek languages were and remainconsidered to be as native to the population of Samarkand, Bukhara, Surkhan-Darya oblasts ofUzbekistan and many regions of South-Western and Northern Tajikistan (Radjabov, 1968: 3).4The difference between Tajiks and Uzbeks is initially presented as that of linguisticnature. The following, however, draws a picture of bilingual communities interspersingthe territories of both of the republics. The similarities between Tajiks and Uzbeks areemphasised throughout the text of the brochure. To underline the genetic connectionsbetween these ethnic groups, the author quotes the Tajik poet Boki Rahim-zade(Radjabov, 1968: 9):
The centuries of a common pathHave made us relatives,“Are you a Tajik or an Uzbek?” –Sometimes people ask us.No wonder in that:We resemble,Each other like blood brothers.
Exactly thirty years later the President of independent Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov hasused those same lines to describe Tajiks and Uzbeks as closely related people. In thespeech at the official opening of the days of the Republic of Tajikistan in Uzbekistan in1998, president Karimov used similar rhetoric structures to those we find in the 1968brochure mentioned above:
The Almighty himself moulded Tajiks and Uzbek from the same clay. Our peoples have beenfriends for millennia now, they intermarry [rodnĭatsĭa], overcome difficulties together, togetherthey build their future. We drink water of the same river; on the same field we sow our seeds.We are indistinguishable neither by our names nor by our looks. In one of his ghazals in Tajiklanguage the great Alisher Navoiy wrote for a reason: “The eyes are Turkic, and the lashes are
4 Unless otherwise indicated all translations from Russian and Uzbek languages are by myself.
8Tajik”. Boki Rahimzoda was absolutely right when he said: “Hey, friend, tell me [in Tajik], are youa Tajik or an Uzbek [in Uzbek]?!” Tell me is there a need to translate this line?! …Uzbeks andTajiks – are a single people speaking two different languages. This truth has a specialsignificance today, as never before, when our people – Uzbeks and Tajiks – having achievedindependence are building their national states (Karimov, 1998).Both the propaganda piece by a Tajik scholar of the Soviet period and the speech of thepresident of independent Uzbekistan construct sameness of Tajiks and Uzbeks throughreferences to a number of traits and shared experiences. Physical appearance, geneticintermixing and geographical proximity are all cited as proofs of ‘brotherhood’. Bodyand kinship metaphors are used to talk of the closeness of the two peoples.
The 1968 brochure sites example of the selfless friendship between Uzbeks and Tajiks,for whom the common all-union interests stand above national ones: their jointrevolutionary struggle in 1916-17, the collective assault on basmachi movement duringthe 1920s, the “enormous help from the Uzbek brothers in the economic and culturaldevelopment” of Tajikistan during the time when Tajik ASSR was incorporated into theUzbek SSR (1924-1929), the transfer of some of the lands for cultivation fromUzbekistan to Tajikistan in 1959, the help in rebuilding of Tashkent after the earthquakein Tashkent in 1966 (Radjabov, 1968: 9-16).
For Karimov in 1998, however, the past history of struggles and mutual help has ananti-colonial flavour. The struggles of the common ancestors of these two people areinterpreted in his speech as their long path to independence: “Our peoples togetherfought against the conquerors, turning into Tumaris, Shirak, Spitamen, Temur Malik.5We lived through the last colonial yoke, which lasted for a century and a half, together.And here, finally, we have reached independence” (Karimov, 1998). Karimov alsomentions more recent history, focusing his attention on the Jadid movement that had amore nationalist character: “Even during the hardest years of tyranny such genuinesons of Uzbek and Tajik people as Ahmad Donish and Mahmudhoja Behbudi, AbdullaKodiri and Sadriddin Ayni, Abdulhamid Chulpan and Abdurauf Fitrat fought a commonstruggle for the ideals of enlightenment in friendship and cooperation” (Karimov 1998).Chapter 4 looks more closely at how historiographic repertoires in the post-independence period built on the Soviet discourses, practices while revising history to
5 Historical personalities in Central Asian history, who opposed various foreign invasions of the region,and were identified as “freedom-fighters” both in Soviet and post-Soviet history writing,
9retrospectively narrate sovereign statehood as an inevitable outcome of a teleologicalcourse of historical evolution.
‘Ethnic animosity’: ‘Tajik’ and ‘Uzbek’ as binary opposites
Despite the lack of certainty of the differences between the two identities, Khrushchevintuitively juxtaposes Tajik to Uzbek, they are automatically conceived of as antipodes.Indeed, although the shared cultural heritage made the task of separating what is ‘Tajik’from what is ‘Uzbek’ very difficult in the early years of the Soviet rule in the region(Sengupta, 2003; Bergne, 2007: 126), Tajikness and Uzbekness emerged as conditionsof being of one another, precisely because ultimately the differences between the twoare undeterminable.
The notion of antagonism between Tajiks and Uzbeks, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan has notabated in significance with the acquisition of independence by the Central Asian statesin 1991 (Jonson, 2006: 108; Schoeberlein, 1994; Rubin, 1994). On the contrary,observers of Central Asian politics, journalists and politicians alike, have pointed out thepersisting conflict between these two states, a regional ‘cold war’ that has many a timeresulted in crises in Tajik-Uzbek relations. Many trace this conflict to a primordialcondition of Manichean antagonism between the “indigenous” Persian-speaking settledpopulations and the waves of invasions of the nomadic Turko-Mongol tribes. The‘working paper’ that was written in preparation for the national territorial delimitationof the region in 1920s sums up this narrative very well:
The Tajiks are the only people [in Central Asia] of Iranian origin, who since time immemorialhave been living in the frontiers of Bukhara and the Turkestan Autonomous Soviet SocialistRepublic ... The conquering Turkic peoples enslaved them. Part of them became totallyTurkicised and adopted the language of their conquerors, while the rest, although they kept theirlanguage, took refuge in the mountainous regions of Samarkand oblast’ and Bukhara, and in thevalleys of the mountain rivers and the basin of the Syr Darya and the Zerafshan where they weredriven by their conquerors (quoted in Bergne, 2007: 3).The thesis of the centuries-old standoff between the Turkic and Iranian peoples, whichin the modern conditions translates into the conflict between Tajiks and Uzbek is rathercommon in the expert accounts of the region. This narrative has become dominant inthe Tajik historiography (Ya’qubov, 2001; Hakimov, 2005; Khojaev, 2002; Nabieva &Zikriyoev, 2001; Masov, 1991, 1995, and 2003) and among some Western scholars’
10
(Rakowska-Harmstone, 1970; Bashiri, 1998). Sovietologists during the Cold War periodfollow the Soviet narrative by identifying the racial differences between the two groups,although when confronted with racial ambiguity, the defining principle becomes thelinguistic practice, as this quote demonstrates:
The indigenous people of the area are the Iranian Tadzhiks, considered to be the most ancientracial group in Central Asia. The mountain Tadzhiks ...represent an almost pure ancient Iranianstock. Some non-Iranian admixture is found among the Galcha – the Tadzhiks of the Darwaz andKarategin mountains. The Tadzhiks of the plains, who mixed freely with numerous invaders,have many Mongoloid racial features and are frequently indistinguishable in physical type fromthe Turkic-speaking Uzbeks, their Iranian language alone marking them as Tadzhiks. Anineteenth-century traveller in Bukhara characterised the Tadzhiks as handsome, polished,intelligent, accommodating, and willing to adjust to rule by a superior force, a judgement thatappears to hold true also modern circumstances. Relations between the Uzbeks and the Tadzhikshave traditionally been hostile because the former ruled the country before the revolution,treating the Tadzhik subjects with cruelty and contempt. (Rakowska-Harmstone, 1970: 8- 9).A lot of commentators go even further back in history to find “the ancient roots of whathas been projected as a Tajik-Uzbek tension” (Chatterjee, 2002: 23). Iraj Bashiri (1998)quoting Ghafurov (1972), for instance, finds the roots of the 1990s conflict in Tajikistanin the events that took place in the Tenth Century during the reign of the Samaniddynasty in the region, or even further in the mists of antiquity projected onto the epicstruggle between Turan and Iran in Firdausi’s Shahname [Book of Kings].
Sometimes, the theories of the antagonism between the Turkic and the Iranian peoplesare compounded with the discussions of whom the Russian imperialist administrationand Orientalists favoured after the conquest of the region. While there was a normativeracial preference for peoples considered descendants of ‘Aryans’ among Russiananthropologists (Laruelle, 2007), the ‘Uzbeks’ were considered the most importantnationality in the region (Allworth, 1990). Most analysts agree that Uzbekistanemerged as the winner from the process of national territorial delimitation (Masov,1991; Haugen, 2003). The great ancient cultural centres of Samarkand and Bukhara, aswell as the colonial capital Tashkent were included in Uzbekistan despite those citiesbeing disputed by Tajikistan and Kazakhstan respectively. However, Edward Allworth(1990) saw the strategy of division of the region as an essentially anti-Uzbek policysince it prevented the integrative processes in the region driven by the assimilativeforce of ‘Uzbek’ identity.
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Moreover, this discussion is even carried into the expert analysis of the causes anddynamics of the civil conflict in Tajikistan in 1990s.6 Sometimes the role of the Uzbekminority, as a group with distinct interests, which identifies with the ethnic homelandacross the border more than with Dushanbe, is assumed to be self-evident within suchanalyses. Statistics on the numbers of ethnic Uzbeks in Tajikistan and ethic Tajiks inUzbekistan are quoted, implying that ‘Tajiks’ and ‘Uzbeks’ living across the areessentially the same as their ‘co-ethnics’ in the eponymous states, identify with their‘homelands’ and share a political agenda. While the Tajik nationalists do expressconcern regarding treatment of ‘Tajiks’ in Uzbekistan -- many of whom the Tajikgovernment believes have been forced to register as Uzbeks and assimilate into theUzbek culture -- numerous anthropological studies and personal anecdotes show thatTajik or Farsi-speakers in Uzbekistan do not always identify themselves as ‘Tajik’. Thus,for instance, Schoeberlein (1994) writes that most of the Tajik-speakers in Samarkand,call themselves as Uzbeks, referring to their “dress, lifestyle, and so on as ‘Uzbekcustoms’”. Although the authorities often have registered Tajik-speakers as ‘Uzbeks’against individuals’ will or without their knowledge, resulting in different members of afamily being registered as belonging to different nationalities, this contradiction isconsidered to be ”a matter of amusement at most, and more often of completeinsignificance” (Schoeberlein, 1994: 122). When asked to identify themselves outsidethe reference of the Soviet grid of nationalities, Tajik-speaking people of Uzbekistanoften first of all identify as ‘Samarkandi’ or ‘Bukhari’. One therefore should take thestatistics of ‘minority’ populations in Central Asia with a healthy dose of scepticism.7
6 Tajik civil war lasted from May 1992 till June 1997, with the most intense fighting taking place withinthe first year. It is estimated that between 50,000 and 100,000 people died as casualties of war andaround 1.2 m were displaced.7 According to the last Soviet census conducted in 1989, ‘Uzbeks’ constituted 23.52% (1,197,841 people),while the percentage of Tajiks was estimated at 62.29 (3,172,200 people) in Tajikistan. In Uzbekistan,Tajiks only accounted for 4.7% of the total population, with Uzbeks constituting 71.4 % (GoskomstatSSSR, 1990). The data on Tajiks in Uzbekistan has been contested by Tajik nationalists, who argue that theactual ratio is closer to 40% (Usmonov 2006: 12). In 1997 the CIA World Factbook estimated thepercentages of Tajik and Uzbek minorities in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan respectively to remain the same,while the titular nations share rose by 4-5 %. Olivier Ferrando writes that data on ethnic composition ofthe population is virtually non-existent in Uzbekistan, as it is the only former Soviet republics that has notconducted a census since independence and where statistics are treated as a state secret. Tajikistanundertook a census in January 2000, using the census forms identical to the ones used in the last Sovietcensus of 1989. However, the internal administrative borders of the regions within the republic havebeen reorganised, which affected the ethnic groups’ ratios within the administrative units. Moreover, theauthorities reinstituted the groups formerly subsumed under the designation of ‘Uzbek’ as officiallyrecognised and accepted ‘nationalities’, while keeping the Eastern Iranian groups of Pamiris within the
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Moreover, any assumptions of a shared ‘group interests’ of the diaspora populationacross the border is not founded in any evidence. In fact, the research of Uzbekminority in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan has demonstrated a lack of interest let alone aclearly articulated policy in regard to the ‘co-ethnics’ abroad (Fumagalli, 2006, 2007).
Despite this, Uzbekistan’s involvement in the Tajik civil war is often discussed in termsof such essential unity of ‘Uzbeks’ across the republics’ borders. At the same time somegroups within Tajikistan are described as Uzbekicised and therefore loyal to Uzbekistan.Sergei Abashin rightly points out that an expert discourse has emerged that analyses theroots and dynamics of the conflict in Tajikistan which calls on an ethnicised conceptionof regionalism as its central component (Abashin, 2007: 234-235). Within this discourseall cultural and social differences attributed to the opposing groups within the conflictwere correlated with ‘sub-ethnic’ underpinnings. Tashkent is therefore depicted asexerting influence by supporting “its own”, Uzbekicised region of Leninabad/Khujandwithin Tajikistan, which despite being populated by majority Uzbek-speaker, wastransferred to Tajikistan in the final delimitation in 1929. Khujand geographically andeconomically is more integrated with Uzbekistan than with Tajikistan, while elites fromKhujand were in power for most of the Soviet period. It is assumed that the Khujandielites were loyal to Uzbekistan and even declared of their intention to secede andpossibly join Uzbekistan in 1996 (Martin, 1997).
Much is made in the analysis of the civil war dynamics of presumably Uzbek ethnicity ofthe Popular Front leaders (Safarali Kenjaev, Faizali Saidov, Mahmud Khudoberdiev andIbod Boymatov) and their links to Uzbekistan (Horsman, 1999: 41; Nourzhanov 2005:115). In her analysis of the images of the Other in Tajik literature across three decades(1970-1990s), Anaita Khudonazar, uses kinship metaphors to refer to three others8 --former colonial master (Russia), neighbouring state (Uzbekistan) and the internal other(Khujand):
designation ‘Tajik’. As a result 1.3% of population (nearly 80,000 people) were reidentified, whichcontributed, but did not entirely determine the decrease in the share of population designated as ‘Uzbek’in Tajikistan by –8.2% (15.3%) compared to 1989 census (Ferrando 2008: 491-497).8 Blakkisrud and Nozimova talk of three others that stand in opposition to the Tajik self that emerged outof their comparative analysis between Soviet and post-Soviet history textbooks in Tajikistan –‘constituting other’ of the Uzbeks, the internalised other of ‘the external self’ of Russian/Soviet identity,and the ‘internal other’ of Islam, which is seen as a threat and largely ignored in history textbook writingof post-Soviet Tajikistan (2010: 175).
13
Russia was seen as both a motherly figure and an evil step-mother. Russia had establishedTajikistan as a state and nourished it socially and economically, but at the same time it haddeformed its identity. Uzbekistan was portrayed as the evil step-father because of thedemarcation during the 1920s and the loss of Samarqand and Bukhara. Khujand was seen as ahalf-brother because it monopolized political power in Tajikistan and imposed its half-Uzbek,half-Tajik culture upon other regions of Tajikistan (Khudonazar, 2004: 20).Although Uzbekistan’s support helped install Emomali Rahmonov as the president, thatbackingwasreportedlywithdrawn when in 1993 he initiated the process of“Kulyabisation” of Tajik politics (Akiner, 2001: 64-66). Uzbekistan plays the role of a‘big brother’ to Tajikistan in this discourse. It is believed to secretly and openlyinterfere into the internal affairs, to exert pressure on Tajikistan by exploiting itsstructural energy and economic dependence on Uzbekistan’s infrastructure andresources (Jonson, 2006: 112-13). It is also reported that Uzbekistan supported localwarlords of Uzbek ethnicity (Mahmud Khudoberdiev) in their revolt againstRahmonov’s power. Many analysts believe that Karimov felt threatened by the power-sharing deal of the Tajik General Peace Accord of 1997 that incorporated the UnitedTajik Opposition into the government structures (Horseman, 1999: 42).9
In Uzbek official discourse, Tajikistan became the site of danger, the source of conflict,drugs and religious extremism in the region (Horsman, 1999: 43; Megoran 2004). InMarch 1998, when several religious leaders in Uzbekistan were arrested as allegedIslamic radicals, Karimov was reported to have said: “They want to turn Uzbekistan intoa second Tajikistan. Such people must be shot in their heads. If necessary, I will shootthem myself, if you lack the resolve” (RFE/RL Newsline 1998, May 4). After thebombings in Tashkent in February 1999, of which the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan(IMU) and Juma Namangani were accused of orchestrating, Uzbekistan closed its borderwith Tajikistan alleging the connection existed between the neighbour and the terroristattacks (Gayeva & Chubchenko 1999, February 26).
The theme of the Uzbek intervention into Tajik politics is the echo of the history ofperceived violence and injustice caused by the separation of “Tajiks” in Bukhara andSamarkand from the Tajik state in 1920s. The narrative of the loss of the ethnic
9 For instance, the minister of emergency situations Mirzo Ziyoev allegedly had a close connection withJuma Namangani, the leader of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). The two men are believed tohad fought alongside one another during the civil war and Ziyoev was even said to be married to arelative of Namangani (Rashid 2002).
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homeland is transposed to modern days. The theme of Uzbek aggression andmalevolence is necessarily accompanied by the themes of betrayal and the search for“true” ethnic roots of individuals and groups (Abashin, 2007: 205). The dominant Tajiknarrative of Uzbek desire to prevent the materialisation of a Tajik state and the betrayalof the Tajik cause by intellectuals suffering from a ‘false national consciousness’ is mostvividly expressed in the works by Rahim Masov. His writing since the publication of
Istoriĭa topornogo razdela [History of Crude Division] in 1991 has become the voice ofresentment towards Uzbekistan within the official Tajik discourse, echoed in post-independence history textbooks and popular discourse (Hakimov 2005, Khojaev 2002,Muhtorov 2000, Nabieva & Zikriyoev 2001, 2006, Ya’qubov 2001).
One can summarize Masov’s theses in the following key points. The Great OctoberRevolution of the Bolshevik party that took place in 1917 was the greatest event in thehistory of Tajik people. While the project of the national territorial delimitation wasjustified and necessary, what the Bolsheviks envisaged did not translate into reality.Many fatal mistakes were made in large part due to careerism and lack of national self-consciousness of Tajiks themselves, who were “poisoned” by the venom of Pan-Turkism.The Pan-Turkists (or “Great Uzbek chauvinists”) initiated “in essence, genocide of Tajikpeople” (Masov, 1991: 11). Uzbeks (Turks) pushed Tajiks into the mountainous parts ofthe region, assimilated them [Tajiks], took their lands away, appropriated their cultureand achievements, and destroyed “Historical Tajikistan” (which includes territoriescurrently included in Uzbekistan). In the 1920s Uzbeks tried to prevent the emergenceof Tajik statehood by all means. Tajiks within Uzbekistan were subjected to a process ofassimilation, which was “very dangerous” and amounted to “overt [neprikrytyĭ]genocide” (77). Even though there were no mass killings, i.e. no genocide in theconventional sense of the word, it was still a genocide “not physical, but documentary”,as a result of which “Tajiks as people no longer existed in Uzbekistan” (78). The imageof the enemy for Masov, therefore, appears in the form of the Turkic/Uzbek other,rather than the former colonial master.
Although the works of Masov are dedicated to the modern history (1920s), hecontinuously makes references to the ancient struggle between the Turks (i.e. Uzbeks)and the Iranian (Tajik) population in the region. Masov proclaims the pure and ancient
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ethnic essence of the Tajiks. Thus mentioning of “Tajik people” is almost invariablyqualified by “the most ancient indigenous people of Central Asia”. He quotes severalRussian anthropologists and historians, who wrote that Tajiks are of “pure Aryan stock”,and himself makes a note of the racial difference between the Tajiks and the rest of thepopulation in the region, saying that Tajiks “have more in common with the Slavic andthe Indo-European peoples rather than with Turks” (23). This naturalization, evenbiologisation of Tajik and Uzbek identities together with the denial of existence of ahybrid identity is what gives rise to the discourse of genocide that is most evident inMasov’s works (1991, 1995). This line of thinking finds its most radical and even absurdexpression in the book Zalozhniki imperii [Hostages of the Empire] by a midwife-gynecologist Sa’dinisso Hakimova (1998).10 Such facile explanation of ethnic animosityarising from the ‘ancient hatreds’ is highly problematic and does not produce muchinsight into the politics of the region’s states today.
Table 1. 1. Binary opposites and hybridity in dominant articulations of Tajik/Uzbek identities
Designation Tajik Sart Uzbek
Language/Heritage Iranian/Farsi/Tojiki Bilingual /Mixed Turkic/Chaghatay/O’zbek
‘Race’/phenotype ‘Europeoid’ /White ‘Metis’ (MixedEuropeoid andMongoloid) Mongoloid/’Asian’
Traditional/
historic lifestyle
Always beensettled, Populationmigrations, Nomads, invaders, non-indigenous conquerors
10 During her exile in Tehran, based on many years of experience of work in midwifery in Tajikistan,Hakimova wrote a book which is an indictment of the healthcare system in Soviet Central Asia. Accordingto her, in order to fix the statistical data, the midwives practiced “writing-off of stillborn and prematurelyborn infants as miscarriages”.This was allegedly done in order to keep the deaths in childbirth and infantmortality rates low. The midwives were overwhelmingly women of “European nationalities” (i.e. German,Russian or Ukranian), which was not a coincidence, according to Hakimova. In her understanding thisamounted to the “systematic (planomernoe) annihilation of Tajik ethnos, which especially took up an“extraordinary scale and scope in Uzbekistan, which is mainly populated by Tajiks”, and in Tajikistanitself during the post-war years with the silent support of the Central Committee of the Communist Partyof the Soviet Union (CC CPSU) and the Union government”(Hakimova 1998: 2). Hakimova does notmention if similar practices existed in Uzbekistan in cases with Uzbek women giving birth, neither doesshe recognize this as a practice common to the entire region (which had the highest birth rates in theUSSR and had the worst medical care system, especially maternity care). In the preface to the book,Hakimova gives an account of the Tajik refugees during the civil war trying to cross the Pianj river toenter the Afghan territory and slaughtered by the Uzbek military. She then proceeds to retell Masov’sthesis of assimilation of Uzbekistan’s Tajiks from which she then makes a mental leap to alleged‘genocide’ of Tajik infants in Uzbekistan.
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autochthonous,most ancientindigenous people sedentarisationof formernomads, semi-nomadicexistence
Relation to ‘high’
culture
Bearers of ‘highculture’ Culturalhybridity Looters andappropriators/usurpersof Tajik cultural heritage
Regional
differences
‘Pure’ Iranianstock (includingpeoples of Pamir). Tajiks of theplains,Khujandis,Samarkandi,Bukhari people
Exclusively Uzbek-speaking population
Current state of Tajik-Uzbek relations
It is still quite common for the official diplomatic discussion of the mutual relations tobe ritualistically prefixed by mentioning the ‘centuries-long’ good neighborly relations,cultural and kinship ties between the two nations. This discourse remains unchangedfrom the Soviet times and finds it final expression in the “Treaty of Eternal Friendship”signed between the two states in 2000.11
The relations between the two states, however, are quite far from the idyllic state of“eternal friendship”. Tajikistan’s economy depends heavily on Uzbek infrastructure, afact that is often exploited by Uzbekistan. Part of Tajikistan, Khujand, has more tieseconomically and infra-structurally to Uzbekistan than Tajikistan. During Soviet times itwas the hub for the region’s transport routes. Nowadays this is no longer the case, asthe transport web crosses the state borders, which the Uzbek side polices. Tajikistan iscompletely dependent on Uzbekistan for railroad links (Jonson, 2006: 115). Some of themeasures that Uzbekistan introduced to the railroads have led to a complete standstillon several stretches of Tajik railroad.12 More recently, the crisis in Tajik-Uzbekrelations escalated over the dispute over water management regimes, whereby
11 Previously, on 10 January 1997, the “Treaty of eternal friendship between the Republic of Kazakhstan,the Kyrgyz Republic and the Republic of Uzbekistan” was signed in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan.12 For instance, in March 2010, Tajik ministry of foreign affairs protested against delays of goods destinedfor Tajikistan in Uzbekistan’s territory. Foreign Ministry spokesman Davlat Nazriev said some 1,000freight cars were being held up at the Khavos, Qarshi, Jayron, and Kudukli stations in Uzbekistan (RFE/RLreport, March 23, 2010).
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Uzbekistan has been exerting pressure on Tajikistan by stopping the Tajik railroadfreight passing through Uzbek territory in order to delay the construction of the Roghundam in Tajikistan (This will be analysed in Chapter 5). Similar dependence exists in thehighway connection, as Tajikistan still lacks a year-round link between its northern andsouthern provinces. When Uzbekistan blocks connecting roads, parts of the countrybecome isolated from the rest of Tajikistan.
The border regime between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan is highly restrictive to trade andtravel. The checks on the posts are often humiliating, the procedures unnecessarilybureaucratized and long. Commercial freight is taxed both formally and informallywhile people are subjected to arbitrary denial of passage, prohibitive visa requirements,extortion and bodily searches (Reeves, 2005). The enforcement of this draconianborder regime followed the 1999 explosions in Tashkent.13 In 1999 Uzbekistan closedthe border posts, introduced a visa regime, increased tariffs and taxes on goods intransit, and mined the border with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in the Ferghana Valley.The mining in effect constitutes an invisible but a very tangible border as there has beenno formal demarcation of it. The mines have caused many civilian deaths and continueto do so. There have also been incidents of people being shot at the Tajik-Uzbek borderas well as a series of alleged espionage scandals. The posturing at the border along withthe discourse of danger is part of the ‘work’ of performing state sovereignty wherebythe spatial and moral boundary is drawn between the self located on the safe, stable andpeaceful inside and the other situated within the dangerous, volatile and violent outside(Megoran, 2004; Aalto, 2003). In Chapter 5 of this thesis I look at another case ofspatial sovereignty performance through the case of the dispute concerning themechanisms of water distribution for energy production and agricultural uses acrossthe border. This is a case of complex dependencies existing between the two states that
13 On 16 February 1999, six bombs exploded in Tashkent, killing sixteen people and injuring more thanone hundred. The attack, which targeted key government buildings, apparently was an assassinationattempt on the president and members of the cabinet of ministers. Very soon after the attack it wasannounced that the militants of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), under the leadership of TohirYuldash, and Juma Namangani were responsible for the explosions. Later, the Uzbek authorities expandedtheir list of suspects to include Muhammad Solih, leader of the opposition Erk (Freedom) Party, who haslived in exile since 1993. All three men were accused of conspiring to forcibly take over the government(Rashid 2002: 149-150).
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come into conflict with the demands of sovereignisation and nationalisation of the newstates and their increased integration into the global markets.
In a way, this dissertation contributes to the discussions of Tajik/Uzbek divide.However, the differences between the two are not seen as inevitable consequences ofessentialised ancient identities. This study of sovereignty in post-Soviet Central Asia isfocused on the Tajik-Uzbek interactions because it is within such ‘encounters’ that‘identity’ is spoken of in the most radical terms. Such articulations of ‘identity’ inrespect to ‘national interests’ and ‘security’ concerns provide us with the necessaryinsights into the location of the legitimate authority and the sources of the claim to theright to existence as an independent state, as understood by the local actors. In theattempt to understand how these two states’ representatives have been asserting theircountry’s sovereignty, the thesis looks at how sovereignty is performed, impersonatedand embodied by the people claiming to speak on behalf the state. Sovereignty is thusmade real through discourses and practices of state’s ‘spokespeople’.
‘Exceptional’ politics: dealing with independence, asserting sovereignty
The Central Asian states present a curious case of decolonisation that was imposed fromthe metropolis rather than fought for and won by the nationalist liberation forces in theperiphery. It has therefore become somewhat of a conventional wisdom in Westernscholarship and popular accounts of Central Asian states’ independence to emphasisetheir unpreparedness for independent statehood, particularly in case ofTajikistan(Olcott, 1996: 120-128; Rubin, 1994: 18; Horsman, 1999: 37; Olimov &Bushkov, 1998: 20). However, as I have argued elsewhere (Suyarkulova in Cummings &Hinnebusch, forthcoming), Central Asian states were not completely devoid of agency inthe process of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The conceptions of ‘sovereignty’advocated by the region’s elites were aligned with the more conservative, pro-Unionforces within the Soviet political scene in the last years of perestroika. Immediatelybefore the dissolution of the USSR the exact meaning of “sovereignty” was negotiatedbetween Moscow and the union republics as well as within the Russian Federationitself. The many different uses of the word in the political discourse during that period
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included among others: sovereignty as decentralisation and greater autonomy; as aright to positive affirmation of federal legislation; as a right to pre-emptive legislation;fiscal autonomy; a ‘single channel’ tax system; property claims; other forms of‘economic sovereignty’; a right to negotiate bilateral power-sharing treaties with thefederal government; a right to determine collective powers delegated to the federalgovernment; a unilateral right to determine powers delegated to the federalgovernment; a right to secession in accordance with federal law; a unilateral right ofsecession; as recognition of being ‘a subject of international law’; full independenceunder international law’; freedom of action for independent state (Walker, 2003: 7).
In Central Asia, ‘sovereignty’ was cautiously used in the more acceptable sense ofgreater autonomy in the matters of local, cultural, economic, and environmentalmanagement, although some voices within oppositional parties spoke of fullindependence (Suyarkulova, forthcoming). The meanings of ‘sovereignty’ were in aconstant flux within the last years of the existence of the USSR. For example, after thefailed coup attempt in August 1991 there was no going back to the meaning ofsovereignty agreed upon before and stakes were raised to radicalise the definition. Thisperiod was characterised by ‘multiple sovereignties’. Central Asian republics startedinsisting on a looser version of the USSR, debating the differences between a ‘unionstate’ and a ‘union of states’, between a federation and a confederation – all these subtledifferences obscuring the meaning of ‘sovereignty’ within the union even further. Forexample, Kyrgyzstani president Askar Akayev was advocating for the future union to bea ‘synthesis of all the principles of both federalism and confederalism’, which should bepossible to adopt ‘on the principle of community’ like that found in Europe, possiblystyled after the British Commonwealth (Zherebenkov 1991, August 26).
In sum, to say that Central Asian states were ‘catapulted’ into independence, or becamesovereign ‘by default’ (Olcott 1992, 1998) is to underestimate the degree of agency thatCentral Asians had in the process of negotiating greater autonomy from the ‘Centre’.Such narratives of the Central Asian states’ path to independence subtly underminetheir right to existence; deny their claim to subject-hood within the internationalsystem. Such discourse is carried on into the post-independence era, when the CentralAsian states’ sovereignty is discussed in terms of deficiency, departure from the ideal-
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form, precariousness and immaturity. It is often asserted that the region’s states werenot prepared for independence, that they lack the objective trapping of sovereignty, thatthey are marked by ‘Soviet legacy’ of incongruence between ‘identity’ and politicalboundaries (Glenn 1999). These accounts are consistent with the Sovietological notionsof the all-powerful ‘Centre’ and the conception of the USSR as an evil empire that was atonce a ‘prison of nation’ and a malevolent manufacturer of nations ‘to makeindependent statehood’ impossible (see Chapter 3).
It has become common to view the post-independence politics in Central Asia in termsof competing ‘levels’ of identity. A common ‘national’ identity is normatively upheld asthe desired outcome of state-building project (Akbarzadeh, 1996). The nationalidentity, however, in such analyses has to compete with sub-national and supra-nationalidentities (Glenn, 1999). It is agreed that the Soviet project of nation-building in CentralAsia has largely failed and the persistence of alternative regional, ‘tribal’, or ‘clan’identities is cited as a proof of that (Edgar, 2004; Schatz, 2005; Collins, 2006). Thus,Kathleen Collins, for example explains politics in Central Asia in terms of ‘clan politics’,understood as “politics organised by and around informal identity networks commonlyknown as clans”, whereby people “strongly identify with their local clan networks, notwith parties, not with ethnic groups, and certainly not with either the democraticopposition or the state” (Collins, 2006: 1). Politics in Central Asia, therefore, stands inopposition to ‘normal’ politics driven by ‘real’ issues debated within anonymousinstitutions of party politics, and civil movements. The politics of ‘tribalism’, ‘clanism’,‘regionalism’, ‘ethnic animosity’ or any other ‘identity politics’ (such as ‘pan-Islamism’or ‘pan-Turkism’), on the other hand, function within the logic of assumed culturalloyalty taking precedence over ‘real’ political issues. Central Asia is found within thezone of permanent ‘state of exception’, as is the rest of non-Western world (Agamben,2005; also, see discussion on post-colonial sovereignty in Chapter 2).
In the case of Tajik-Uzbek relations the ‘exceptional politics’ discourse merges thenarratives of ‘regionalism’, ‘clanism’, ‘localism’ [mestnichstvo (Rus); mahalgaroi (Taj);
mahallachilik (Uzb)] with ‘ethnic animosity’ superimposed onto the ‘regional’, ’tribal’,and ’clan’ identity. The inter-Tajik conflict is analysed in terms of regionalism and ethnicanimosity, rather than as a real ideological struggle over the optimal form of
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government. The period between 1989 and 1991 was probably the highest point ofpolitical pluralism in Central Asia. However, the democratic aspirations of the CentralAsian people are subsumed under the discourse of ‘identity politics’.
This kind of explanations of Central Asian politics is objectionable for many reasons.First of all, they are based on the stereotype of some societies as primitive, backward,and irrational, and therefore found in the global ‘state of exception’. Second, thereferences to ancient (or modern) clan, tribal or ethnic animosities do not in fact explainanything. They present us with a theoretical dead-end in that they cannot account forhow conflicts actually arise, escalate and are resolved or how ‘normal’, everyday politicsfunction in Central Asia. Finally, they present an essentialised and a static concept ofidentity, implying that ‘identity groups’ constitute coherent entities, acting out of‘objective’ self-interests in pursuit of power and access to resources (on personificationof political entities read in Chapter 2).
Structure of the dissertation
This dissertation is organised both chronologically and thematically. Chapter 2 outlinesthe theoretical and conceptual framework of the present enquiry as well as discussesthe methodological approach of this study. Chapters 3 and 4 present a historicalnarrative of two periods of state-creation in Central Asia, focusing on the jointemergence of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Chapter 4 examines history-writing as adialogic state-building practice before and after independence. Chapter 5 then switchesfrom the historical dimension of the study to the analysis of geopolitical articulations ofsovereignty through a case study of a controversy surrounding the construction of theRoghun hydropower plant in Tajikistan.
Chapter 2 of this dissertation explores theoretical meanings of sovereignty, itsapplications to the colonial and post-colonial statehood, and applicability of thoseconceptions to the post-Soviet states. Based on the ideas of Jacque Derrida, JeanBaudrillard and Cynthia Weber, I offer a metaphor for sovereignty based on thetopological shape of a Möbius strip, a paradoxical one-sided surface with only one
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boundary folding in on itself. The second chapter further discusses the ontological andepistemological assumptions of the dissertation through the discussion of themethodology of the enquiry that has led to its production. The method of discourseanalysis is discussed in brief. This dissertation uses a combination of various discourseanalytic tools. The central philosophy of the enquiry is to explore relations betweentwo states through their interaction rather than a one-sided process of representationof the self (usually a more powerful actor/group of actors) in relation and opposition tothe other (usually the weaker one). The method used in this thesis is a dialogicapproach of analysing ‘discursive encounters’ between actors speaking on behalf ofTajikistan and Uzbekistan. As part of the process of discursive encounter analysis(DEA) such methods as metaphor, narrative and predicate analysis, as well as dialogicalanalysis were utilised.
The rationale behind the choice of the combination of these methods is that any identityconstruction is found in the social dialogic process of negotiation and sanctions of thecompeting narratives of the self, which depend heavily on reception and acceptance bythe ‘audience’/the other. The construction of the self depends on the successful use ofdiscursive strategies which allow the speaker to advance a desired identity forthemselves and resist the negative, undesired constructions offered by others. Thisexplains why the same events are talked of differently by different actors, and also whythe same actors may choose to narrate the same events differently in different contexts.
The methodology appendix further offers the ‘narrative’ of the research process bydisclosing the personal connection of the author to the subject matter, the fieldworkencounters and why the particular case studies were chosen. The use ofautoethnography as a means of more transparent and self-aware authoring is suggestedas a potentially productive way for understanding the International Relationsscholarship has been constructed through a combination of institutional arrangements,norms and expectations and the unique experiences of each researcher.
The third chapter provides a narrative of the emergence of the current states ofTajikistan and Uzbekistan in 1920-1930s. Far from a comprehensive account of theregion’s history, this chapter is a brief overview of the diverse, hybrid and ambiguous
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identities from tsarist Russia’s colonisation of the region till the emergence ofindependent states of Central Asia in 1991. The complex intertwining of history ofPersian and Turkic speaking peoples in the region, the imperial encounter and theSoviet state and nation-making endeavour of the Marxist ‘civilising mission’ provide thecontext for all post-independence interactions between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Ifone were to use the body metaphor, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan were born in theircurrent borders in 1920s as conjoined twins. The twins were separated in 1924 withthe promotion of Tajikistan to the SSR status. However, the ‘birth trauma’ and the painof separation has left the Tajik state crippled by the longing for the lost territories(“phantom limb” syndrome), perceived as the ‘heart’ of regional Persian culture andsymbolic of past glory, sovereignty and heritage of statehood.
The purpose of the chapter is not to provide the ‘correct’ version of history of the regionand the peoples populating it, but to explore the ambiguity, hybridity and multiplicity ofidentities behind the labels of Tajik and Uzbek. The goal here is the problematisation ofthe facile labels justifying the existence of titular states containing eponymous peoplesdefined in terms of ethnicity. It is the ambiguity of where the ‘Tajik’ identity ends and‘Uzbek’ one begins that is behind the discursive encounters discussed inChapters Fourand Five. In the Möbius strip of identity/difference to be Uzbek means not to be Tajikand vice versa, but there is no ultimate signified on the other side of the ribbon, as thereis no other side. The background provided in this chapter is essential for understandingthe discursive encounter analysis undertaken in the following chapter.
The fourth chapter presents the first case study, the discursive encounter aroundhistorical narratives produced by actors speaking on behalf of the nation and state inTajikistan and Uzbekistan. Historiography is understood here as the process of self-identity construction by historians, politicians and ‘lay’ people through narrative ofnation and statehood. This process is akin to ‘biographical narratives’ by means ofwhich people construct a coherent and continuous sense of self. Various texts, includinghistory textbooks, official speeches, as well as monuments, images, and internet fora areanalysed within dialogical framework to see how competing narratives are advanced byvarious actors to make statements about the racial supremacy and cultural superiority,make territorial claims and to justify the very right to existence of the current nation-
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states. Various repertoires and discursive dialogic strategies are utilised to assert one’sclaim to sovereignty in its territorial, existential and moral dimensions. We find,therefore, that the narrative of Tajik history deeply depends on the Uzbek other for theconstruction of the self and vice versa. The two narratives are in constant dialogue andthe process of negotiation whereby each actor’s goal is to present an optimalrepresentation of their social self to the interlocutor and other possible audiences, tojustify one’s actions, and to resist negative representations of the self by others. WhileTajikistan’s history is essentially a history of an imagined ethnic community,Uzbekistan’s historical narrative is based on the attachment to a particular territory,defined by the boundaries created in the 1920-30s delimitation of the Soviet Socialistrepublics. These two radical narratives of the same events, peoples and territoriesillustrate differing sources of sovereignty in the two states, irreconcilable on the currentterms of discourse, yet fundamentally interdependent.
The fifth chapter shifts our attention from the temporal (narrative identity over time) tospatial (geopolitics of water use) articulation of sovereignty in Tajik-Uzbek dialogicinteractions. In that chapter we look at the ongoing controversy between Tajik andUzbek governments and expert communities over the plans of the Tajik government toresume the construction of the Roghun hydropower project (HPP) on the Vakhsh River,to which the Uzbek government vehemently objects. This case study examines concretedialogic strategies and moves that each side’s actors take to assert their sovereignty.Despite it being called ‘discursive encounter analysis’, there is an important aspect ofinteraction implied in the concept of ‘dialogic’ identity construction. Both sides engagein a series of dialogic moves constrained by their overall purpose and general context.Within that dialogue, previous statements of the interlocutors are reflected and thefuture moves are anticipated. The dialogic moves are accompanied by what I call‘sovereign acts’ – moves aimed at asserting sovereignty – which can be manifested inpopular mobilisation in protests against the construction of the hydropower plant, saleand purchase of shares, stopping of the railroad traffic of the goods destined for theRoghun and the Tajik Aluminium Plant (TALCO), exchange of diplomatic notes ofprotests and refusal to attend regional leaders’ forum. All these dialogic interactionsultimately pursue three strategic goals. First, they aim to advance a positiverepresentation of the self and negative portrayal of the other. Secondly, they want to
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resist the negative portrayal of the self by the other. Finally, they attempt to influencethe opinions of relevant onlookers/audiences, to add to their prestige and establishfavourable relations of power. Ultimately, each state sees the stake in their debate overRoghun to be their status as sovereign states via notions of territoriality, security andidentity.
The final chapter concludes the dissertation by summarising the main findings,discussing theoretical and methodological limitations of the approach taken andexploring potential implications of this thesis for the broader field of InternationalRelations. To conclude, this chapter has introduced briefly the thesis topic and thereasons for choosing it, main research questions and the purpose of the study, summaryof the main existing views and conventional wisdoms about the subject and how thisthesis engages with these views. The following chapter discusses the main intellectualapproaches and methods of analysis employed in this thesis.
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Chapter Two
Sovereignty as Dialogue
This chapter presents theoretical and conceptual frameworks guiding the subsequentanalysis as well as introduce the methodological approach and overall research designof the study. First, the historical emergence and evolution of the meanings of theconcept of ‘sovereignty’ is introduced briefly. The discussion then progresses into thedefinition of sovereignty as exception and the analysis of post-colonial sovereignty asthe double exception from the international rule of ‘real’ sovereignty. Second, the“Möbius strip of sovereignty” conceptual framework is presented. Möbius strip is animage and a symbolic representation of this author’s idea of sovereignty, which gives adirection to the study and demonstrates the relationships between different constructsinvestigated here. The conceptual framework seeks to demonstrate the author’s ownposition on the problem and to operationalise the theoretical framework. Third,discourse analysis is introduced and justified as the guiding methodological approach ofthe study. Methods of predicate, metaphor, and narrative analysis are used in thisdissertation in order to demonstrate how sovereignty is spoken about, defended andjustified through discourse and practice. Finally, the overall ‘discursive encounter’research design based on Lene Hansen’s (2006: 73-92) framework is explained.
1. Theoretical framework: Sovereignty as exception
Ambiguity of the referent object and subject of sovereignty
Sovereignty is arguably the master-concept of the International Relations theory and isdefined by both its centrality and ambiguity (Bartelson, 1995: 13). Indeed, most of therecent scholarly explorations have deplored the obscurity of the concept (see, forinstance, Krasner 1999, Prokhovnik 2008). The frustration of political and legaltheorists is partly due to the multiple and diverse uses of the term at different historical
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junctures and in different geographical locations. The common theoretical impulsetherefore is to find a common substance, some glue that would unite and hold togetherall the various meanings attributed to sovereignty. As Thomas J Biersteker and CynthiaWeber noted there is a tendency “to combine population, territory, authority andrecognition – the principal constitutive elements of sovereignty – into a single,unproblematic actor: a sovereign state” (1996: 5). However, a number of scholars ofsovereignty pointed out the productivity of such ambiguity and its ideological andpolitical functions (Ashley 1988, Walker 1993, Bartelson 1995, Doty 1996).
It is therefore important to look at how sovereignty has been understood and usedthroughout centuries in various political and legal contexts while trying to avoiddogmatic impulses to fix the use of the term. Genealogical accounts of the evolution ofthe term are vital for demonstrating how the formulation of meanings of sovereigntyand circumstances of its invocation are inherently political (Onuf 1991, Bartelson 1995,Prokhovnik 2008). Sovereignty should be treated not as some elusive reality behindvarious imprecise uses, but rather as an argument, as a claim for authority in a politicalsystem, as a speech act and a performance aimed at establishing political actors’existence and agency.
The many definitions emphasise different elements within the bundle of conceptsunited under the title of ‘sovereignty’. Most scholars examining the concept havecombined two main aspects of sovereignty in their definitions. On the one hand,sovereignty is the ultimate authority to claim the coercive power within a giventerritory and over a defined population. On the other, sovereignty is understood asindependence from coercion exerted by outside forces (e.g. Holsti, 2004: 113).Sovereignty is thus written from both ‘inside’ and from ‘outside’ (Walker 1993). This isreflected in the theoretical distinction made between ‘internal’ and ‘’external’sovereignty. Stephen Krasner, however, differentiates between four types ofsovereignty: international legal sovereignty (the principle that international recognitionshould be accorded only to juridically independent sovereign states); Westphaliansovereignty (the principle that states have the right to exclude external authority fromtheir own territory); domestic sovereignty (the actual effective exercise of control overthe domestic territory and command of authority and legitimacy over the population);and interdependence sovereignty (the capacity of the state to regulate movements of
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capital and people across the border) (1999: 9-25). Such differentiation indicates thedifference between international norms recognition and non-interference into internalaffairs and the actual exercise of control and power within a territorial state.
There still exists a disagreement among legal scholars, political scientists and politicianswhether sovereignty of a state should be declarative and thus based on the act ofproclaiming a state or whether it should be grounded in the existence of a governmentwithin a given territory pursuant to a community of people. Historically, however, theact of recognition or non-recognition of a state has been based not in an exact sciencebut determined by political and diplomatic considerations. Sovereignty is ‘spoken’ andperformed from the inside, but it has to be asserted by the speech-acts of externalrecognition and performances of ‘international relations’.
In the Montevideo Convention of 1933, for example, sovereignty of the states isassumed to exist prior to and independent of international recognition. Independenceof the states is found in a set of ‘marks’. Thus, Article 1 of the Convention states that“the state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications:(a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity toenter into relations with the other states”. It is not clear, however, whether the capacityof a state to enter into relations with other states is measured by some objectivecriteria. The capacity of a state to participate in international relations is dependent onother states’ recognition of the state in question as a ‘person of international law’.However, Article 3 of the same convention asserts that “the political existence of thestate is independent of recognition by the other states” and that “even beforerecognition the state has the right to defend its integrity and independence, to providefor its conservation and prosperity, and consequently to organize itself as it sees fit, tolegislate upon its interests, administer its services, and to define the jurisdiction andcompetence of its courts”. Therefore, there seems to be a contradiction between thequalification (d) of Article 1 and Article 3, because the assertion of internal sovereigntywhich is prior to international recognition does not entail the capacity to enter intointernational relations, which is necessarily premised on such recognition. In otherwords, the paradox of the positivist conception of international legal sovereignty isfound in the impossibility to meet the ‘objective’ criteria for international legalpersonhood outside of the social context of international relations. Sovereign states’
29
existence is mutually reinforced by the speech-acts of recognition and performances of‘international relations’.
Ultimately, the authority and power to rule over a defined geographic area rests on apolitical fact for which no purely legal explanation can be provided, and onlymetaphysical claims can be made. When Jean Bodin first formally used the term‘sovereignty’ in 1576, he defined the term as “the absolute and perpetual power of acommonwealth” (Franklin, 1992: 1). The sovereign power was originally understood tobe vested in God, and represented on Earth in “a sovereign prince” who was “onlyaccountable to God” (Franklin, 1992: 4). This notion of a monarch as a representation ofa transcendental sovereignty has theological roots. The crown was seen as the symbolof permanence of sovereignty, which guarantees continuity of state power regardless ofthe changes in kings and dynasties. The mortal body of the king was an embodiment ofthe eternal body of a sovereign body politic (Bartelson, 1995: 98). This idea was an echoof the doctrine of the Church as the corpus mysticum1 of Christ himself (Kantorowicz,1997: 206-7).
Jean Bodin lists ten true marks of sovereignty. According to him, a true sovereign hasthe sole authority:
1) To give laws and change them at will (without consent of the subjects);2) To wage war against opponents or enemies of the state;3) To appoint the highest officials of the state only at its own will;4) To have the last judgement in legal disputes and thus also power to pardon andgrant freedom to prisoners irrespective of the law;5) To coin and validate money within the state;6) To impose tax on subjects or to delegate that right to officials or lesser lords;7) To confiscate land and assets;8) To use a royal seal to validate and authorise;9) To change the language of this subjects;10) To reserve the exclusive right for himself to bear the title of ‘majesty’ (Bodin,1992: 46-98).
1 Kantorowicz (1997:209) also notes that the term corpus mysticum was used synonymously with corpus
fictum, corpus imaginatum and corpus repraesentatum in the legal organological doctrine of legal personsas corporations conceived of as ‘bod[ies] composed of head and members’.
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Bodin’s marks of sovereignty are in fact the indications of the authority of a sovereign tosuspend application of the rule, to make an exception. The prerogative of a sovereign towage war and make peace, to grant and confiscate property is derivative of the status ofthe ultimate decision-making power. As Schmitt notes, the essence of sovereignty is“not ... the monopoly to coerce or to rule, but ... the monopoly to decide” (2005: 13).Such monopoly of decision-making in extreme cases means the authority to decide thatthere exists a state of emergency and to declare it, thus simultaneously suspending thenormal constitutional order.
The decision on the state of exception in itself is a performance, often taking the form ofa speech-act. All of the above marks of sovereignty are indeed speech-acts (such asgiving and changing laws, declaring wars, appointing officials, passing judgement,granting pardon, et cetera) or ‘performative utterances’ (Austin, 1962: 5), throughwhich sovereignty of a ruler becomes apparent and is at the same time constituted. AsHansen and Stepputat well put it:
What is implicit but never spelled out in Bodin’s text is that sovereignty is an affect ofthese actions, and that sovereignty needs to be performed and reiterated on a daily basisin order to be effective, and to form the basic referent of the state. (Hansen andStepputat, 2005: 7. Emphasis is as in the original).Thus, the traditional and charismatic power of a king was performed ritualistically byboth the king and his subjects. This power was legitimised by reference to some extra-social, pre-political authority such as God, nature or some mythical foundational event.As soon as the performative cycle was broken down and the source of authoritydoubted, the power of the sovereign disintegrated.
The French Revolution of 1789 quite literally removed the crown, together with thehead of the king, and secularised the notion of sovereignty. From then on, sovereigntyhas been thought of as originating in the collective will of ‘the people’. Modernconceptions of sovereignty therefore presuppose some form of popular sovereignty, i.e. aform of a representational government (Canovan 2005). The sovereign king or queenanointed by the Church as the representative of God’s sovereignty on Earth has beenreplaced in the modern discourse with the concept of ‘social contract’ (Prokhovnik,2008: 79). ‘The people’ in its turn has been variously defined as citizenry, ruling class,regime, or nation. However, the paradox of popular sovereignty is found in the very
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constitution of the subject and the referent object of sovereignty --‘the people’ -- asrepresented in the state, embodied and impersonated by its leaders. Slavoj Žižek,describes this transition in ideological construction of sovereignty arguing that in themodern state,
the totalitarian Leader ... no longer needs this external point of reference to legitimise his rule. ...Here the basic deception consists in the fact that the Leader’s point of reference, the instance towhich he is referring to legitimise his rule (the People, the Class, the Nation) does not exist – or,more precisely, exists only through and in its fetishistic representative, the Party and its Leader(Žižek, 1989: 146, emphasis in the original).In the modern state the sovereign power is ‘imagined’ and ‘produced’ by performativemutual embodiment and impersonation of ‘the People’ (mostly defined as ‘the Nation’)through the government.
A conceptual legal and political connection forged between the body politic and
territorial sovereignty culminated in the so-called Westphalian state system (Murphy,1996: 86). Romantic visions of nationalism that started to emerge in the post-Napoleonic world brought about a strong political ideology, which was premised on analmost sacred connection between the people and the land (the emotive labels of‘homeland’, ‘motherland’ or ‘fatherland’ replaced the designations such as the ‘realm’and ‘commonwealth’). With the rise of nationalism as the dominant popular basis forsovereignty, the organismic and familial metaphors of state and the nation proliferated(Smith, 1991: 76). Following the body metaphor a sovereign entity was conceived ascorporeality with an obvious inside and outside (Walker 1993, Holsti 2004).
This system crystallised around the same time as European empires started to emerge –the fact closely related to emergence of conceptions of state sovereignty as reflection oflegitimate international legal personhood (Prokhovnik, 2008: 82). Europeancolonisation was justified by liberal ideas that compared a sovereign individual to thestate (Hansen and Stepputat, 2005: 9). The international legal doctrine of sovereigntytherefore emerged out of “the colonial encounter” as a result of the efforts by imperiallegal scholars to come to terms with cultural differences (Anghie, 2004: 2-3). Thecolonised peoples and lands were excluded from humanity and denied personhoodcompletely and, therefore, sovereignty in the early system of colonial imperialism. Inthe later stages, they were assigned a status of a ‘child’ within the mandate system
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according to their percieved relative degree of development (Lyons and Mastanduno,1005: 6-7; Strang, 1996: 24). The postcolonial sovereignty is still often metaphoricallyconceived of as ‘adolescent’ (Doty 1996).
Post-colonial sovereignty as the state of exception
The central issues of concern in the study of sovereignty during the past decades wereformulated in terms of whether or not the dogma of state sovereignty was renderedobsolete by the processes of globalisation and the competing norms of human rights,democratisation and human security (Lyons and Mastanduno 1995, Evans and Sahnoun2001, Bickerton et al. 2007). This body of literature is related to the post-World Warand post-Cold War concern with post-colonial sovereignty, and the attempts to come toterms with the challenges to statehood in the so-called Third World (Jackson 1990,Anghie 2004, Doty 1996, Hansen and Stepputat 2005, Gravagui 1996). It is generallyagreed that sovereignty requires not just the legal right to exercise supreme power, butthe actual exercise of such power as well. There can be no de jure sovereignty without
de facto exercise of it. In other words, neither claiming sovereignty (or beingproclaimed sovereign) nor merely exercising sovereign power is sufficient. In the caseof post-colonial states, however, the sovereignty doctrine of the international law hastaken up “unique forms which differed from and destabilised given notions of Europeansovereignty” (Anghie, 2004: 6).
A seminal work in this regard was the 1990 book by Robert Jackson entitled Quasi-
states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World, in which he argues thatthe states created as a result of decolonisation lacked empirical statehood and werebrought into existence only thanks to the will of the international community to assert asort of affirmative action when it came to recognising the post-colonial states. TheThird World “quasi-states” thus possess what Jackson calls “negative sovereignty” asopposed to the European “positive sovereignty”.
Other scholars also grappled with incongruence of the ideal of sovereignty withinternational practice. Hinsley’s ‘ineffective states’ (1986), James’s ‘permeable states’(1986), Buzan’s ‘weak state’ (1991) are all attempts to classify states within the
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international system according to the variance in the degree of sovereignty. ThirdWorld states’ sovereignty is still viewed as deficient and their statehood as precarious.Such terms as “collapsed”, “failed” and “fragile” all reflect the perception of a deficientand incomplete nature of the post-colonial states’ sovereignties and statehoods.
The usual narrative in historiography of statehood tells us that the Westphalian systembased on the idea of territorial sovereignty emerged in Europe and then spread acrossthe world, first as a result of imperialism, and subsequently replicated in the post-colonial world. However, according to Antony Anghie, far from preceding thecolonisation of the various peoples in Asia, Africa and South America, the sovereigntydoctrine arose out of the colonial encounter (2004: 2-3). It was a means for thecolonisers to justify their conquests and domination of the colonised peoples throughthe discourse of cultural difference, which resulted in the articulation of the “civilisingmission” doctrine. Tracing the emergence of sovereignty doctrine in the discipline ofinternational law, Anghie surveys key sources on international law at the turning pointsof the history of colonialism. His analysis leads him to unexpected conclusions.Sovereignty, which is normally perceived as a universal, empowering and positiveinstitution in international relations has in fact arguably been used to delegitimise thenon-European forms of sovereignty and therefore their claims for authority within theirterritory and independence from foreign imperial domination (Strang, 1996: 25).
In the aftermath of the Second World War, the norm of sovereign equality was codifiedin the UN Charter, guaranteeing equal status to all member-states, regardless of theirsize, relative power or wealth. This norm, despite its liberating potential, arguably has aflipside. It became, according to postcolonial legal scholars, a means of erasure of thecolonial past and attribution of responsibility for the internal problems to the newlysovereign states. The unique vulnerability and dependence of the post-colonial states’sovereignty on the system of the international law built into it by the colonialencounter, however, continues to persist despite the declared sovereign equality of allstates (Blaney and Inayatullah, 1996: 84-5). Thus, Ferguson argues that the language of‘sovereignty’ depoliticises global division of labourand poverty in postcolonial states.Designation of postcolonial states as ‘sovereign’ (and therefore independent) allows toframe poverty as the ‘national’ concern, while the past of exploitation and persistingglobal patterns of inequality can be erased (Ferguson 1997).
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Apart from postcolonial critique of ‘sovereignty’, constructivist and poststructuralistscholars of International Relations problematised the concept in their writing over thepast two decades. R.B. J. Walker addressed the problem of sovereignty in the so-calledThird World, arguing that sovereignty is not something that states have, but rathersomething that states do (Walker, 1996: 16). This performative quality of sovereignty isalso reflected in Cynthia Weber’s (1995) work, in which she examines how sovereigntyis practically constituted in activities and discourses of the state actors. She focuses onhow the meaning of sovereignty is stabilized by analysing a particular political practice– intervention. In order to do so, she examines three instances of intervention duringdifferent time periods to demonstrate the contingency of the meaning attached tosovereignty at different points in time. In each case, Weber demonstrates how re-articulations of what constitutes the proper locus of sovereign power and theboundaries of the intervening political community help legitimate the intervention. Sheargues that sovereignty and intervention are mutually constitutive. Althoughintervention is commonly understood to be a negative term, because it refers to aviolation of sovereignty, its use fixes the meaning of sovereignty in a particular locationof time and space, because it presupposes the knowledge of what lies within thelegitimately monopolised powers and authorities of a state, where the boundaries of astate should be drawn, who belongs to that particular political community and whodoes not. Therefore, the language of justifications of an intervention or protestationagainst it, serves to stabilise sovereign nation-statehood. Intervention is an alibi forsovereignty and sovereignty in its turn is an alibi for “domestic community” in whosename it is claimed (Weber, 1995: 27, 128). In Weber’s opinion, “there is no “natural”sovereign state because there is no “natural” foundation of sovereignty” (1995: 27).
Following Cynthia Weber’s exploration of variation of the meaningsovereignty/intervention, Helle Malmvig’s book (2006) argues that space is also animportant component of sovereignty discourse and practice (Malmvig, 2006: 2). Someplaces are imagined as less sovereign as well as ‘backward’ in their temporal location(somewhere in the ‘state of nature’). Her case studies of the intervention in Kosovo,(where the events were constructed as within the concerns of internationalcommunity), and non-intervention in Algeria (where they were framed exclusively as an
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internal affair of the state), demonstrate that sovereignty was questionable in the lattercase and therefore it had to be asserted by non-intervention:
When politicians and others were invoking Algerian sovereignty, they were, at one and the sametime, referring to sovereignty as a given, and yet recognising that sovereignty no longer residedwithin the obvious and non-political. Sovereignty was something that needed to be emphasisedand demonstrated. ... Politicians were therefore caught in a paradoxical practice, where theysimultaneously constituted sovereignty as something given and natural, and as somethingcontested and political (Malmvig, 2006: 39).Thus, postcolonial states are portrayed as both spatially and temporally removed fromthe sovereign ‘norm’. Doty writes that sovereignty of the states in the global South isgenerally represented as ‘adolescent’ (1996: 87-89). States as ‘mature’ and ‘adolescent’entities is a logical extension of the metaphor of ‘state as a person’ and the generalnarrative of state sovereignty as a process originating in the mythical ‘state of nature’.‘Backwardness’can also serve as a reference to the temporal dislocation into the past, tothe archaic forms of governance from the Euro-centric point of reference.
The echo of the ‘state of nature’ thesis is found in the ‘state of exception’, first discussedby Carl Schmitt (2005). The ability to declare temporary suspension of normal politics,according to Schmitt’s thesis, is the true and only measure of sovereignty: “Sovereign ishe who decides on the exception” (Schmitt, 2005: 5). The state of emergency withinwhich the rule of the exceptional politics is established is a momentary return to thestate of nature and the very instance of the original assertion of sovereign power. Civilwar is usually seen as such return to the state of nature. That is why the states that areexperiencing or recently experienced a civil war are conceptualised as ‘failed’, or lackingin internal sovereignty. Georgio Agamben writes of modern emergency politics as “alegal civil war” (2005: 2).
Post-colonial sovereignties, therefore, could be imagined as being in a permanent ‘stateof emergency’. Conversely, the entire region of the global South is treated by theinternational community as “almost permanent zones of exception” confirming the ruleof Westphalian sovereignty (Hansen and Stepputat, 2005: 18). This double exception ofthe ‘quasi-states’ from the rule of sovereignty is reflected in the modes of thinking ofand describing of post-colonial states as ‘characterised by disorder, chaos, corruption,and general ineptitude’, thus assigning them a lesser degree of agency andhierarchically positioning the states of the global North as more ‘mature’ and
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‘responsible’ (Doty 1996: 42). Doty continues, “many of the earlier colonial stereotypesare present in the real state/quasi-state opposition: inability to handle power andauthority responsibly and humanely, incapacity for self-government, generalincompetence” (Doty 1996: 152). The discourse of ‘failed’ or ‘quasi’-states thereforecreates not only temporal and spatial zones of exception, but also moral geographies ofsuperiority/inferiority, order/chaos, rule of law/corruption, and so on.
To sum up, sovereignty as a concept is fundamental to international relations theory inestablishing the spheres of the domestic and foreign, order and chaos, and hierarchy ofpower relations. Rather than being a reflection of ‘how things are’, sovereignty is asocial construct. It has largely evolved as an international law concept through thecolonial encounters of the European states with what later became ‘Third World’ or‘Global South’, and is an inherently political concept, rather than a natural and apoliticalcategory. While legal sovereign equality of all states is assumed, postcolonialsovereignty is still conceptualised in both political and scholarly discourse as a type of adeviation, or an exception from the rule of ‘positive’ sovereignty. Therefore, not only isthe sovereignty of post-colonial states constructed as different from that of the FirstWorld states, but their deficient and precarious sovereignty destabilises the supposedabsolute nature of idealised standard of sovereignty found in ‘the West’. The post-colonial state is thus represented as pregnant with both “peril” (‘they are not like us’)and “promise” (‘they might eventually become like us’).
2. Conceptual framework: Möbius strip of sovereigntyAt the age of about twelve I read a short story by Martin Gardner called “The no-sidedprofessor” (Gardner 1987). The premise of the story was based on a curious topologicalfigure called the Möbius strip and its amazing quality of having only one side and oneedge. A professor of topology in the story presents his discovery that logically followsfrom the properties of the Möbius strip – it is possible not only to conceive but actuallyconstruct a ‘zero-sided’ figure. The eccentric scientist then in an extraordinary feat ofyogic flexibility bends his own body into the required shape and ... disappears.A Möbius band is created by twisting a strip of paper by half a turn and gluing the twoends together. If you try to draw a line on one side of the band, your pencil will return
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to the starting point without having to go over the edge. If you were to cut the band inthe middle, rather than end up with two separate rings of paper you will have a singleloopwith a full twist. This possibility of a one-sided and single-edged surfacecontradicts the principles of Euclidian geometry that most of us learn at school.
The image and idea of the Möbius strip occurred to me, as a postgraduate student, as auseful way to conceptualise and visualise my thoughts on sovereignty. I propose it as ametaphor to guide our thinking on sovereignty as a concept of international relationstheory, which seems to establish the realms of internal and external, presence andabsence, identity and difference, while in fact these apparent dichotomies are part of aMöbius loop of Derrida’s différance (1982).2
In her study of the United States’ politics of representation in relation to the Philippines,Roxanne Lynn Doty argues that sovereignty is essentially a ‘floating signifier whosemeaning is always deferred’ (1996: 96). “This is most obvious in instances of ‘third-world’ sovereignty”, she writes, “where any stable and decidable signified forsovereignty are conspicuously absent and the signifier sovereignty floats, unanchored”(Doty, 1996: 96). Here Doty refers to Derrida’s concept of différance to suggest thatmeanings of words rely on differentiation from the words with opposite meanings andat the same time on deferral, “putting off of the encounter with the missing presencethat the sign is presumed to be moving toward” (Doty, 1996: 6). This continuouscirculation of signs where the meaning is constantly deferred “by means of a systemicplay of differences” (Derrida, 1982: 11) might suggest us that those signs ultimatelyrefer to nothing and that they are indeed “empty signifiers”. The sign of sovereigntyacts as the central one in the chain of signification. It is a sign to which all the othersigns such as ‘authority’, ‘power’, ‘legitimacy’, and ‘the people’ are supposedtoultimately refer back to. The Möbian conception of sovereignty refers to thecirculation of signifiers that metonymically become substituted for one another,creating an illusion of difference while indefinitely deferring the encounter with the
2Différance is a ‘neographism’ introduced by Jacques Derrida, which incorporates both ‘difference’ and‘deference’ in French spelling. It is the notion that words and signs can never fully summon forth whatthey mean, but can only be defined through appeal to additional words, from which they differ. Thus,meaning is forever "deferred" or postponed through an endless chain of signifiers. Looking a word up in adictionary is an example of différance. If you were to look up all the words that make up the definition ofthe original word, and then all the words contained in the following definitions, the process ofdifferentiation and deferral of meaning would be endless.
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final meaning and distancing us from the initial master-signifier3 thus allowing theillusion of double-sidedness where there is none.
Baudrillard uses the metaphor of the Möbius strip in his Simulacra and Simulation toillustrate how the logic of simulation works by “subtle, maleficent, elusive twisting ofmeaning”, which “does not necessarily result in despairing of meaning, but just as muchin improvisation of meaning, of non-meaning, of many simultaneous meanings thatdestroy each other” (1994: 16-40). In other words, proliferation of signs, which appearto substitute one another metonymically, destabilises the meaning of words. In theprocession of simulacra, we move from a sign as (1) a “reflection of a profound reality”to (2) an image that “masks and denatures a profound reality” to the one that (3)“masks the absence of a profound reality”, until finally (4) we reach a state wherebysigns bear “no relation to any reality whatsoever” and the image is “its own puresimulacrum” (Baudrillard, 1994: 6). I argue that a Möbian conception of sovereigntyarticulation best illustrates the process whereby signs are circulated and twistedproviding ‘alibi’ for an absent master-signifier, be it God, the Nation, or the People.
Figure 2.1. Möbian sovereignty model
The inspiration for this dissertation in large part was provided by Cynthia Weber’s book
Simulating Sovereignty (1995), which in its turn was aspired by Baudrillard’s work on
3 Master-signifier is a term, based on the linguistics of Saussure, which belongs to Slovoj Žižek who used itto analyse ideology. It is ‘a signifier without signified’ to which all other signifiers within the chain ofsignification ultimately refer to (1989:93). Others have used the term ‘empty signifier’ to refer to thesame idea. The open-endedness of master-signifier which allows it to be equivalent to multiple othersignifiers is also the condition of its contestability, giving rise to political ideological discourse.
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simulation and symbolic exchange. According to Weber, global politics have entered thepost-representational stage. We no longer know what we mean by “sovereignty” or“intervention”. These terms have become empty, interchangeable and self-referential:
The circulation of hyperreal signifiers as alibis for sovereignty and interventionsimulates the sovereignty/intervention boundary. Writing the state in an order ofsimulation requires simulating the sovereignty/intervention boundary and otherboundaries (e.g. domestic/international, inside/outside, citizen/foreigner). ...
Investigating sovereignty, then, requires investigating how states are simulated (Weber,1995, 129, emphasis added by me).‘The logic of simulation’ is meant here not as “organised hypocrisy” (Krasner 1999), ascynical pretence, non-genuine, surrogate to the ‘real’ thing out there. Simulation isinterchangeable here with “virtuality”, understood not as “ersatz, the unreal real”, butrather as “neither reality nor unreality”, a state which is sufficient unto itself (Wilson,2005: 34). Neither does the talk of simulation and virtuality mean that social relations,activities and institutions involved in articulation of sovereignty are completelyimaginary phenomena. Rather, sovereignty belongs to the order of ‘hyperreality’, asdefined by Baudrillard, “a simulation of something which never really existed”(Baudrillard, 1994: 6). 4 Similarly, the proliferation of ‘sovereign’ state model hides thefact that there does not exist an original authentic sovereign state to refer back to.
This is why I propose to apply Baudrillard’s observation that in modern politics “allreferentials combine their discourses in a circular, Möbian compulsion” to thearticulation of sovereignty discourses (Baudrillard, 1994: 17-18). A similar thought, Ibelieve, is expressed in Bartelson’s discussion of ‘parergonality of sovereignty’, theconcept derived from Kant’s idea of ‘parergon’ – a frame, which is at once “a compositeof inside and outside” and which is “an outside which is called inside the inside toconstitute it as inside” (Bartelson, 1995: 51). Just as a frame of a painting establishesthe boundary between the inside and the outside while being part of neither,sovereignty as a concept performs the function of a parergon in international relations,Bartelson argues. Genealogy of Sovereignty attempts to establish how sovereignty came
4 For instance, a recent episode of the on BBC Three’s popular show Snog Marry Avoid? featured a girlfrom Dewsbury, England, who imitates Japanese style called ‘Gyaru’ (Japanese transliteration of theEnglish word ‘gal’, which in turn originates from a popular jeans brand’s advertising campaignproclaiming “I can’t live without men”), imitating a cartoonish version of a ‘Californian’ girl with makeupsimulating tanned skin, bleached blonde hair, wide ‘European’ eyes and narrow nose. A ‘PersonalOverhaul Device’ (POD), which is itself a TV simulation of a sarcastic and judgemental computer ‘fightingfakery’ gave the girl a ‘make-under’, which included makeup and hair dying, but which was simulatingabsence of makeup and restoration of ‘natural beauty’.
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to be understood as both empirical (objectively observable) and transcendental(referring to an ultimately unknowable) foundation of the modern state. As he writes,“the juxtaposition of the domestic and the international as we know it today is a fairlyrecent and essentially modern construct, following from a specific parergonal functionattributed to the concept of sovereignty by a likewise specific arrangement of modernknowledge” (Bartelson, 1995: 52). “Without this parergonality of sovereignty”, hewrites, “there can be no intelligible talk of the state or anything international, nor anyempirical disciplines devoted to the analysis of their finitude” (190).
The theme of the framing quality of sovereignty is continued in the writing of GeorgioAgamben, who discusses the paradoxical condition of sovereign power as located at thesame time both “inside and outside a juridical order” (Agamben, 1998: 18). Building onCarl Schmitt’s definition of sovereignty as the authority to decide on the state ofexception (2005: 13), Agamben uses set theory to define an exception as an ‘inclusiveexclusion’, because while it “cannot be included in the whole of which it is a memberand cannot be a member of the whole in which it is always already included” (25).
Homo sacer, a person who is considered to be outside of law, but at the same time is partof legal-political system that defines its boundaries,5 is an example of such an inclusiveexclusion, his body being the site of the exercise of sovereign power. Agambenconcludes that: “The state of exception is thus not so much a spatio-temporalsuspension as a complex topological figure in which not only the exception and the rulebut also the state of nature and law, outside and inside, pass through one another(Agamben, 1998: 37). The inside, therefore, constitutes outside. Both are part of asingle-surfaced Möbian loop.
The designations ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ conceptually come about from individualexperience of one’s body in the world. Tuan writes that such orientations as “vertical-horizontal, top-bottom, front-back and right-left are positions and coordinates of thebody that are extrapolated onto space” and that correspond to temporal and moralrealms of “future-past” and “sacred-profane” (Tuan, 1977: 34-35). Similarly, the
5Homo sacer (Latin for the ‘sacred man’ or ‘the accursed man’) in Roman law referred to an oath-breaker,who by breaking the oath (act of cursing oneself) was considered to be at the mercy of gods. Such aperson was banned, could be killed by anyone, but could not be sacrificed (Agamben, 1998: 72). In themodern days, the concept can be applied to people who are outside of political and legal order (statelesspeople, concentration camp detainees).
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construction of inside and outside in IR, creates spaces corresponding to self and other,and moral boundaries of order and chaos, civil society and the state of nature. R.B.JWalker in his work Inside/Outside demonstrates how the discourses of InternationalRelations theory participate in the construction of the very concepts they claim toexplain, sovereignty being the central one. Sovereignty as the main principle ofinternational relations serves to demarcate the borders of a political community, toseparate the domestic from the foreign. “To refer to international relations”, - he writes -“is to suggest that what goes on between states is in principle quite different from whatgoes on within states” (Walker, 1993: 63, emphasis in the original). Sovereignty thusestablishes not only spatial and temporal, but also ethical/moral boundaries, wherebythe ethics of the domestic politics are inapplicable to the international relations. Therelationship between International relations as a discipline and sovereignty as its mainfoundational concept are circularly mutually productive, whereby sovereignty isconstructed by international relations theories and international relations theories areonly possible with sovereignty as their basis. Walker uses Derrida-style deconstructionof Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes and Max Weber in order to demonstrate by means ofhistorical and interpretive readings of the classical texts that state sovereignty iscomposed of countless pairs of binary oppositions. The most prominent of these pairs isfound in the title of the book – Inside/Outside – and corresponds with other pairs(Self/Other, presence/absence, politics /relations, empirical/normative). They aremutually inter-woven in a ring of Möbius.
Another important point that Walker makes (and which is important for this study) isthe assertion of the constructiveness and re-constructability of state as a politicalinstitution. This means that states are not permanent fixtures within global system;they are neither already consolidated sovereign states enjoying full “empirical” and“positive” sovereignty nor are they failed “quasi-states” that only survive thanks tojuridical or “negative” sovereignty (Jackson 1990). States are ‘written’ in never-endingdaily practices and discourses regarding the proper and legitimate location of powerand authority within a society, regarding the boundaries of those societies, andregarding the issues of inclusion and exclusion into the political community. Walkerwrites:
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The state appears in the conventional story as a formal and almost lifeless category, when in factstates are constantly maintained, defended, attacked, reproduced, undermined, and relegitimisedon a daily basis. The conventional story combines with a legalistic reading of the state to mystifythe minute rituals through which states are constantly made and remade. Again, appeals to statesovereignty serve to maintain the high ground of timelessness (episteme, eternity) against theflux (doxa) of time, and to confirm the existence of the state as something “out there” separatefrom the ordinary experience of people’s lives (168).So how exactly are states simulated in practice? The next section of this chapterexplains in more detail the methodological approach incorporating theories of languageand meaning to the study of sovereignty that this dissertation adapts.
3. Research methods: Sovereignty as utterance and performance
The choice of research methods in this dissertation is closely related to the qualitativenature of the study that investigates meanings, perceptions, symbols and descriptions.The actors’ behaviour, within given situations, is observed, their interactions areanalysed as speech-acts and performative events, and scrutinised for patterns andcategories, in order to answer the research questions. The main methodological taskwas to determine who speaks on behalf of the state and the people and how these actsof impersonation and embodiment of the state help simulate sovereignty and thus thepossibility of international relations.
Discourse analysis as approach and method
Discourse analysis as a methodological approach in IR has been called upon tosupersede the representational logic and causal explanations of ‘epistemic realism’ andto substitute it with a non-causal ‘logic of interpretation’ (Campbell, 1998: 4). Withinthe notion of ‘logic of interpretation’ lies the understanding that phenomena and eventsare rendered meaningful in human imagination by analyzing the unfamiliar in terms ofthe familiar. This cognitive process has been labeled as ‘schema’ theory of learning inthe study of psychology, or described as metaphorical thinking in linguistic analysis(Lakoff and Johnson 2003). While the traditional approaches assume Saussureanrepresentational logic of the relationship between discursive practices and the ‘realworld’, the poststructuralist approach implies moving from the logic of representation,
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which assumes presence of a signified behind the signifier, towards the logic ofsimulation whereby concepts are constituted by a chain of signifiers without anultimate signified (Cummings, 2009: 1085).
There is no one ‘how to’ guide to discourse analysis methodology in internationalrelations. Various authors have, therefore, dealt with the pragmatics of conducting theirresearch and data analysis in different and sometimes rather creative ways (Milliken1999, Hansen 2006, Weber 1995, 2001, Fierke 2005). Most discourse analysis studiesin IR tend to concentrate on politics of representation of ‘Others’ by actors representing‘the West’ (Doty 1996, Neumann 1999, Campbell 1998). While such research has beenessential for deconstructing the ‘common sense’ assumptions and exposing the power-knowledge praxis, the ‘others’ still mostly remain silent and do not ‘talk back’ (Spivak1988).
Jennifer Milliken (1999) and Lene Hansen (2006) have attempted to move away fromthe perception of discourse analysis as ‘anti-methodology’ and to assert it as alegitimate method of analysis in IR by developing “criteria for and exemplars ofdifferent types of discourse studies” (Milliken, 1999: 226). This thesis draws on anumber of such examples of discourse analysis methodology as the source forpragmatic ‘how to’ guidance on undertaking such a study. In particular, I have soughtto understand how states are constituted as actors and subjects with authority to speakand act through discourse (Milliken, 1999: 229), how temporal, spatial and ethicalboundaries of inclusion and exclusion are drawn, made natural and policed, how thepolitical and the ideological is represented as commonsensical, unavoidable and natural(Hansen, 2006: 19).
Scholars of IR have identified a link between discursive identity construction, notions ofstate/national interests, perceptions of threat, and foreign policy. Ontologically, statescome into being and are maintained through discursive practices of identification anddifferentiation between self and other. The negative and positive linking of certainplaces, subjects and ideologies to binary opposites constitute boundaries between thepolitical temporal, spatial and ethical insides and outsides. To ‘be’ for a state, therefore,is to exist in the discourse of the actors authorised (or claiming authority) to speak andact on its behalf. This ‘existence’, however, is meaningless without recognition of
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relevant Others (audiences, interlocutors). Identities are thus relational, narrative andperformative, with the story-telling and performance taking place in ‘dialogue’ with theother (Bakhtin 1986).
Predicate analysis: Us and Them
Discursive constructions of ‘us’ and ‘them’ are the basic building material for thediscourses of national identity. Such discourses mainly utilize four types of discursivemacro-strategies, namely:
 Constructive – strategies that are aimed at constructing (national) identities;
 Preservative/ justificatory – strategies that are used to preserve or reproduce(national) identities;
 Transformative – strategies that seek to change (national) identities;
 Destructive – discursive strategies that aim to dismantle (national) identities(Wodak in Seale et al, 2004: 205).
For this thesis it was important to observe the constitution and maintenance of nationaland state identities in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan through examination of the textsproduced within the discourses of identity and difference holding the following keyquestions in mind:
1. How are the persons/actors/groups named and referred to in the texts? Whatpredicates/ epithets accompany the self- and other- group names?2. What qualities, traits, characteristics and features are attributed to them?3. What arguments and argumentation strategies are used in order to justify thepositive or negative attributions, inclusion or the exclusion of the other?4. Whose perspective is being expressed (the author’s own voice - intentionality)?Who are the author’s audience (addressivity)? What are the ‘voices that camebefore’ (intertextuality and interdiscursivity)?5. Are the utterances overtly expressed? Does the author try to mitigate them? Orare they even intensified? Is the text a site of struggle of competing discourses?
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What are the traces of competing discourses and ideologies within this text?(206-7).
For instance, construction of positive self- and negative other- representations as foundin the works of most prominent Tajik and Uzbek historians, water experts, journalistsand politicians were analysed. For this purpose I found the following table, borrowed inits entirety from Ruth Wodak (Table 13.1 in Seale at al, 2004: 207), very useful as aguiding tool.
Table2.1. Discursive strategies for positive self- and negative other-representation
Strategy Objectives Devices
Referential
/Nomination
Construction of in-groups andout-groups Membership categorization;biological, naturalizing anddepersonalizing; metaphors andmetonymies; synecdoche (pars prototo, totum pro pars)
Predication Labeling social actors more orless positively or negatively,deprecatorily or appreciatively Stereotypical, evaluativeattributions of negative or positivetraits; Implicit and explicitpredicates
Argumentation Justification of positive ornegative attributions Topoi used to justify politicalinclusion or exclusion,discrimination or preferentialtreatment
Perspectivation,
framing or
discourse
representation
Expressing involvement;Positioning speaker’s point ofview Reporting, description, narrationor quotation of events andutterances
Intensification,
mitigation
Modifying the epistemic statusof a proposition Intensifying or mitigating theillocutionary force of utterances
Therefore in my analysis of texts I looked for patterns and performative speech-actswhich established in- and out-groups and described relationship between those groups.I specifically also sought out the open and ‘hidden’ dialogues, whereby actors on bothsides of the discursive boundaries engaged with the arguments, references and impliedantagonisms contained in the past and present articulations of identity.
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Metaphor analysis: Personification of the sovereign
Sovereignty is most of the time discussed through metaphors of personification of thestate, nation or people, whereby certain (collective) actors come to impersonate andembody the various referents of sovereignty in various contexts. The modern notionthat connects ‘the people’ with a political entity in the container of a nation-state,presupposes unity and continuity of the political people across territorial space andover time. While it is obvious that ‘the people’ is a collection of individuals, a nationalcommunity is ‘imagined’ as a collective body with a shared collective ‘memory’ orheritage that is passed on between generations.
Many authors have made the simple observation that the sovereignty as a concept“arose in conjunction with the idea of state as a persona ficta” (Prokhovnik, 2008: 20).Bodin and Hobbes exploited the metaphor of the state-person in their theorisation ofdivine and natural origins of the sovereign authority. Like a sovereign rationalRenaissance man, the state has often been conceptualised in rather anthropomorphicterms. Perhaps, the most graphic depiction of such a collective person is Hobbes’sLeviathan, who is imagined as a giant whose body is a composite of all the citizens’bodies: “The multitude so united in one person, is called a common-wealth. This is thegeneration of that great Leviathan, or rather (to speak more reverently) of that MortallGod, to which we owe under the Immortall God, our peace and defence” (Hobbes, 1962:120). It is worth noting here, that the original cover of the Leviathan featured anillustration of the collective body politic with its torso and extremities composed of ‘thepeople’ and the head being the sovereign king.6
Locke and Rousseau in their political philosophies interpreted the meaning of thepopular in the social contract quite differently, but both of them formulated their
6 A typical account of state as a corporate person is found in John of Salisbury’s book Policraticus: “Thestate [res publica] is a body [corpas quoddam] ... Within that state, the prince ... occupies the place of thehead; he is subject to the unique God and to those who are his lieutenants on earth, for in the human bodythe head is also governed by the soul. The senate occupies the place of the heart, which gives good andbad deeds their impulses. The function of the eyes, the ears and the tongue is assured by the judges andthe provincial governors... The “officers” and “soldiers” ... can be compared to the hands. The prince’sregular assistants are the flanks. The quaestors [quaestous or stewards) and the registrars... evoke theimage of the belly and intestines which, if they have been stuffed through excessive greed and if they holdin their contents too obstinately, give rise to countless and incurable illnesses and, through their vices,can bring about the ruin of the body as a whole. The feet that always touch the soil are the peasants”(John of Salisbury 1990, Book VI, Chapter 24).
47
theories of natural rights based on the analogy between the sovereign state and thesovereign individual (Prokhovnik, 2008: 83). John Locke also talked of the ‘body of thepeople’ and the ‘head of state’, although unlike Hobbes, who was a monarchist, Lockeassumed the right of the ‘body of people’ to rebel against a tyrannical king. Thisdemonstrates that the metaphors involving personification of the state have a greatpolitical potential and can be mobilised by forces regardless of their location on thepolitical spectrum. According to Rousseau, at the moment of conclusion of a ‘socialcontract’ an artificial collective body composed of all the individuals that make up thecommunity is created, which is then capable of “acting in concert” (Rousseau, 1968: 60).The fiction of a ‘social contract’, this act of incorporation, thus creates a link between the
members of the state and its head (the sovereign), establishing a body politic, a public
person.
Margaret Canovan (2005) in her exploration of the meanings of the concept of popularsovereignty analyses the evolution of the idea ‘the people’ with the accompanyingpersonification and corporation metaphor. ‘A people’ is imagined throughout thecenturies as an organic collective body of res publica with ‘members’ which has thepotential for collective action, while at the same time ‘the people’ are simply aaggregation of all the individuals within a political community (Canovan, 2005, 45-6).These are two competing visions or metaphors of ‘the people’, which correspond tocompeting theories of nationalism.7
Our theories of how the world works are often shaped by metaphors, which transfer aliterally inapplicable meaning of one sign onto another, representing an event or a thingthrough its resemblance to another, unrelated one. For instance, ‘society is like anorganism’ or, ‘states are like people’ are very common metaphors used in theorising of
7 They stem from the binary opposition of Nature versus Artifice as the roots or the essence of a nation.On the one hand we have a Romantic vision of a nation based on ethnicity reflected in the metaphor of thepeople as a single organism or body, corresponding to the primordialist understandings of the origin andnature of nations (Geertz). On the other hand, the Roman view of the people is based on the civicunderstanding that ‘the people’ (populus) can be ‘built’, corresponding to the constructivist theories ofnations and nationalism (Anderson, Gellner, Barth). A synthesis of the two competing metaphors ofpeoplehood/nationhood is found in the ethno-symbolism (Anthony Smith, Hutchinson) which combinesnature and artifice. It attempts to reconcile the extreme modernist and primoridialist positions byproposing the hypothesis that nationalisms creatively recycle elements of pre-existing group identitiesand narratives in order to foster a collective sense of belonging to a polity, regardless of the objectivevalidity or accuracy of the narratives upon which the myths of common descent are built. Nations thusare ‘real’ in effects rather than in essence.
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international relations. It is said that ‘metaphor ... touches a deep level of understanding..., for it points to the process of learning and discovery – to those analogical leaps fromthe familiar to the unfamiliar which rally imagination and emotion as well as intellect’(Battimer1982: 90, quoted in Barnes and Duncan, 1992: 10). In an intriguing way,metaphors provide us not only with seemingly transparent heuristic devices for makingsense of the world around us, but also disclose the process of theory formulation andcreativity. Metaphors, especially those drawing their comparisons from the naturalworld have long produced important insights, and lent legitimacy to theories likeningsocial phenomena and processes to the timeless “laws of nature”.
There is a long tradition in Western philosophy beginning with Aristotle to considermetaphors and use of other ‘figures of speech’ as a logical fallacy (Walton, 1996: 172). Itis considered that the ambiguity resulting from such creative use of language muddlesclear thinking and contradicts the notion of rational thought as literal, conscious, logical,transcendent (disembodied) and dispassionate. Hobbes too wrote in Leviathan that‘when we use words metaphorically; that is in other senses than that they wereordained for; ... [we] thereby deceive others’ (1962: 34). However, Lakoff and Johnson(1999) argue that far from being a fallacy or mere flourish of poetic speech,metaphorical thinking is at the heart of all human reasoning:
Most of ordinary human thought – thought carried out by real “rational animals” – is metaphoric,and hence not literal. It uses not only metaphor but also framing, metonymy, and prototype-based inferences. Hence it is not “logical” in the technical sense defined by the field of formallogic. It is largely unconscious. It is not transcendent, but fundamentally embodied. Basicinference forms arise partly from the spatial logic characterised by image schemas, which in turnare characterised in terms of the peculiarities of the structures of human brain and bodies. Thesame is true of aspectual reasoning – reasoning about the way we structure events, whichappears to arise out of our systems of motor control. Metaphorical thought, which constitutes anoverwhelming proportion of our abstract reasoning, is shaped by our bodily interactions in theworld (Lokoff and Johnson, 1999: 514).The sovereign state is also been conceived of metaphorically in the internationalrelations theory. It is assumed in mainstream ‘statist’ IR thinking that states aresovereign ‘unitary rational actors’ acting in the conditions of anarchy and motivated bythe ‘self-interest’ of ‘survival’ (Waltz 1979; Keohane 1986). States are therefore likenedto persons and living organisms, whose continued existence (by analogy to mind andbody) depends on maintenance of both their personality and physical security. Thisproblem of subjectivity and agency in International Relations has been framed as the
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problem of the ‘ontological status of the state’. Within the constructivist school severalthinkers have grappled with the issue of anthropomorphic state and attempted toresolve it in a number of ways. Heated debates regarding the “ontological status of thestate” have taken place in the past decade (Ringmar 1996; Wendt 1999; Review of
International Studies forum discussion by P.T. Jackson, Iver B. Neumann, Colin Wightand Alexander Wendt 2004, Mitzen 2006, Krolikowski 2008). 8
States and nations are routinely described as if they were living organisms, which areborn, struggle for survival, reach maturity, and even die (Waltz 1979, Wendt 2004,Holsti 2004). States are also attributed emotional responses and states, ‘fear’ being thecentral one for the traditionalist approaches to international relations, but also ‘hope’and ‘humiliation’ being attributed not only to individual states, but whole geopoliticalregions (Buzan 1991, Moïsi 2009). A metaphor of a state as an organic ‘body politic’therefore becomes a common prop when talking about sovereignty and statehood.David Campbell analyses the use of this analogy of his Writing Security arguing that theuse of the trope of a healthy body -- endangered by all sorts of external influences thatcan lead to disease, pollution, madness or weakening -- is central to articulation of thediscourses of danger delineating the Inside and Outside of a state (Campbell, 1998: 75-78). According to his interpretation, the body trope is a part of discourse of ‘man’through the discourse of ‘state’, as first articulated in Hobbes’ Leviathan (Campbell,1998: 56). ’Man’ imitates nature in order to construct an artificial likeness of the Self –the Leviathan, or the sovereign state. These constructions of the state through practicesassociated with sovereignty and intervention, through body metaphor or otherwise not
8 Most realist IR scholars have been simply assuming the agency of the states as persons. Others sincehave become more self-conscious about anthropomorphising states and have conceded that agency canonly be appropriately placed within individuals and that the personhood of states in the internationalrelations is but a metaphor: a shorthand for the complex web of relations and struggles which take placeat the domestic level. Alexander Wendt, however, in his Social Theory of International Politics (1999) andin the forum discussion in the Review ofInternational Studies dedicated to the problem of personhood ofstates, has taken an unequivocal stance that “states are people too” in a quite literal, and not metaphoricalsense. Brent Steele, treats nation-states as actors that seek ontological security (Steele 2008: 3). He arguesthat nation-states attempt to maintain a sense of oneness and sameness over time and space and in orderto achieve such a state of coherence, unity and continuity the construct narratives of themselves andengage in practices that solidify their identity and spatial boundaries of the self. Jennifer Mitzen (2006)argues that nation-states act in the interests of their self-identity, sometimes, even at the expense to theirphysical security.
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only delineate the state territorially by separating Inside from Outside, Self from Other,but also creates “moral spaces” of identity (Campbell, 1998: 73).
Individual and collective identities are mutually constitutive and it is hard todisentangle them. Collective identities are called upon in individuals’ constructions ofcoherent self-identities, as well as institutions like the state whose function is defined asprotecting that identity, are anthropomorphised to be seen as acting to protect thoseidentities. Judith Butler (1999) has argued that identity is performative. A successfulperformance, however, depends on audiences’ reception. The officials’ hegemonicrepresentation of the state as the provider of both physical and ontological security forits citizens is often challenged by subgroup actors and various societal practices. Areified vision whereby state’s ontological security automatically satisfies its individualmembers’ (citizens’) needs, omits from the description the important process ofcontestations of identity that take place within a society. This view reflects the logic ofrepresentation, where a state as an institution is supposed to represent the “people”, orthe “nation” in whom the sovereignty of the state is vested.
Anthony Lang (2002) argues that “the state is embodied and represented in thediplomat/soldier” (Lang, 2002: 18). He writes that “state representatives believe that intheir political and ethical actions they are embodying the state agency of the communitythey represent” (Lang, 2002: 29). It is in those moments of embodiment andrepresentation that the state really comes into existence (17). Regardless of theindividuals’ differences in terms of their ontological security, there is a sharedcommitment within state structure, among the elites and among the population to thepreservation of the state’s self-identity.
I do not believe that states can justifiably be analysed as persons writ large. I agree herewith Ringmar in that there is no need to discuss the problem of state action in terms ofontological commitments. States exist in so far as they are characters in the stories toldabout them by the individual actors who claim the authority and the will to speak onbehalf of ‘the people’ and thus the state. A state therefore is personified metaphoricallyby individuals and collectives claiming the right to impersonate and embody ‘thepeople’. Ringmar in his book Identity, Interest and Action (1996) proposes to focus onthe contestation of the concept, rather than its essence (45). He, however, takes the
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metaphorical (“as if”) approach to state personhood one step further to develop a“narrative theory of action” (1996, Chapter 3). Once one adopts this “narrativistic”perspective the ontological quandary regarding what constitutes an “actor” and whattheir “existence” ceases to be relevant:
It is simply not possible to say what an actor would be ‘in him-, her-, or itself’, since he, she or itcan only come to exist as acting, as preparing to act, or as just having acted. An actor is not what aperson or a group ‘really is’ since actors exist only in the narratives they tell about themselves orthat are told about them. Actors exist in stories and nowhere else, and stories are governed bynarratological, not ontological requirements (74-75).Therefore, while I disagree with anthropomorphisation of states, I believe that they‘exist’ as persons within the narratives constructed by various actors that claim to speakand act on behalf of ‘the nation’, ‘the people’, or ‘the state’.
Metonymy and synecdoche: Impersonating and embodying the sovereign
Pier Bourdieu pointed out the power of speech acts, such as naming, to bring about thevery existence of the groups and entities which are supposed to be described.Arguments about identities, classifications and the boundaries of the groups, accordingto Bourdieu, are in the fact, “the struggles over the monopoly of the power to makepeople see and believe, to get them to know and recognise, to impose the legitimatedefinition of the divisions of the social world and, thereby, to make and unmake groups”(Bourdieu, 1991: 221). Similarly, after the group has been brought into existence by theact of naming it and its recognition by the relevant audiences, it can only continue itsexistence by delegating its voice to a spokesperson “who will bring it into existence byspeaking for it, that is, on its behalf and in its place” (Bourdieu, 1991: 249). The“mystical body” of the people is therefore created out of a collection of individualsthrough these discursive practices (Bourdieu, 1991: 209).
The ‘people’ therefore is personified through a body metaphor and impersonated byspokespeople designated as the voice of the collective person. Impersonations of thestate can take on a form of a demonstration, a theatrical performance of ‘the people’ asa whole. Alternatively, individuals can impersonate the state, the nation or ‘the people’in their capacity as state officials, army or police servicemen, diplomats, or simply
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individuals in interactions with outsiders of the political community. Individuals canimpersonate and embody the state in various ways. Alisher Faizullaev argues that while“ontologically states are not persons ... phenomenologically individuals make themsuch” (Faizullaev, 2007: 538). In his opinion, individuals experience states as personsand those individuals are capable of identifying themselves with states, with this stateidentity being “different from national, social or political identities” (Faizullaev, 2007:538).
Sovereignty is embodied by many performances within state institutions such as thearmy. Madeliene Reeves, for example, describes how the state is ‘written’ onto thebodies of soldiers by the abusive practices of dedovshchina,9 experienced by peoplesubjected to body-searches when crossing the border, manifested in posturing of borderguards and customs officials on the borders (Reeves 2007). The state leaves its markson the bodies of people making them into subjects, soldiers or bureaucrats(representatives of the state), while people come to impersonate the state both in themeaning of assuming the personality and authority of the state and imitating, mimickingthe appearance and character of that personality.
Narrative analysis: telling stories of Self and Other
This thesis adopts a narrative conception of identity. A narrative identity, according toRicoeur, is constructed dynamically within a narrative of one’s life (‘a life story’) as“durable properties of a character” (195). According to the narrative theory, developedby Walter Fisher, people are all essentially story-tellers and these story-telling humansare significantly different from the economics’ ‘rational actors’ (Fisher 1987). Narrativeconception of rationality is based on coherence and fidelity of the stories told, not onhow much is known about the facts of the world and merit of the arguments advancedin defence of a particular course of action. While the rationalist world is that of puzzleswaiting to be solved, the narrative world is composed of stories which we can choose to
9Dedovshchina is the informal system of subjection and brutalisation of the new conscripts by the seniorconscripts about to be demobilised (dedy) or by the officers formerly in former Soviet army, and nowfound in the post-Soviet armed forces. It is equivalent to the English terms ‘hazing’ and ‘bullying’, but inmore extreme cases can amount to torture and other degrading and inhumane treatment. There areknown cases of fatalities as a result of dedovshchina.
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create, re-arrange and constantly re-write as we try to make sense of our lives and theworld around us (Fisher 1987).
Indeed, it has been argued by a group of scholars working on the intersection ofcognitive psychology, linguistics and social sciences that human thinking isfundamentally metaphorical and narrative (for example, Paul Ricour 1977, Soyland1994, Lakoff and Johnson 2003). Keith Shimko in his essay entitled “Foreign PolicyMetaphors: Falling ‘Dominoes’ and Drug ‘Wars’" (1995), examines the role thatanalogical and metaphorical thinking plays in foreign policy decision making. Heapplies the use of metaphorical thinking onto the script/schema theory of cognitivepsychology. Analogies and metaphors therefore are a means of making sense of theworld by tying new information onto the existing network of scripts thus rendering itunderstandable and manageable. Metaphors are used in the initial stages of decisionmaking (“framing” of the problem), “defining the situation, analysing the issues andstakes involved, and perhaps suggesting a general approach; the actual process of“problem solving” requires the use of historical analogies in order to identify specificcourses of action and evaluate their prospects for success or failure. The role ofmetaphors in decision making is significant if metaphorical thinking is indeedinstrumental in framing the problem. Shimko concludes by stating “metaphoricalthinking, like analogical thinking, is probably ‘inescapable’ because people have nochoice but to rely on what they already know to understand what they do not know andon past experiences to understand and solve new problems” (Shimko in Neak et al,1995: 82).
Creation of narrative meaning is a mental process that helps people to combinedisparate episodes, events and actions into meaningful and coherent stories, thusmaking sense of the world around them and helping one understand his or her place inthe narrative and, therefore, in the world as well. Not only does narrative constructionhave this sense-making function but it also serves as the subject-constituting cognitivemechanism (Polkinghorne 1988). In order to be part of a story one has to have acoherent and continuous identity which is more or less constant. Thus ‘biographicalnarratives’ on an individual level help construct one’s life story as that of a coherentsubject; collective narratives (or myths) have a function of sustaining shared beliefs andupholding communal values and thus are important for societal cohesion.
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Narratives are held together by metaphorical thinking:
Human experience is not organised according to the same model we have constructed for thematerial realm. I envision the primary organising principles of human experience is more akin tothose that construct poetic meaning than to those that construct the proofs of formal logic.Experience makes connections and enlarges itself through the use of metaphoric processes thatlink together experiences similar but not exactly the same, and it evaluates items according to theposition they hold in relation to larger wholes (Polkinghorne 1988: 16).All elements in a narrative are evaluated according to their contribution to the finalresolution of the story, or its ‘point’. Often times narratives can be retrospectivelyrearranged, their respective elements re-evaluated in the light of the eventual outcomeof the story. Once the final outcome is known ‘bad’ characters and their actions canbecome ‘good’ and vice versa depending on what the goal or the desired outcome of thenarrative is considered to be. This is very important for our understanding of humansciences, because people and scientists often build their explanations based on sometype of narrative in which all elements are connected by a plot highlighting eachindividual element’s contribution to the development and resolution of the story andthe achievement of the final outcome of the story. A good example of this is the varietyof narrative explanations of the collapse of the Soviet Union. A narrative explanation isby definition retroactive since it clarifies the significance of the events that had occurredbased on the outcome that has followed (21).
Identity is normally understood as a perceived continuity, sameness and wholeness of aperson’s conception of self over time and space. Paul Ricoeur makes a distinctionbetween identity understood as sameness and identity as selfhood, arguing that they arenot the same and only intersect in one sense – both are perceived as having somefundamental permanence in time (Wood, 1991: 189-192). People attempt to achieve aconstant and coherent sense of self by ‘telling stories’ about themselves. For thisdissertation’s purposes I shall focus on two types of narratives told by peopleimpersonating and embodying the state. The first type of narrative focuses on the past,thus constituting a stable identity which connects the past and present selves, which isespecially important in case of such imagined collective ‘persons’ as ‘the people’, ‘thenation’ or ‘the state’. The second type of ‘story-telling’ locates the narrated self in spaceby tying the collective identity of the sovereign agent to a particular territory.
55
Historiography as a ‘biographical’ narrative of Self and Other
States are constituted in time and space by means of constructing narratives of theirorigins, pasts and futures (“biographical narratives” of Giddens 1991) as well ascreating a presence for themselves in space by constructing “geographies of affection”whereby boundaries between “inside” and “outside”, the “us” and “them” are produced(Ringmar, 1999: 77-78). A “biographical narrative”, according to Anthony Giddens(1991) is a “narrative of the self, the story or stories by means of which self-identity isreflexively understood, both by the individual concerned and the others” (245).
A person with a reasonably stable sense of self-identity has a feeling of biographical continuitywhich she is able to grasp reflexively and, to a greater or lesser degree, communicate to otherpeople. ... A person’s identity is not to be found in behaviour, nor – important though this is – inthe reactions of others, but in the capacity to keep a particular narrative going (Giddens, 1991:54, emphasis in the original).Biographical narratives of the states take the form of historiographies of particularnations, ethnic groups or, in some cases, simply the territories that the current statesoccupy.
“Geographies of affection” stem from anthropomorphised notions of distance, locationand proximity, which are articulated in relation to a human body (back, front, left, right,within sight, within a walking distance, etc). Positions of elevation in relation to one’sbody as well as the right hand side are associated with light, the sacred and the futureand are hierarchically superior to the profane, dark, and the past that are usually linkedto the posterior and left-hand side (Tuan, 1977: 35). What is close to us is alsoconsidered as safe and superior to what is distant and thus alien (50). An intenseattachment to homeland also closely tied to the practice of ancestor worship, whosegraves are inevitably fixed within a certain locality. One’s human mortality istranscended by the permanence of the land.
Biographical narratives are inseparable from the narratives creating affectivegeographies in that “abstract space, lacking significance” are turned into “concreteplace, filled with meaning” and imbued with time (Tuan, 1977: 199). Whenever anindividual feels loss of control over the events unfolding around him, it is natural toevoke an image of an idealised past, which is rescued from the “crumbling landscapes”
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with the help of various devices, such as museums, artefacts, memorials and so on(Tuan, 1977: 187-188).
Geopolitics as a narrative of belonging
This dissertation explores the spatial dimension of performance of sovereignty from thecritical geopolitics perspective, which looks at geopolitics as a political and discursive
practice (Aalto, 2003: 20). It is political in a Schmittian sense in that it delineates theinside and the outside of the unit of political loyalty, thus creating in-group as opposedto the out-group (Schmitt 2007). This boundary construction is important not onlybecause it actively constructs the link between territoriality of the state to itssovereignty, but also because it creates a ‘friend-enemy’ distinction, which is central toidentity articulation. Geopolitics is also a discursive activity by the virtue of framing andjustifying policies related to ‘other’ places and policing of the state boundaries based ongeopolitical imaginations that construct places and spaces as either safe or dangerous.Therefore, the policies and actions of states are justified in relation to perceived threatsand national interests. Moreover, geopolitical discourses are instrumental forontological assertions of existence of certain places – before any framing of places asdangerous can take place the existence of such a place has to be assumed. With theseassertions also come assumptions of the natural relations between these entities as wellas accounts of their agency and motivations. These are usually achieved through therhetorical device of ontological metaphor that identifies abstract concepts and entitiesas persons (Lakoff and Johnson, 2003: 33). States thus are almost invariably referred toand treated as persons in IR theorising as well as our everyday speech. All theseelements of discourse – entities with their assumed nature and motivations,assumptions of relations existing between various entities, and metaphors used to mapnew concepts onto the familiar ones – are tied together through the construction ofnarratives.
The wholeness and unity of the state and society has been traditionally representedfrom the organismic metaphor in geopolitical thought. The founders of geopoliticsRatzel and Kjellen, conceived of states as ‘living organisms, which are born, grow and
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die’ (Faizullaev, 2007: 537). A similar organismic metaphor of sovereign nation-state asthe most competitive life form in the process of natural selection is described by Spryut(1994). States were also considered as a ‘natural habitat’ for ethnic groups and nationsas biological species fighting for the ‘living space’. Sovereignty is therefore articulatedin a set of practices and speech acts whereby states are personated, impersonated andembodied in particular historical and geographical circumstances.
4. Research design: Sovereignty as a dialogue
Discourse analytic research design in this study has been constructed according to thethird of Lene Hansen’s ‘ideal types’ (2006: 75-82); based on the number of selvesinvolved, the number of events analysed, ‘intertextual models’ utilised and the temporalperspective adopted. The overall research design incorporated four key elements andcan be summarised as follows:
 Number of selves: the discursive encounter seeks to establish two identities orstate-persons. In other words, the analysis does not assume that there areactually two persons communicating within the discursive encounter, merelythat multiple actors seeks to speak on behalf of and represent idealised ‘Tajik‘and ‘Uzbek’ identities, which are simulated, dissimulated and contested in theprocess;
 Number of events: three key events are analysed within this research design: firstone is the delimitation of the borders in 1920s; second is the independence fromthe Soviet Union in 1991; finally, the ongoing ‘event’ of the controversy andpolicies surrounding the construction of the Roghun hydropower station. These‘events’ are related due their significance to the process of state-making andsovereignty-assertion through Tajik-Uzbek relations.
 Intertextual model: The research design uses a mixed intertextual model byanalysing a wide range of sources and discourses. While most of the discussionis focused on the official discourse, wider political debate and culturalrepresentations are also included.
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 Temporal perspective: The study focuses mainly on two moments in central Asianhistory that are crucial for understanding of the nature of statehood andsovereignty. These are the two periods of state-creation: the first being theperiod of delimitation and nation-building in the 1920-30s, and the secondstarting with independence and state-building in the 1990-2000s.
Dialogic analysis: discursive encounters
An important aspect of narrative practices of self-construction examined in thisdissertation is its interactional component. Stories told on behalf of sovereign agentsperform social actions through direct and indirect involvement of audiences. Theprocess of interactive constitution of identity is dynamic. Some research, for example,has demonstrated how the response of the audience made the story-teller change theentire point of the story (Polanyi, 1985: 63-74). Narratives, being in essence stories thatwe tell about ourselves and the world around us, are embedded in a social process ofinteraction with significant others. Stories are told to audiences and gain or loose theircredibility from reactions of the listeners. Audiences are involved in the constructionand reconstruction of stories, either directly, through engaging in a dialogue, orindirectly, through the process of what Bakhtin referred to as “hidden dialogicality”:
Imagine a dialogue of two persons in which the statements of the second speaker are omitted,but in such a way that the general sense is not at all violated. The second speaker is presentinvisibly, his words are not there, but deep traces left by these words have a determininginfluence on all the present and visible words of the first speaker. We sense that this is aconversation of the most intense kind, for each present, uttered word responds and reacts withits every fiber to the invisible speaker, points to something outside itself, beyond its own limits,to the unspoken words of another person. (Bakhtin, 1984: 197).According to Bakhtin, in the drama that is every utterance there are three ‘characters’involved, three ‘voices’: the personal voice of an intentional speaker (intentionality), thevoice of the audience it is addressed to (addressivity), and the voices of the storytellerswho came before you (intertextuality) (Bakhtin, 1986b: 121-122, quoted in Wertsch2002: 16). Discourse analysts have classified narratives’ functions as referential and
dialogic (Ricoeur 1981, Wertsch 2002: 57-60). The former “concerns the relationbetween narratives and the settings, actors, and events they depict”, while the latter areabout “the relations between one narrative and another” (Wertsch, 2002: 62).
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The methodological choice of analysis of so-called “discursive encounters” in this thesisallows “to contrast the discourse of the Self with the Other’s ‘counter-construction’ ofSelf and Other” (Hansen, 2006: 76). Most of the studies utilising the method ofdiscourse analysis across different disciplines looked at the constructions of the Self(usually a European or ‘Western’) in relation to or in opposition to an exoticOrientalised Other (Said 1978, Campbell 1992, Doty 1996, Neumann 1999).
Those studies, however, do not examine the other’s discourse of that self (therelationship here is reversed, of course, and the other becomes the self and vice versa).Such ostensible absence of the discourse analytical studies of discursive encounters iseasily explained by practical difficulties of gaining access to texts produced by the non-European other, both in physical and linguistic sense. Unlike other studies of identity ininternational relations that applied discourse analytical strategy to the unequaldiscursive and political power relations between a former colonial power and a post-colonial subject, this study focuses on two post-Soviet states’ formulations of identity inrelation and in opposition to one another.
This is an interesting project for two main reasons. First, we can see that constructionsof identity in international relations are not necessarily formed aroundsuperiority/inferiority. Discursive encounters inevitably take place within the contextof unequal power relations, whereby the terms and boundaries, within which possiblediscourse can take place are usually delineated by the more powerful of theinterlocutors. The other, however, can be represented not only as inferior, but alsothreatening or simply foreign to the point of indifference. Second, in case of Tajikistanand Uzbekistan, where identity boundaries are often indeterminate and ambiguous, it isof interest to see how identity and territorial boundaries are constituted throughdiscourse and practice of foreign policy, historiography and geopolitics.
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Research design: Sovereignty as Dialogue
Above is the figure based on the research design model as proposed by Lena Hansen(2006: 75), modified by taking into account the spatial dimension of this researchproject. The figure summarises all the relevant components of the research design.There are two main components that set this research apart from other similardiscourse analytic accounts in the study of IR. First, this is one of the first studies whichsystematically undertakes a dialogic study of identity construction in Central Asia (theonly other I am aware of is Megoran 2004). Second, the study incorporates both thestudy of articulation of sovereign identity of the state through time (historiographicnarratives) and space (geopolitics of water use).
Sovereignty
as Dialogue
Number of
selves:
Two
Number of
events:
three (related
by issue)
Temporal
perspective:
two periods of
state-creation
Intertextual
model:
Mixed (mostly
official
discourse)
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Conclusion
Two tendencies have been the source of ambiguity in the various conceptualisations ofsovereignty. First, there is the fact that the referent object of sovereignty has shiftedover time with new signs standing for the transcendental entity of God as the ultimatemaster-signifier. Second, there is consistent recourse to the anthropomorphicconceptualisations of the varying referent objects of sovereignty. The evolution of theconcept is the story of ‘quilting’ of various signifiers to the empty master-signifier ofsovereignty following the logic of representation, whereby metaphor of a sovereign as aperson (with a body, consciousness, morality and emotional states, and life cyclescomparable to that of a human being) emerged as the basis of the main narratives.
The following chapter examines the evolution of the concept of statehood andsovereignty in Central Asia and traces the path of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan toindependence. We are going to see how the ‘people’ were redefined by the Soviet stateas both ‘national/ethnic’ and ‘proletarian’ people and how the Sovietisation of CentralAsia changed the basis for sovereign statehood from dynastic into nationaldetermination. A brief history of the delimitation of Central Asia will demonstrate theroots of the Tajik-Uzbek antagonism, which is still relevant today both within academiccircles discussing ‘ethnogenesis’ and ‘history of statehood’, and inpolicy circles debatingthe proper use of region’s water resources.
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Chapter Three
Two Periods of State-Creation
We have Italy; now, let’s have Italians(Massimo D'Azeglio on Italian unification)
This chapter investigates two periods of state-creation in Central Asia: the emergence ofthe Tajik and the Uzbek Soviet Socialist republics in 1920s and the period ofsovereignisation and independent statehood since 1991. These two periods arepresented in chronological order but each thematic section incorporates both. First, thechapter turns to the events preceding the demarcation of the current borders of theTajik and the Uzbek state in 1920s. An account of the post-independence debatesregarding the history of delimitation is outlined in that section. Second, the case of Sarts- the group that went from being the main category used to describe the population ofCentral Asia to complete disappearance from political discourse in 1920s – is discussed.The Sarts reappear in the post-independence period within the academic disputesbetween Tajik and Uzbek historians and ethnographers. Finally, the chapter isconcluded by a discussion of how in the post-Soviet period sovereign statehood itselfbecomes elevated into the status of ideology and a normative requirement. Thischapter, therefore, engages with two formative periods for Central Asian states, linkingthem across time and space.
1. The delimitation of national republics: the process, the rationale
and the post-Soviet interpretations
Prior to the military expansion of the Russian Empire into Central Asia, there were threemajor dynastic state formations in the region – the Khanates of Qoqand and Khiva andthe Bukhara Emirate (Iskhakov, 1997: 17). All three of these state formations were
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ruled by Uzbek1 dynasties and the boundaries among them were under constantcontestation (Bregel, 2003: 62; Akhmedzhanov, 1995, 4; Iskhakov, 1997: 16).Boundaries and identities in Central Asia during that period were characterized by highfluidity and areas of shifting overlap (Brower 1997, Slezkine 1997).
Figure 1. The end of the 19th century and the early 20th century: Western Turkestan under
Russian rule (Bregel 2003: 93)
1 In the 18th century the basins of the Amu Darya and Syr Darya passed under the control of three Uzbekkhanates. These were, from west to east, the Qunggirats based in Khiva in Khorezm (1717–1920), theMangits in Bukhara (1753–1920), and the Mings in Kokand (c. 1710–1876). Source: .Soucek 2000: 177-180.
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Russian imperial conquest in late 19th century resulted in establishing of theGovernorate-General of Turkestan, which incorporated the former Khanate of Qoqand,with an administrative center in Tashkent (Alimova & Rtveladze, 2001: 122). Unlike theterritories to the north that were fully incorporated into the empire, the Khanate ofKhiva and Emirate of Bukhara received a special status of nominal independence(Iskhakov, 1997: 28). While Bukhara nominally remained independent, Khiva became aprotectorate directly administered from Petroaleksandrovsk (Amu-daryinskiy otdel ofthe Sir-daryinskaya oblast within Turkestan General-Governorship) thus beingsubordinate to Tashkent. Both Bukhara and Khiva retained full control over theirinternal affairs however, only having to abolish slavery and reduce their armies inaccordance with their agreement with Russia (Bregel, 2003: 90). The Russianauthorities refrained from inferring into the internal affairs of Khiva and Bukhara. TheTurkestan administration, governed by General Von Kaufman, deemed the achievementof a “stable peace with Bukhara” and widening of trade relations with it as its mainpolicy success, claiming that for the Russian empire there is no need to annex theemirate. It was considered much more beneficial to rule with the help of an obedientemir, rather than keep a standing army and the administrative apparatus necessary formaintaining control over colonial territories (Alimova & Rtveladze, 2001: 124).Although initially Russian forces were reluctant to establish formal rule over the region,the conquest crept on. Between 1868 and 1876, substantial parts were annexed fromBukhara (including Samarkand) and Khiva, while the remaining parts were left asprotectorates; the Qoqand khanate was abolished altogether with all its territoriesannexed (Soucek, 2000: 198-199).
The momentous changes that took place at the heart of the Russian empire in the firsttwo decades of the twentieth century did not affect its southern protectorates in anysignificant measure initially. The Bolshevik revolution was reenacted in Tashkentshortly after the fateful events in Russia and was wholly an undertaking of the ethnicRussian and other ‘European’ workers and exile revolutionaries. The ProvisionalGovernment in Petrograd was initially represented by the Turkestan Committee inTashkent, and, after October 1917, the Tashkent Soviet. The ‘Europeans’ continued toexclude the local population from power structures, and rejected the calls for a coalitiongovernment from the indigenous ‘Muslim’ councils, justifying their refusal by portrayal
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of the Muslim leaders as ‘backward’, non-proletarian and incapable of self-administration. The alienated local elites reacted by establishing parallel “Muslim”soviets (Soucek, 2000: 211).
In December 1917 a Congress of the Muslims and Ulama in Kokand declared aterritorial autonomy “in union with the Federal Democratic Republic of Russia” (Soucek,2000: 213). The Kokand Provisional Government (Quqond/Turkiston muhdoriyati),which existed till February 1918, turned out to be a “head without a body”, lacking anarmy, wide support of the population and financial means, it was crushed by theRussian troops sent by the Tashkent Soviet (Rakowska-Harmstone, 1970: 19). Theperiod between December 1917 and 1918 in Turkestan was therefore marked by aconfrontation between two conceptions of the legitimate basis for sovereignty. TheTashkent Soviet was guided by revolutionary ideas and saw the government in Kokandas bourgeois and therefore illegitimate. The indigenous leaders in Kokand, however,were struggling for self-determination and saw the Tashkent government as acontinuation of colonial rule. Another layer of confrontation was added by acontestation of authority and power between the central government in Russia and thelocal communists in Tashkent (Soucek, 2000: 217). The Governorate-General ofTurkestan, therefore, was transformed into the Turkestan Autonomous Soviet SocialistRepublic (TASSR) in April 1918. Territorially it remained unaltered until nationaldelimitation in 1924.
At the same time as the ‘Muslim’ autonomy was struggling for recognition in Kokand,the Jadids of Bukhara and Khiva (the so-called ‘Young Khivans’ and ‘Young Bukharans’)saw the revolution as an opportunity to shake off the double-burden of monarchicaldespotism and tsarist colonialism (Khalid 1999; Soucek, 2000: 221). They appealed tothe Soviet in Tashkent to intervene. Khiva fell in February 1920 and in April that yearthe khanate was declared Khorezmian People’s Soviet Republic (PSR). Bukharafollowed the suit in September when the Young Bukharans started an uprising inChardjou and backed up by Frunze’s Red Army division succeeded in taking over thepower in the emirate. Emir said Alim Khan fled to Eastern Bukhara (the part of theemirate that was to become Tajikistan). In October that year Bukhara Emirate wastransformed into Bukharan PSR (Soucek, 2000: 222). Jadids Fayzulla Khojaev and
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Abdulrauf Fitrat became the first prime minister and the foreign minister of the newrepublic, respectively (Soucek, 2000: 223).
Both of the Peoples’ republics of Khiva and Bukhara were still considered independentand their relations with Russian were determined by the treaty of alliance signed inMarch 1921. Up until the national delimitation the boundaries of these territorialformations remained unchanged. It was only in 1924 that the plans started to be madefor Bukhara, Khiva and Turkestan to be put “into a big cauldron” and divided “accordingto the nationalities principle thus creating new republics” (Karasar, 2002: 204).
A crude division?
The process of transformation of the former Governorates-General and Russianprotectorates into the Soviet Union republics has been labelled as the ‘nationalterritorial delimitation’ [Natsional’no-territorial’noe razmezhevanie] in Soviethistoriography and adopted by scholars of the Soviet Union (Soucek, 2000: 223). TheNational territorial delimitation of 1924-29 reorganized the political boundaries andintroduced a radically new principle of social and political identity in the region. Hirschidentified three main principles that guided the delimitation process: the ethnographic(‘national’) that ensured that compactly habituating ethnic groups are given autonomyor in case of larger groups, a territorial unit; the economic viability principle maintainedthat economically interdependent regions should not be separated; and finally, theprinciple of administrative and political rationality, which often took precedence overthe other two (Hirsch, 2000: 211).
Although both the Khorezm and Bukhara People’s Socialist republics were initiallytransformed into the Soviet Socialist Republics in order to qualify to join the USSR (inOctober 1923 and September 1924 respectively), a decision was then made to remoldthem together with Turkestan into completely new federal units (Soucek, 2000: 224). Inlate October of 1924 the Central Executive Committee of the USSR confirmed thedecisions by all relevant regional bodies regarding the national territorial delimitationin Central Asia. As a result, national territorial units belonging to three tiers of Sovietstatehood were formed. The highest within this hierarchy of statehood was the status
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of a Socialist Soviet Republic (SSR), which was a union member and had (declarativelyat least) full sovereignty and the right to secession. Second in the degree of autonomywere the autonomous republics (ASSR), which were included within a socialist republic.Finally, there were autonomous oblasts and regions, national districts and villagesoviets and even collective farms providing cultural autonomy to ethnic groupscontained within an SSR or an ASSR (Martin in Suny and Martin, 2001: 73). This hasbeen called “matrioshka” system after the famous Russian nesting dolls (Slezkine, 1994:430).
In the summer of 1920, Vladimir Lenin famously wrote a resolution ordering “to 1)draw up a map (ethnographic, etc) of Turkestan with subdivisions into Uzbekia, Kirgiziaand Turkmenia; 2) To find out the conditions of merger or division of these three partsin detail” (Gordienko, 1959: 150). This order started the process of negotiation of thefuture boundaries of Central Asia. Despite the fact that it was not put into action until1924 this document points to several important facts regarding the Soviet conceptionsof nationalities in the region. First, we find out that there existed a generalunderstanding of there being three main identity groups in the area with languages,lifestyles, appearances and cultures distinct enough to be identified for future territorialformations fit for nation-statehood. The finer differences between the Kirgiz and theKazakh (or Kara-Kirgiz and Kirgiz at the time) and between the Uzbeks and the Tajikswere articulated later, in the course of the process of delimitation. Moreover, there wasa certain measure of foreign policy consideration in the implementation of nationalitiespolicies in Central Asia, which was seen by the Bolsheviks as a “bridge to the East”, ameans to propel the global revolution (Karasar 2002).
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Figure 2.1. Central Asia before delimitation (1920-1924). Source: Carlisle 1994, p. 112.
As a result three major national units emerged initially: (1) the Kirgiz [=Kazakh]Autonomous Socialist Republic within the Russian Federation comprised of the formerTurgayskaya, Semipalatinskaya, Akmolinskaya and Ural’skaya oblasts of Turkestan SSRas well as a part of Astrakhan and the Mangishlak area of the Zakaspiyskaya oblast; (2)the Turkmen SSR made of the territories of the Zakaspiyskaya oblast (exceptMangishlak, which was given to Kirgiz [=Kazakh ASSR in 1920]); and (3) the Uzbek SSR,which initially included the territory of Bukhara SSR, western parts of Khorazm SSR(Khiva) and Sirdaryinskaya, Samarkandskaya and Ferganskaya oblasts of the TurkestanASSR (Bregel 2003: 94).
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Figure 3.2.. Central Asia during delimitation (1924-1929). Source: Carlisle 1994, p. 113.
National delimitation in the region was officially put on the agenda with the report byFaizulla Hodjaev “On delimitation of Soviet Central Asia into a set of republics accordingto national identity (O razmezhevanii Sovetskoi Srednei Azii na riad respublik po
natsional’nomu priznaku)” at the Central Committee of Bukhara Communist Party’ssession in February 1924 (Masov, 2004: 357). A committee was created to deliberateon the most sensible way to conduct the delimitation to meet both the requirement ofnational self-determination and economic viability. Haugen argues that ‘Uzbek-Tajik’emerged as a joint identity counterpoised to the largely nomadic and rural ‘Turkmen’and ‘Kazakh’ (2003: 156-7). The separation of ‘Tajik’ from ‘Uzbek’ only occurred as areaction to rapid ‘nationalisation’ of the new Uzbek SSR within the short periodbetween 1924 and 1926. Distinct ‘Tajik voices’, thus, emerged only as a result of‘nationalisation of political discourse’ within the ‘Uzbek-Tajik’ republic, whereby Tajiknationalism developed as a “kind of minority nationalism that defined itself inopposition to ‘Uzbek’” (160).
The Uzbek sub-committee was adamant in its rejection of merger into a “Central AsianFederation” and emphasized that “it is an unconditional necessity for and independentUzbek Republic to enter the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the same basis as the
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Ukraine Republic and other Soviet Republics” (Carlisle, 1994: 118). The committeedrew up theses that envisaged creation of “special Soviet republics” of Uzbeks andTurkmens, reunification of the Kyrgyz (Kazakh) population with the already exitingKazakh ASSR (within Russian Federation); the document also stated that “Tajik people(narodnost’ tadzhikov) will create an autonomous oblast with Uzbekistan – Bukharacomposed of Match, Karategin and Garm” (Masov, 2004: 357).
This statement then was replicated in other official documents on the issue and is ofinterest for our analysis for two reasons. First, the hyphenation of Uzbekistan andBukhara demonstrates that the project of Uzbekistan was understood by the local elitesas synonymous with Bukhara. Second, it shows the narrow understanding of Tajiks asthe mountain people, whereas the urbanite Farsi-speaker were neither considered Tajikby others nor self-identified as such. The project of Tajik autonomous oblast’ was toinclude only the high mountainous regions, populated by peoples speaking a distinctdialect of Farsi language, having a distinct appearance and life style, whose mainoccupation (according to urbanites, who perhaps only had limited contact withmountain dwellers) was “collection and sale in the towns of the valleys of firewood andsnow” (Masov, 1991: 44).
The period between 1924 and 1926 is marked by conspicuous absence of ‘Tajik voices’within the debate on delimitation. The initial low level of interest in self-determinationamong those called ‘Tajiks’ is demonstrated by the quote of Faizulla Hodjaev: “As for theTajiks, in relation to them we have two options: either they can be included in ourrepublic as an autonomous part (kak samostoiatel’aĭa chast’) or, to receive completeindependence as well; on this issue we do not have the opinion of Tajiks themselves”(Masov, 2004: 360). To some scholars it indicates the lack of distinct nationalconsciousness of those who could potentially identify themselves as Tajiks at that pointin time (Haugen 2003, Schoeberlein 1994). To other observers, most notably Tajiknationalists like Rahim Masov, this is a sign of pan-Turkic ambition to silence andmarginalize Tajik voices and the false-consciousness of ‘Tajiks’ themselves, who‘poisoned’ by the venom of pan-Turkism betrayed their ‘true’ national interests (Masov,2008: 53).
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During the initial stages of the process of deliberations on the national territorialdelimitation of Central Asia in 1924, Tajiks were not represented as a subcommitteecomprised of the Party members self-identifying as Tajiks. According to Masov, thatwas all part of the Pan-Turkist/great Uzbek chauvinist conspiracy against Tajikstatehood. It seems to me, however, that among the elites from among urbanintelligentsia of Samarkand, Khudjand and Bukhara, whose primary identities werelocal and political, there were simply no sympathizers with the cause of Tajikindependence. There was nobody to represent Tajiks and therefore the subcommitteewas created for pure pro forma three days prior to the session of Central Committeethat adopted the plan of delimitation (Soviet Encyclopedia 1974: 107). Thesubcommittee was comprised of ‘Uzbek’ communists Ch. Imamov, A. Hodjibaev and M.Saidjanov, who, according to Masov were ill-placed to defend the interests of the Tajiks.The ambivalence regarding whose interests are reflected by the delimitation can beobserved in the minutes of the meeting that discussed the project of Tajik AO(autonomous oblast’). Upon hearing the details of project one of the participants of thesession, Hodjanov, made the following remarks, addressing the ‘representative’ ofTajiks:
We have included forty percent of Tajiks into the autonomous oblast’, while the rest are left withnothing [ostaĭutsĭa ni pri chem]. Furthermore, the cultural centers of Tajiks remain within Uzbekrepublic, whereas the mountainous, unreachable places we are giving to the oblast’. Perhaps, it isnot your fault. You were not given much more (laughter in the audience), but nonetheless thishardly resembles ‘self-determination’. If there is such little need in this oblast’, then the ExecutiveBureau is not forcing anyone into self-determination... I find this issue insufficiently developed,and although comrades Tajiks, it seems, are satisfied with its resolution, I am not (laughter).What kind of autonomy is that, if out of one million and two hundred thousand Tajiks eighthundred thousand are left outside? I think that based on the decree of Politburo we can include 3people in the bureau of the committee, but not to declare the tops of the mountains as a republic,this is quite insufficient and if you were to include me among Tajiks, then I, doubtlessly, wouldnot say much more (Masov, 1991: 45-6).Further in the minutes comrade Imamov asked Hodjanov to refrain from givingopinions “in the role of Tajiks”, saying that “one cannot be more Tajik than Tajiksthemselves (laughter), and if he [Hodjanov] is not satisfied with the existing state ofaffairs, that is due to the fact that there is no difference between us [Uzbeks] and Tajiks”(Masov, 1991: 47). Finally, when the session proceeded to voting on the issue, the chair,I.A. Zelenskiy asked “Who’s in favour of the project proposed by the Tajiks?” Hodjanovcorrected “By the Uzbeks” (Masov, 1991: 50).
72
Being the head of the Institute of History of the Tajik Academy of Sciences Rahim Masov(1991) has been promoting the view that existence of Tajiks as an ethnic group of theirown was systematically silenced and denied by the pan-Turkist forces that werepredominant in Central Asia in the first two decades of the twentieth century. Pan-Turkism and “Great Uzbek chauvinism” are equated in Tajik history writing, and theterminology used to make the link quotes directly from the Soviet discourse onnationalities (Masov, 2004: 356). While the Soviets promoted national self-determination of the peoples that were oppressed during the Tsarist colonization, theydistinguished between “good” self-determination and “bad” great power chauvinism,“the nationalism of oppressor nations and the nationalism of oppressed nations, thenationalism of large nations and the nationalism of small nations” (Martin, 2001: 71).Thus the more numerous peoples of a particular region were accused of chauvinisticpolicies and attitudes towards lesser ethnicities within those territories. For instance,there were accusations of great Georgian chauvinism towards Ossetians andAbkhazians; Great Russian chauvinism towards Belorussians; and, similarly, greatUzbek chauvinism towards Tajiks (Martin, 2001: 71-2).
While almost all of the major ethnic groups claimed some sort of autonomy and createdinstitutions for advancement of their educational and cultural needs, Tajiks had none.In fact, an argument was advanced (as was the case with the Sart population) that therewas no real difference between the Tajiks and the Uzbeks (Masov, 1991: 47).Assimilation of Tajiks was seen as an inevitable and desirable outcome of state-buildingand modernization of the region. Tajik language was viewed by many (as well as theArabic script that was used to write it) as the language of the Amir (the dethronedmonarch) and therefore a symbol of feudalism and backwardness (Masov, 1991: 73).Thus, for instance, Turkestan newspaper published an article entitled “In the country ofTajiks” in January 1924 that stated:
The desire to use this language [Tajik – R. M.] means, first of all, a striving to stand on thesidewalk of life [otdelit’sĭa ot zhizni], because life within the stream of history is against it [Tajiklanguage], secondly, the fact of its acceptance means to accept not a useful, but a useless and aredundant language, and therefore the Tajiks need to simply [prosto naprosto] immediatelyswitch to Uzbek and not to hold on to a ‘special Tajik language‘, since ‘the path of social progresshas already determined their fate’ (quoted in Masov 1991: 17).It has been argued that possibility of statehood in parts of East Bukhara was contingentupon the success of the Red Army in fighting the local insurgency of the basmachi
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movement (Bergne, 2007: 31-8). One of the arguments against giving Tajikistan thestatus of a union republic was the lack of dominance of the Soviets on the ground inmany regions populated predominantly by Tajiks. The same applied to the possibility ofunification of the so called “mountain” and “valley” Tajiks into a single administrative-territorial unit, thus creating a ‘Greater Tajikistan’. Representatives of Tajiks fromamong the Uzbek Communists kept saying that ‘at the moment’ the inclusion of allTajiks into a single republic was impossible “neither geographically nor economically”(Masov, 2004: 368). We can see from the statements of various representatives thatthey envisaged possibility and even necessity of multiple revisions of the nationalterritorial delimitation based on the will of people populating certain regions (whichpartially did take place in 1920s-30s). As the chair of the Sredazburo Zelenskiy said inhis official statement regarding the outcomes of the delimitation: “This work [creationof the national republics] we have undertaken in a rough draft version [v cherne], thereis still a lot that has remained unspoken [nedoskazannogo] here; this work has beendone with an axe [prodelana toporom]” (Masov, 1991: 66).
On the 6th of September of 1924 the borders of the Tajik autonomous oblast (AO) werefinalized. The issue was reopened shortly after by the chair of the Central ExecutiveCommittee of East Bukhara Nusratullo Makhsum (Lutfullaev), who upon familiarizinghimself with the minutes of the commission of national territorial delimitation wrote aletter to the Communist Party’s Central Committee addressed to Stalin. In that letter heexpressed an opinion that “the issue concerning the interests of the Tajik people wasresolved unjustly” (Masov, 2004: 369). In Makhsum’s opinion, the borders of the oblastwere drawn incorrectly with a large proportion of territories populated by Tajiksadjacent to the Tajik AO included in Uzbek SSR, while the decision to create the Tajik AOas a subordinate part of Uzbekistan violated the rights of Tajiks to self-determination onthe par with Uzbeks and Turkmen. The cultural centers with predominant Tajikpopulation were also separated from Tajik AO. Bukhara, Samarkand and Khujand thatcould potentially serve as capital cities for Tajikistan remained within Uzbekistanbecause Tajiks and Uzbeks were said to cohabitate peacefully within those regionswhile the economic interests of both groups were considered to be one and the same.Therefore, the Tajik population of the valleys was said to “economically gravitatetowards Uzbek territories” (Masov, 2004: 368). Besides, Samarkand was the capital of
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the Uzbek SSR and therefore all the Tajik population living in and around Samarkandcould not be included in Tajikistan. Some (including first of all Masov) interpret thedecision to have Samarkand as the first Uzbek capital as part of the greater Uzbekconspiracy against Tajik statehood. The main ‘proof’ of their point is that shortly afterthe delimitation the capital was moved from Samarkand to Tashkent (in 1930) thusdemonstrating that the initial choice of capital was instrumental in order to keep thecity and the oblast within Uzbekistan. It is not clear why exactly the change of thecapital happened, but one can suggest that once Samarkand was secured, Tashkent,which was also disputed between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan became the first choicefor the national capital as the biggest and the most industrialized city in the region(Bergne, 2007: 49).
On the 11th of October of 1924 the Politburo of the Central Committee of BolshevikParty ruled to create an autonomous republic of Tajiks (instead of oblast) within UzbekSSR (Masov 2004: 372). The Committee also made a decision to consider inclusion ofPamir as an autonomous oblast within the Tajik ASSR, which eventually, among otherfactors allowed the promotion of Tajikistan to a union republic status (Encyclopedia1974: 108). The territory of the Tajik ASSR was initially comprised of five regions(viloyats) of Bukhara People’s Soviet Republic that were included in it in 1924. Theywere Garm, Dushanbe, Kulyab, Kurgan-Tube regions and Karatag tuman of Sary-Assiyo
viloyat. In the end of November that year additional territories were added to TajikASSR, namely, the parts of former Turkestan Republic – Ura-Yube and Pendjikentregions. Pamir oblast renamed as the Gorno-Badakhshan AO was added to the republic’sterritory in January 1925. Finally, the territory of Khujand okrug of Uzbek SSR enteredterritory of Tajikistan in September of 1929 as a concession to territorial claims ofTajiks when the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic was created (Bergne, 2007: 105). Thusthe territory of Tajik oblast was considerably increased as it grew to first an ASSR andthen to an SSR between 1924 and 1929. However, it fell short of the grand project ofGreater Tajikistan that the Tajik elite aspired to (Abashin 2003).
Tajik historiography describes the five years when Tajikistan existed as an autonomousrepublic within Uzbekistan as the period of extreme hardship and injustice towardsTajik people from Uzbek authorities (Masov 1991, Bergne 2007: 55-85). The Uzbek SSRwas charged with economic wellbeing and development of its subordinate republic.
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The common budget allocated from the Center was to be benevolently redistributedtowards the needs of Tajik ASSR by the Uzbek administrators in Tashkent. In reality,however, Uzbekistan preferred to use the resources allocated for the needs of bothrepublics solely for the development of its own regions (Bergne 2007).
Being a minority within Uzbekistan, Tajiks also relied on Uzbek authorities in provisionof their educational, language and cultural rights. However, the cadres’ practices inUzbek SSR discriminated against other ethnicities, especially Tajiks. Therefore, peoplewere unwilling to openly record their identity as Tajiks or send their children to Tajikschools as that was seen as not conducive to success in one’s career (Bergne 2007). Anappointment to work in Tajikistan was seen as an exile for those, who fell out of favourin Tashkent (Masov 2004: 466). In Samarkand as well as other regions of Uzbekistanpopulated by Tajiks, as documental evidence suggests, teaching in Tajik was prohibitedunder various excuses.
During the census conducted in 1926 Tajiks living in Uzbekistan reportedly wereintimidated into recording themselves as Uzbeks under the threats of being exiled intoformer Eastern Bukhara, the unfriendly and poor mountainous regions that made upTajik ASSR; some of those, who declared their Tajik identity were rumored to had beenremoved from their high posts as a result. One’s social mobility was seen as very muchdepending on the declared nationality, which is why many people found it natural tofollow the path of least resistance in those turbulent times (Schoeberlein 1994).
According to the official Tajik history narrative, the Tajiks as a people were facing thethreat of eventual complete assimilation and disappearance under the willful rule of theUzbek big brother. Therefore, the creation of Tajik SSR was an event of grandiosesignificance, since it “gave a final blow to the assertions of Pan-Turkists to the extentthat Tajiks are not a separate people, but are ‘an Iranised Turkic tribe’. Tajik peoplewere rescued from the danger of dissolution in the environment of Turkic peoples,gained an opportunity to form a nation” (Masov, 2004: 378).
It is still debated whether or not Uzbekistan emerged as the ‘winner’ from thedelimitation process. Roy (2000) and Carlisle (1994) seem to think that Uzbekistan wasaccorded preferential treatment, while Allworth (1990) thought that Soviet border-
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making was anti-Uzbek (‘divide and rule’ theory). Donald Carlisle argues thatUzbekistan was in fact “Bukhara writ large” (1994: 105), while Sergei Abashin writesthat “the Uzbek project was realized in 1920s as a truncated version of the “Turkestanproject”, as a result of which contemporary Uzbek nationalism still bears an imprint ofthe idea of pan-Turkism” (Abashin, 2007: 196). Since there was no possibility for theJadids, who sympathized with and then joined Bolsheviks, to fulfill their Pan-Turkistagenda in the region, Uzbekistan became its Soviet incarnation, Abashin argues.According to this interpretation, the construct of “great Uzbekistan”, which initiallyincluded Tajikistan as an autonomous republic with Uzbek SSR, was reduced to presentborders to counter what was seen as “great nation chauvinism” of Uzbeks towardsTajiks.
The project of “great Tajikistan”, which its founding fathers envisaged and that wouldinclude the lion’s share of present-day Uzbekistan’s most culturally developed urbancenters and fertile lands, failed to materialize as well, due to a host of factors. Arguablythe Tajik demands could not be satisfied, because, according to state-building principlesof the USSR, in order to get a status of the Union republic a republic had to have aninternational border (Hirsch, 2000: 219-224). If Tajik demands for Termez,Surkhandarya and Bukhara oblast’ were met, Uzbekistan would have lost its unionrepublic status and would have to enter “great Tajikistan” project on the rights of anautonomous republic. In other words, there would be a total reversal of roles betweenthe two. In the end, Tajikistan only got Khujand to make it economically viable, while allthe other territories that were claimed remained with Uzbekistan, as the results of 1926census were used, not the 1920 census as Tajiks demanded (Hirsch, 2000: 222).
The local actors and elites were not entirely devoid of agency in the process ofdelimitation. Obiya Chika in an essay entitled When Faizulla Khojaev Decided to Be an
Uzbek explores this politician’s ostensibly radical transition from local/regional identity(Bukharan) to that based on an ethnic designation (Uzbek) in 1924-5 (2001: 99-118).Chika argues that this was a political survival strategy of choice not only on a personallevel. In Chika’s interpretation, Khojaev acted in the interest of preserving Bukhara’sstatehood and sovereignty to the best of his ability given the circumstances. DonaldCarlisle (1994) has convincingly argued that Uzbekistan emerged a clear winner fromthe process of razmezhevanie, which for Uzbeks amounted to reorganization of the
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lands of the former Bukhara emirate to include all of the fertile and industrializedterritories from the neighboring Khiva and Turkestan. In other words, the new UzbekSSR “was in fact a Greater Bukhara”; and the main beneficiaries of the process ofdelimitation were the Bukhara Jadids, including Failzulla Khojaev, the founding father ofUzbekistan, himself (104-5). Chika writes that Khojaev was insisting that Bukharashould enter the USSR on the par with other union republics as an SSR. Once it becameclear that the doors to the Union were shut for Bukhara as a self-standing political entitydue to the negative reputation it had acquired among the Bolsheviks, Khojaev acceptedthe option of national delimitation as a lesser evil in preserving Bukhara even if in adiluted form and rebranded as ‘Uzbekistan’.
Delimitation according to the national principle was by no means the only option on thetable at that point: the alternatives to the national principle of division included: (1)conducting national delimitation only within Turkestan ASSR, i.e. allowing Bukhara andKhiva preserve their independence; (2) creation of a Central Asian Federation byanalogy with the Transcaucasian Federation; and (3) transforming the Turkmen oblastinto a Turkmen Autonomous Republic (Carlisle 1994: 116). Neither of the optionssatisfied the political needs of the day and it was decided to proceed with the nationaldelimitation, thus creating a Turkmen SSR out of the Transcaspian part of Turkestanand an Uzbek SSR composed of Uzbek parts of Bukhara, Khorezm and Turkestan.
This decision was opposed by some prominent party members, most notably Chicherin,the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR. In the period between April andOctober 1924 Chicherin sent a series of letters to the top officials in Moscow, includingStalin, Zinov’ev, and Trotskiy, expressing his concern with the process of delimitation asdamaging the relations with both the West and the Muslim world. In his opinion, “theliquidation of independent Bukhara, one of the most honorable and popular traditionalMuslim states, whose independence we promised to maintain in our agreement withAfghanistan, would without doubt result in great wrath in the Muslim world and astrong movement against us” (Karasar, 2002: 205). Chicherin also quotes FaizullaKhojaev, according to him ‘a very enthusiastic supporter of national delimitation’, assaying that the project was rushed and that “the liquidation of the traditional holyBukhara may create a serious ‘fermentation’ – unrest if not more, among the city-
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dweller middle-bourgeois masses, small commercial classes and big dikham-farmers”(Karasar, 2002: 206).
Chicherin tried to warn the comrades in Kremlin that according to a report by ComradeGerman, “the main initiators of the national delimitation -- the Uzbek commercialbourgeois – hope to get rid of poor areas and create a large cotton producing region,which would provide them with commercial opportunities” (Karasar, 2002: 207).Khojaev was a son of a wealthy Bukharan merchant and could act as a lobbyist ofcommercial interests. Above all, however, the creation of Uzbekistan was a compromisebetween maintaining independence and being absorbed into Turkestan. The option of aunified Soviet Turkestan never appealed to Faizulla Khojaev, even in its early pan-Turkist incarnation promoted by Turar Ryskulov. To him Turkestan was a foreign placeand one subordinated to Russia too. Through his support of the national principle fordelimitation, Khojaev succeeded in his efforts of making Bukhara/Uzbekistan a memberstate of the USSR.
Analysing the rationale for Soviet border-drawing in Central Asia
The process of formation of Tajik and Uzbek identities needs to be analysed not inisolation but within the wider regional context of the events and processes taking placein the region in 1920s, including the process of definition of such designations as‘Kazakh’, ‘Kyrgyz’, ‘Turkmen’, ‘Karakalpak’, ‘Uygur’ and so on. As it’s been mentionedbefore, the Revolution of 1917 has set in motion complex processes of redefinition ofwhat was considered relevant political identities, whereby former excluded groups(such as jadids and local communists) were now given prominence while the discourseof the dominant groups of the pre-revolutionary period were being marginalised anddelegitimised (Soucek 2000: 210-211). The articulation of the answer to the question“Who are ‘the people’ in Turkestan?” and “What is a ‘nation’?” in 1920s was based onthe process of negotiation between Bolsheviks on the one hand and local reformists(jadids and ‘natsional’-communists) and traditionalist elites (ulama and ‘basmachi’) onthe other (Khalid 2001). ‘The common people’ also took a part in negotiating theiridentities locally (Haugen 2003).
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The competing accounts of the rationale for the delimitation in the region are in largepart determined by the fundamental disagreement regarding the nature of the Sovietstate. Difference between different interpretations is fundamentally based in what theimplied definition of ‘the people’ a particular writer has in mind. On the one hand, thosewho see the Soviet Union as primarily an heir of the Russian empire, explain thedelimitation as a ‘divide and rule’ policy, while the people are mostly defined as‘Muslim’ (Bennigsen 1983, Encausse 1979, Allworth 1990). The ‘divide and rule’ thesis,which portrayed the Soviet state as an omnipotent power victimising local population,was advocated by Turkestani émigré community’s accounts of the event (BaymirzaHayit and Mustafa Chokaev).
The resulting ‘nationalities’ and boundaries, according to this school of thought, were‘artificial’ as opposed to ‘genuine’ identity of ‘Ulama’ or ‘Turkestani’ and therefore notonly an unjust and misguided colonial policy but also pregnant with potential for revoltand inter-ethnic strife as a result of the desire of the people to realise their ‘true’identity (Wimbush 1984, Baldauf 1991). Sovietologists adopted the vocabulary ofconstructivism to delegitimise the Soviet definition of ‘the people’, but kept theessentialist conception of primordialists in their assessment of the implications of thepolicies today (Cox 1998). This school of thought also presupposes an omnipotent andomnipresent state or the ‘Centre’ and a somewhat schizophrenic conception of a HomoSovieticus as a silent conformist and a secret dissident at the same time (Yurchak 2006,Mitchell 1990). The arguments of the Sovietologists have been somewhat uncriticallyadopted by some of the post-Soviet scholars of Central Asia both from within the region(for example, Ilkhamov 2002) and from outside (Roy 2000).
On the other hand, those who perceive the USSR to be a modernising and centralisingstate, see it as a practical measure to improve governmentability of the region byrationalising administrative-economic borders and gaining the good will of the localpopulation through promotion of local cultures. ‘The people’ within this interpretationof the delimitation process are defined in ethnic and class terms. The Soviet accountsdelimitation were rooted in the communist class thinking and theory of consecutiveformations based on the mode of production, as well as on the notion that the world isdivided into a finite number of ‘peoples’ which strove to self-determination (Gordienko1959, Yakubovskaya 1960, Vahabov 1961, Landa 1964, Ahmedzhanov 1989, 1995,
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Masov 2000). Soviet anthropology developed a ‘theory of ethnos’, which displayedprimordialist thinking to a large extent, but cannot be reduced to purely organismicmodel (Slezkine 1996, Abashin 2006). Indeed, the radically organic theory of ethnosdeveloped by Gumilev (1989) in late Soviet period was rejected by the scholarlycommunity (but appears to be rather popular in Central Asia). The Soviet policiesactually displayed a curious mix of primordialist beliefs and constructivist mindset andpractices.
While there was a definite continuity between Russian imperial and Soviet rule inCentral Asia, it is debatable to what extent the Soviet Union was indeed an empire(Beissinger 2006, Khalid 2006, Edgar and Blitstein 2006; Northrop 2004; Suny & Martin2001; Hirsch 2000, Slezkine 2000). Some Western scholars hold an opinion that SovietUnion was in that respect no different from other modernising states of that period inworld history, or that it was at least a special kind of an empire -- an ‘affirmative actionempire’, or an ‘empire of nations’, characterised by ‘ethnophilia’, a love of ethnicparticularity (Slezkine 1994, Hirsch 2000, Khalid 2006, Edgar 2006). Another importantcontribution of this group of scholars is recognition of some if limited agency of the localactors in the delimitation process (Sengupta 2000, Haugen 2003, Khalid 2001, Fragner1994, and Chika 2001).
To sum up, the debates regarding motivations behind delimitation are highly complexand are shaped by conventional wisdoms regarding the Soviet nationalities policies thathave roots in the ideological struggle of the Cold War (Sengupta 2000, Abashin 2006,Haugen 2003, Schoeberlein 2004). It can concluded from a review of literature, that theBolsheviks in Moscow as well as local intelligentsia and to some extent ‘common’ peopleof Central Asia articulated a concept of ethnic national identity that was compatible withthe Soviet liberation project. Although there was a certain degree of uneasiness amongcommunists about possibility of ‘bad’ bourgeois-type nationalism emerging out of theself-determination agenda, the Soviet system promoted ‘ethnic particularism’ as ameans to promote the development of good (“oppressed-nations”) nationalisms duringthe New Economic Policy (NEP) years (Slezkine 1994).
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The curious case of disappearing and reappearing Sarts
There is ongoing debate on the nature of Russian Orientalism, and whether theconcerns outlined by Edward Said (1978) are applicable to the specific historical andgeographic context of Russia’s encounter with its ‘Orient‘(Khalid 2000, Knight 2000,Todorova 2000 Brower & Lazzerini 1997). In line with Said’s discussion of the closeconnection between knowledge and power in imperialist projects,2 Tsarist orientalistethnographers and linguists that followed the troops and administration made a firstattempt to categorise the colonial population according to the ethnic principle (Brower1997: 115). Benedict Anderson and Edward Said pointed out the importance of thepractice of naming and categorising the subject populations for the colonial enterpriseand the impact of such classification for the on the emergence of national identityamong the colonial people (Anderson 1991, Said 1978). Very much like other EuropeanOrientalist traditions, Tsarist Russia’ orientalist school was based on a combination ofnotions of anthropological superiority, cultural distancing, racism, and religious dogma.It was an important “tool of Russian rule in Turkestan” after the tsarist army conqueredthe region in late 19th century (Brower 1997, 114). The ethnographers, historians,linguists, statisticians, administrators, and even artists of the Russian empire used aneclectic list of criteria to deal with the diversity of subject population (Slezkine 1997,Holquist 2001, Sanders 1999). In addition to the linguistic criteria, Russianethnographers used a great variety of data subsumed under the categories of“sustenance, sex, and settlement” (Slezkine 1997: 40). However, Russian Orientalismwas arguably also greatly influenced by the European ideas of nationalism at the time ofthe conquest of Turkestan between 1870s and the 1917 revolution (Tolz 2005: 127). Asa result they proceeded from the assumption that the world is naturally divided into afinite number of ethnic groups that seek to form a national state for themselves. In theirpursuit for scientific truth they followed a rather objectivist approach to identifying
2 Edward Said uses the term ‘Orientalism’ in three different ways, all of which for him are“interdependent”. Firstly, Said refers to ‘Orientalism’ as an academic study of the ‘Oriental’ peoples andthe places and the institutions of learning and research associated with such academic discipline.Secondly, Orientalism is “a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinctionmade between ‘the Orient’ and (most of the time) ‘the Occident’”, which serves as a starting point forpolitical and social theories, artistic, poetic and other popular cultural representations. Finally, thirdly,‘Orientalism’ in Said’s parlance, refers to the “corporate institution for dealing with the Orient – dealingwith it by making statements about it, authorising views of it, describing it,, by teaching it, settling it,ruling over it: in short, Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authorityover the Orient” (pp. 2-3).
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‘ethnic’ groups in Turkestan. However, the reality on the ground often left theOrientalists perplexed, frustrated and confused (Haugen 2003, Abashin 2007, Brower1997).
Different labels emerged out of various encounters between groups and exonyms(ethnonyms used by ‘outside’ groups) did not always correspond to the endonyms(autonyms) of the groups. Group names were also used contextually for self and otheridentification depending on the situational needs and types of interactions. For instance,the designation of the locals as the ‘Muslims’ emerged out the colonial encounter andserved as a pseudo-ethnic term to differentiate ‘European’ colonisers from the variousindigenous peoples (Brower 1997).
The concept of ethnicity in its modern understanding was largely foreign to theinhabitants of the region, apart from Jadid reformers.3 Rather, their self-consciousnesswas a complex alloy of various overlapping identities of local, confessional, class and/orprofessional nature. Multilingualism was a norm. While there existed group names ofthe contemporary titular (name-giving) nationalities of the states in the region (Tajiks,Uzbeks, Turkmen, etc), they were not the most important or the first identity given bythe locals to their Russian interlocutors. In this chapter we will concentrate ofdesignations ‘Tajik’, ‘Sart’ and ‘Uzbek’, which confused the Russian scholars perhaps themost because they “crossed expected boundaries that, according to the orientalists,were not relevant or decisive for what was to be considered a ‘nation’ or a ‘people’”(Haugen 2003: 31).
The case of a mysterious disappearance of a major category which the colonialadministration used to designate millions of its subjects is a perfect example of howidentity categories were manipulated in order to fit the purposes of governing thepopulations. In the Tsarist colonial census conducted in 1897, the number of a categoryof people called ‘Sarts’ exceeded that of ‘Uzbeks’ in the three main oblasts of Turkestan(Haugen 2003: 34). However, ‘Sarts’ disappeared completely as a census category in the
3Jadid movement (from Arabic ‘Usuli Jadid’ [New Way]) was a reformist enlightenment movement in theMuslim provinces of the Russian empire. The Jadids advocated a form of ‘defensive modernisation’ as ameans to overcome the region’s backwardness and maintain independence. Some of the Jadids joined theSoviet government during the first decade of the Soviet rule in Central Asia. They were subsequentlyprosecuted as national-bourgeois elements during e Stalinist purges of 1930s. Adeeb Khalid is anexcellent source on history of Jadidism (See Khalid 1997, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2004, 2006, 2007).
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1926 Soviet all-Union census (Abashin 2009: 254). What was considered the principalcategory during the time of Tsarist administration was dismissed within the period ofless than thirty years. This demonstrates how what was considered legitimate andrelevant identity categories was being rapidly re-evaluated within that period. Thechoice of criteria for designating a certain group as a nation or a ‘people’ depended on anumber of factors, including the scholars’ and politicians’ ideological and politicalpreferences, their education and personal experiences, and on the circumstances oftheir encounters with the subject populations. However, the period is also characterisedby a massive political upheaval whereby various political groups engaged in thecontestation of the right to speak on behalf of certain groups, a struggle for the power toredefine the meanings of all sorts of classifications and designations. The designation‘Sart’ could play many roles in this political process of contestation due to its ambiguity,but it also proved too ambiguous of an element for the task at hand and was discardedas a result. In my opinion,’ Sart’ was to a large extent a floating (or an ‘empty’) signifierwith a plethora of connotations and that fact itself allowed it to be dissolved byadministrative fiat as ‘pseudo’ or even an irrelevant and offensive category.
In an example quoted by Brower (1997), a recorded conversation with a Turkestanisubject reveals that the locals used multiple designations to refer both to themselvesand to others:’ “I’m a Kirgiz”, says a native [nomadic tribesman -- DB] from the shores ofIssyk-Kul’, “but I’m an Uzbek”’. The puzzled ethnographers noted in exasperation that“even Sarts affirm ‘We are Uzbeks’” (129). The common tribal ancestry connected the‘Kirgiz’ and the ‘Sart’, but the latters’ settled way of life differentiated them. At the sametime, the meaning of the term ‘Sart’ differed in various localities and people in differentprovinces would identify themselves by the name of the place first (Samarkandi,Bukhari, Qoqandi, and so on). Another version suggests that because the states in theregion were governed by the descendants of the Uzbek Shaybanid dynasty4, peopleidentified as ‘Uzbek’ because they considered themselves as Uzbek subjects
4 Shaybanids are the descendants of Shayban (Shiban), who claimed to be a direct descendant of ChenghisKhan. Muhammad Shaybani (ruled 1500-10), who gave his name to the Shaybanid dynasty, conqueredSamarkand, Herat (for a time) and Bukhara from the control of the last Timurid, Muhammad ZahiriddinBobur. The Shaybanids ruled the Khanate of Bukhara from 1505 until 1598 and the Khanate ofKhorazm(Khiva) from 1511 until 1695. They are considered to be the first rulers of the region thatidentified with the common tribal designation of ‘Uzbek’ (O’zbek), which later became the referant to alldynasties descendant from the Shaybanids as well as their subject populations (Soucek 2000: 149).
84
(Schoeberlein 1996: 13). Therefore, the term was not used in an ‘ethnic’ sense as it isapplied today.
Ethnographers strived to identify objective grounds to differentiate between Sarts,Uzbeks and all the others. The confusion surrounding the term ‘Sart’ is illustrative ofthe imperial preoccupation with neat ‘scientific’ classification of peoples, things, andsocial phenomena. The debate concerning the ‘true’ identity of Sarts continued throughthe Tsarist period and into the early Soviet period, and has been recently resurrected inthe post-independence Central Asian states (especially Tajikistan and Uzbekistan). Thedebate was regarding whether the Sarts were an ethnic group distinct enough toconstitute a separate category, or whether they were ‘really’ Uzbeks or Tajiks. But sincethere was no agreement on what words ‘Tajik’ and ‘Uzbek’ meant in the first place, thedesired clarity of classification could not be achieved (Brower 1997: 129).Schoerberlein (1994) argues that, indeed, even to this day, “the ‘national’ identitiesindicated by the terms ‘O’zbek’ and ‘Tajik’... have not become exclusive”, and that “manyother overlapping concepts of descent, region, religion and other cultural groupscontinue to structure the lives of Central Asians” (iii). In other words, a complexhybridity of identity defies any attempts to pigeon-hole group and to neatly demarcatethe borders of identity.
The term ‘Sart’ combined in itself many binary opposites that served as identifyingcategories in classification efforts at the time as well as the many connotations of thoseopposites. It was an ultimate hybrid identification term, the different meanings of whichwere called upon according to the circumstances of interaction. Thus, for example,Russian orientalist Samoilovich in 1910 wrote: “Following the Arab conquest, theoriginal Iranian population of Central Asia was given the name ‘Tajiks’ by the nomadicTurks in the North, a name that they adopted. In the course of time, and no later thanthe time of the Mongol conquest, the Turks again gave this population a new name,‘Sarts’, although this did not replace the first one. Prior to this, the term ‘Sart’ had nothad any ethnic meaning. Consequently, the ancestors of today’s Sarts were by bloodand language Iranians” (Haugen 2003: 31). Samoilovich thus recognises that Tajik is anexonym arising from an encounter with an outsider group to differentiate between thelocal groups. He also recognises that previous uses of the term were non-ethnic, yet heinsists in equating ‘Sart’ with ‘Tajik’ based on the criteria of language and ‘blood.’
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Other Russian scholars, such as Bartol’d noted the evolution of the meaning of thedesignation and emphasised the gradual fading out of the Iranian dimension throughmixing of ‘Sarts’ with Turkic-speakers of the region beginning in the 17th century afterthe ‘Uzbek’ tribes conquered the region in the 16th century (Bartol’d 1963: 468).According to their analysis, designation ‘Sart’ was not equivalent to ‘Tajik’ but rathermeant sedentary population under Uzbek (dynastic) rule. ‘Sart’ was believed todesignate the urban ‘Turks’ as opposed to nomadic Turks and Persian-speaking’ Tajiks’.With time, as well, people started referring to themselves as ‘Uzbek’ to indicate theirstatus as subjects of the khanates ruled by an ‘Uzbek’ dynasty regardless of theirlifestyle, linguistic practices or physical appearances.
Such mixing of categories and casual substitutions of terms is evident in the quote fromRussian scholar Khoroshin: “The population of the Turkestan krai consists of twopeoples [narodnosti]: the settled Tajiks and the half nomad Uzbeks, who in their turnhave had great influence on the Tajiks, turning parts of them into Sarts, a settled peopleof Tajik origin speaking the Uzbek language” (Haugen 2003: 32). In the same text wefind reference to “Sart-speaking Tajiks” (meaning ‘Uzbek-speaking Tajiks’ and later on‘Uzbeks’ are described as “partly settled, partly half-nomad and partly nomad” (butdifference between ‘Sart’ and ‘Uzbek’ is earlier explained as that of settled versusnomadic lifestyles) demonstrating the fluidity of identities, and actual undecidability ofbelonging to either group. Muriel Atkin somewhat adds to the confusion by pointing outthat “Tajiks and Uzbeks alike were known as Sarts”, and adding that “the name ‘Tajik’was applied occasionally to Uzbeks as a synonym for Sart” (Atkin 1993: 152).
We can see that different criteria (language, race, mode of living) are applied in order todifferentiate the groups – main ones being binary pairs ‘urban/rural’,‘sedentary/nomad’ and ‘Iranian/Turkic’. Each of these binary opposites was alsoassociated with a cluster of associated connotations organised hierarchically with thefirst one in the pair being superior to the other half. Sedentary and urban lifestyles andmodes of production were associated with progress, modernity, degree of‘advancement’ along the evolutionary continuum of civilisational development(Khodarkovsky 1997, Slezkine 1997). Tribal identification and rural lifestyle wereassociated with waves of Turkic and Mongolian invasions that in the Russian narrativedestroyed the great city-civilisations of ‘indigenous’ Iranian-speaking peoples of the
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‘Aryan’ stock (Vambery 1914: 153-154; Shozimov 2003: 23, Usmonov 2006: 37).Within this discourse, Sarts were identified with urban culture as opposed to rural‘Uzbeks’. Samoilovich also founded the Uzbek-Sart distinction in the social organisationwith Sarts characterised by absence or loss of the traditional tribal consciousness, andUzbeks self-identification being organised according to clan-tribal principles (Abashin2009: 254).
Some Russian Orientalists perceived ‘Sarts’ as a group distinct enough to be considereda separate ‘people’. Thus Anatoii Bogdanov conducted extensive craniological studies inorder to ‘prove’ that Uzbek and Sart constituted different people, while NikolaiOstroumov established a ‘Sart literary language’ (Brower 1997: 129; Abashin2009,:267). After the revolution local intellectuals such as jadids Mahmudhoja Behbudiand Sherali Lapin objected to the use of ‘Sart’ as a designation for local populated basedon this perception of the term as an imperialist insult (Ilkhamov 2002: 79).5
In the end, the undecidability of the sign ‘Sart’, the lack of an ultimate referent led to itselimination as a legitimate census category. ‘Sart’ as a word is still found in CentralAsian languages and recently found its way back into the academic debates, once againthanks to its ambiguity. Sergei Abashin has argued that in the post-independenceCentral Asia, especially in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, ‘Sarts’ are ‘remembered’ or‘forgotten’ depending on the ideological and political agendas of the scholars (2009:54).‘Remembering’ Sarts allows to destabilise the long-established national identity labelsalong which the political boundaries were drawn by the Soviet state. The almostimpossibility to draw a clear distinction between Uzbeks and Tajiks is most clearlyreflected in the so-called problem of Sarts, which became most politically salient duringthe years of national territorial delimitation in Central Asia. It demonstrates mostgraphically, that in the period before the national territorial delimitation, which wassupposed to be a direct process of national self-determination in the region, theprevalent forms of self-identification were not necessarily ethnic.
5 I have a personal memory of seeing a dictionary of ‘Sart language’ at the Tashkent historical museum’sexposition. Within the same exposition were some examples of the use of ‘Sart’ as colonialist pejorativedesignation for local population, as demonstrated by photographs of signs reading “No dogs or Sarts” inthe parks of the colonial cities’ European quarters. Still used in the south of Kyrgyzstan by the Kyrgyz torefer to the Uzbeks the word has preserved its pejorative connotation of the past.
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In fact, as Sergei Abashin (2007) writes, the main forms of self-consciousness can beillustrated by four groups that gradually “fell out” of or never made into censuscategories. These groups are Kypchaks, Hodja, Samarkandi and Sarts, correspondingrespectively to kinship-tribal, class, local and socio-economical forms of identity. Thelatter, Sart identity, meant “an urban dweller, a craftsman or a merchant” (Abashin2007: 25). It therefore indicated more to the way of life rather than ethnicity of aperson. Sarts could be either Turki or Farsi speakers or bilingual and could havedifferent phenotypes Indeed, as a Russian ethnographer Patkanov of the Tsaristcolonial period is quoted to have said: “it appears a rather complex, if at all possible,undertaking to draw a line of distinction between these [Uzbeks, Tajiks and Sarts] threeethnic groups (narodnosti)” (quoted in Abashin 2007: 135).
If one takes a look at consecutive censuses conducted in the region between the end ofXIX century and the national territorial delimitation in 1920s (namely, the censuses of1987, 1917, 1920 and 1926), an extremely interesting picture emerges. Sarts as acensus group went from being the most numerous one to total disappearance in 1926census. The censuses data (especially the last one conducted by the Soviet authorities in1926) were used as empirical evidence that determined the territories and thus theresources and status given to an ethnic group at the Union level. Most Sarts wererecorded as Uzbeks in the census of 1926. Thus, Sarts as a group underwent atransformation from a rather elastic category, which could include all those groupswhose ethnic belonging was unidentifiable in late XIX century, to mean “Uzbek ” - thenew common denominator that was chosen a unifying title for various tribal, class andlocal groups (including Lokay, Barlos, Kypchak, Hodja, Samarkandi, etc) – in 1926onwards. Abashin describes, for instance, how the population of Mindon village with 36years (between 1890 and 1926), according to the official data has changed its identitytwice. First, in the end of XIX – beginning of XX century the Mindonians, who wereinitially described in the statistics as comprised of the “Tajiks”, “Kashgaris”, “Sarts” and“Kyrgyz” , were all recorded as “Sarts”; only to be transformed ‘magically’ into “Uzbeks”in 1920s (37-38).
Thus, within a life-time of one generation, without any significant change of thecomposition of the population (i.e. no in- or out-migration), the Mindonians eitherdramatically underwent two major shifts in self-consciousness or simply changed their
88
census categories thanks to the policies and practices determined by politicaldevelopments in the region. Obviously, both the census taking practices and the widepropaganda work among the population had its effects on the census outcomes,however, it would be too simplistic to argue that the imposition of “Uzbek” as a unifyingcategory was entirely arbitrary and forced. It followed a rather simple logic that if thecountry is to be called “Uzbekistan”, its population must be “Uzbek”. Despite thediversity of the Central Asian society and multiplicity of self-identification terms,“Uzbek” was perhaps the most acceptable common name for the various groups, whichdid not have strong ethnic self-consciousness. As ever in Central Asia we observe thatin the space between the dichotomies of the nomads and the settled, the Turkic and theIranian, the urban and the rural there are many categories that are transitory andundetermined.
Nationalising state and the return of the Sarts
Nationalism is a political ideology that constitutes a distinct community of people thatseek to politicise that distinction by establishing a territorial state. The Central Asianstates’ domestic and foreign policies are often analysed as those of ‘nationalising states’(Brubaker 1996). Graham Smith (1998) describes the ‘nationalising state’ as the onethat (1) essentialises, ‘primordialises’ a nation, depicts ethnic identities as linear,constant and homogenous; (2) ‘historicises’ nation, presenting it as ancient, with its‘golden century’ and national heroes; and (3) ‘totalises’ the nation, ignoring individualdifferences and depicting a nation as a ‘collective person’ with collective memory,collective homeland, and so on (15-16). In Central Asia we observe such tendencies toprimordialise, totalise and historicise the state (Bohr 1998: 136). The nationalisingstates of the region have built on the Soviet tradition of ‘ethnogenesis’ to claim ancientroots, belonging to the current homeland and therefore a right to sovereign statehood(Abashin 2006). As a result, history remains a highly politicised enterprise, often led bythe state and/or by nationalistically-minded scholars. ‘Remembering’ and ‘forgetting’certain episodes, personalities and interpretations of the past is part of this process ofhistoricising of a nationalising state.
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Sergei Abashin (2009) has argued that in the post-independence period we observe inCentral Asia a collision between the desire to ‘remember’ and the desire to ‘forget’ Sarts(254). Indeed, remembering Sarts for Tajik scholars and politicians is consistent withtheir vision of national delimitation and allow to destabilise the establishedunderstanding of Uzbek identity. As a result we observe great attention being paid tothe issue of Sarts by Tajik scholars in 2000’s, for whom the question is a means tocontinue the discussion over the meaning of ‘Tajik’ identity and to return to the issue ofinterpretation of the history of the 1920s. Predictably, Rahim Masov was in theforefront of this discussion. In his Tadzhiki: Vitesneniie i assimiliatsiia [Tajiks:Displacement and Assimilation] (2003), Masov writes that Sarts are “a mixed peoples[narodnost’]” which emerged as a results of “merger” of Iranian-speaking populationwith Turko-Mongol “aliens [prishel’tsami]”, however, the “ratio [primes’] of the Tajikblood was much greater in Sarts” (36-37). To Masov, as usual, ‘Iranian-speaking’ issynonymous to ‘Tajik’, and the question of ‘blood’ or race is decisive in determiningone’s ‘true’ national belonging. Moreover, he uses the usual dichotomy of ‘local’ versus‘alien invaders’ in order to represent anything associated with ‘Turko-Mongol’ invasionas diluting the essential identity of the ‘Iranian-speaking’ peoples/’Tajiks’. Thisobjectvist approach is also observed in his earlier comments on the Sart issue: “Sartswere essentially not only Turko-Tajik half-bloods [metisi], but the absolute majority ofSart population were actually Tajiks, who due to a set of objective and subjectivecircumstances forgot Tajik language, their own ethnic origins (Masov 1995: 62). In thisinterpretation, one’s identity is determined not by one’s language or even self-identification, but solely by race, and people are describes as either ‘half-bloods’ or‘pure’ Tajiks based on that principle alone.
Another Tajik scholar , Mirbabaev (2002) writes in an article with a self-explanatorytitle “On the term ‘Sart’ as a synomym of ethnonym ‘Tajik’” that “Sarts were Tajiks, andnot Uzbeks or Kyrgyz” (pp. 185-6). In his interpretations the ‘Sart’ language “consistedof Tajik words mixed in with Uzbek dialects” (191). He further notes that because Sartswere in contact with Turkic peoples they “developed bilingualism” (192). However,despite this, Mirbabaev insists that it would be erroneous to “view the Sarts as aseparate ethnic group” (194). Mirbabaev follows the same nationalistic agenda and
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objectivist approach to identity as Masov, but bases it (rather unconvincingly) onlinguistic characteristics of the group.
Finally, Shozimov in his Tadzhikskaia identichnost’ i gosudarstvennoie stroitel’stvo v
Tadzhikistane [Tajik identity and state-building in Tajikistan] (2003) argues that “it iswithin the different interpretations of the term that the key to understanding both Tajikand Uzbek identity lies” (88). Shozimov points out contradictory criteria used indefining the three groups (Sarts, Tajiks and Uzbeks): “If the criteria for defining theTajik identity are the Tajik (Farsi) language and the settled way of life, then Sarts,according to the majority of researchers, possessed the same characteristics. In thiscase, what are the criteria differentiating Tajik identity from that of the identity of theSarts?” (87-88). On the other hand, he continues, if Sarts are settled Uzbeks, then whatis the difference between the Tajiks and the settled Uzbeks? He proposes to look for thesolution to the problem of sarts “not in the view [this term, ‘sart’] as a constant ethnicand social unit, but as a hanging phenomenon with different meaning across differenthistorical periods” (89). The Russian authorities tried to define the Sarts as a separateethnic category, but up to the beginning of the twentieth century Sarts remained aspecial socio-cultural group, which preserved both within Uzbeks and Tajiks and whichunited them.
Within the Uzbek academic circles the desire ‘to forget’ the ‘Sarts’ prevailed untilrecently, since the discussion would inevitably bring up the non-Turkic roots of theUzbeks and to resume the debates regarding the Tajik claims on the cultural heritageand territory of Uzbekistan. Thus, for example, Ahmadali Asqarov writes: “Up to the1920s, the supporters of the Indo-European conception characteristic especially to theRussian orientalism, defined the term ‘Uzbek’ narrowly as including only the ShaybanidUzbeks, not recognising the local Uzbek-speaking population (so-called ‘Sarts’ – ancientTurkic-speaking population of Mawaraunahr and Khorezm, although the term ‘Uzbek’included both of these parts of the Uzbek people” (1997: 75). Asqarov admits that thepopulation called ‘Sarts’ did not have Uzbek self-consciousness, but points to the dataindicating they spoke a Turkic (“old-Uzbek”, according to Asqarov) language. Thelanguage here is the defining characteristic that allows Asqarov to retrospectivelyproject Uzbek identity onto the Sart group. The same strategy of equalising
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Iranian/Farsi with Tajik as used by Masov is followed by Asqarov in equalising Turkicwith “old Uzbek”.
Other Uzbek historians and ethnographers mention Sarts as part of the ‘sub-ethnos’groups that contributed to the ‘ethnogenesis’ of the Uzbek people. For instance,Shaniyazov in Protsessi formirovaniia uzbekskogo naroda [The Processes of Formationof the Uzbek People] (2001) mentions ‘Sart’ as one of the terms used for Uzbeks in 18-19th centuries with reference to Bartol’d (415). Djabborov, who wrote an ethnographicwork on the Uzbeks (1994: 2007) lists Sarts as one of the ‘subethos’ groups within theUzbek ethnos in 19h century, describing them as “the descendants of the ancientpopulation of the region” without any reference to language (2007: 32-33).
In this respect the publication of the Archaeology of Uzbek Identity by Alisher Ilkhamov(2002) was a surprising exception to the rule of silence on the Sart issue in Uzbekistan.In 2002 the Open Society Institute sponsored the publication of a book, which instantlybecame a rarity since only a thousand of copied were printed. The book entitled The
Ethnic Atlas of Uzbekistan immediately attracted attention and stirred controversy inthe academic circles of Uzbekistan. The volume was comprised of three sections:“Ethnic Minorities”, “the Uzbeks”, and the “Review Articles” (including an overview ofthe ethno-cultural centres functioning in Uzbekistan and a piece on the cemeteries ofthe various ethnic groups). Alisher Ilkhamov, the director of the OSI office in Uzbekistanat the time, edited the volume and authored its most controversial section, the onedealing with the emergence of modern Uzbek identity, the English language version ofwhich later was republished as an article entitled The Archaeology of Uzbek Identity in
Central Asian Survey (Ilkhamov 2004). In his Archaeology Ilkhamov called forapplication of the constructivist ideas on nationalism in Central Asia. AlthoughIlkhamov’s call in itself was quite bold and innovative in itself, he uses constructivistconcepts to write a postcolonial critique of the Russian and Soviet nationalities policiesand as an attempt to come up with an improved, more inclusive design for Uzbek nation.In his attempts to move away from the received wisdoms of the Central Asian school ofethnography and history, Ilkhamov sometimes confuses the constructivist theoreticalcritique with the polemical language of Sovietology.
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Ilkhamov dates the emergence of modern Uzbek identity to the creation of the UzbekSSR within the Soviet Union in 1924. This came in direct contradiction of the prevailingmethodology of ‘ethnogenesis’ practiced by the Uzbek ethnologists and historians alikethat dated Uzbek identity as far into the antiquity as I millennium BC to the times whentribes identified by them as ‘proto-Turks’ inhabited the region (Asqarov 2007,Kamoliddin 2004). Ilkamov puts forward a thesis that the modern Uzbek identity can betraced to three main historic ethnic components: the Dashti-Kypchak nomadic tribesthat migrated into the region in early XVI century, the local Turkic tribes of theChaghatay and Oghuz lineage, and, finally, the so-called Sarts, or the “urban Turkic-speaking population, who did not trace their identity by tribal affiliation by the XIXcentury” (Ilkhamov 2005). He, however, categorically differentiates the Uzbeks thatidentify as such today and the Uzbeks that lived in the region before the nationaldelimitation and the creation of the Uzbek SSR in 1924. So far from the traditionalrepresentations of the emergence of the Uzbek identity as an “objective natural-historicprocess”, Ilkhamov argues that it was tightly intertwined with the efforts on the part ofthe local elites and intelligentsia, such as jadids and the local members of theCommunist Party, as well as the apparatchiks representing the central CommunistParty.
Uzbek academia did not react to the publication immediately. However, in 2004 a groupof senior scholars from the Institute of History of the Uzbek Academy of Sciencespublished a review on the Atlas and accused its authors of lack of professionalism andnecessary expertise and dismissed the publication as an example of “what an ethnicatlas of Uzbekistan should not be like” (Alimova, Arifhanova & Kamoliddin 2004). Theydismissed the position of Ilkhamov on the ‘recent‘ (16th century) emergence of theUzbek nation the discussion in the Russian journal Etnograficheskoe obozrenie (2006).Ilkhamov’s critics, who have internalised the highly negative Soviet meaning of suchlabels as ‘pan-Turkism’ and ‘pan-Islamism’, see his use of the words in connection to theJadid leaders as offensive, referring to them as ‘accusations’.
In an internet-based publication Alikhan Aman deals with the problem of ‘correct’designation of Sarts by attempting to prove Turkic etymology of the word ‘Sart’ itself.Once again Turkic is automatically assumed to be equivalent to ‘Uzbek’. Aman concludesby saying that the term was an exonym and had a lot of negative connotations. As a
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result it was rejected by the local population as a self-designation (2007). It is notentirely clear from the writing of the official Uzbek historians and ethnographerswhether they see the ‘Sart issue’ as part of a conscious policy of ‘divide and rule’, anelement of struggle between various elite groups, or simply as a manifestation of theinferior knowledge and understanding of the region by the outsiders. It is obvious,however, that the issue is highly politicised (although sometimes personal antipathiescome into place in such debates) and the stakes are high in the game of assigning ‘Sarts’as equivalent to either modern ‘Tajik’ or ‘Uzbek’ designation.
2. Nationalising states, ideology of national independence
Ideologies and politics of nationalism have largely defined the ideal-type model ofpolitical units within the international system in the twentieth century. ‘The people’across the world have mostly been defined as ‘national people’. Theories of origins ofnations, as discussed briefly in Chapter two, are based on two main opposing metaphorsof society: organismic and mechanical. Within the organismic understanding of society,‘the people’ are conceptualised as a collective organismic body of a collective person(Neumann 2004). This metaphor gains legitimacy from its conceptual connectedness tothe realm of ‘nature’. Within the mechanical metaphoric frame the society is conceivedin terms of a Newtonian system with forces acting upon objects, checks and balances,and structures.
Related to this metaphor is the construction metaphor, whereby society is the subject to‘engineering’, nations and states are ‘built’, ‘reconstructed’ or ‘collapse’. This idea of ‘thepeople’ sees society as an artifice, or an imitation of nature. Although these are the twoextremes on the continuum of possible metaphors of states and societies, bothmetaphors have some important features in common in that they envision polities ascomplete closed systems, the proper functioning of which is governed by someunalterable ‘laws’ (Rigney 2001, Canovan 2005).
There has also been much cross-fertilisation between the two metaphors, with eachborrowing from the other. For instance, within theoretical debates on nations and
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nationalism, the followers of the ‘primordialist’ (organismic metaphor) and‘constructivist’ schools have often resorted to the categories and the language used bythe opposing school. Constructivists who protest the essentialising of identity oftenretreat into using the same essentialising language, talking of nations as if they werestable, coherent and unitary actors (Brubaker & Cooper 2000, Abashin 2009). ‘Identity’becomes something one ‘possesses’ and that functions as a motivating force behindgroup action (Katzenstein 1996, Neumann 1999, Steele 2008). For some primordialistsas well, the fact that nations are constructed is irrelevant to how a nation isconceptualised once the ‘construction process’ is complete. In the sphere of politics,nationalists despite their romantic notions of an organic nation with roots in the mistsof antiquity have undertaken conscious efforts to ‘build’ nations, to adopt policies andcreate institutions that enhance national consciousness (Slezkine 1994, Suny & Martin2001, Verdery 1991).
The narratives of the national following the organic, mechanic and a hybrid metaphorscan be summed up as the awakening of the ‘Sleeping Beauty’, complete substitution ofnature with artifice a la ‘Stepford wife’ or a monstrous ‘Bride of Frankenstein’. Both ofthese basic metaphors or their combination can and have been applied productively byactors located at different points along the political continuum. An expert I interviewedwhile in Tajikistan commented that the state after independence had a simulatorycharacter [‘simulĭativniĭ kharakter’], and was akin to the description of a creaturesupposedly born by a Tsarina in Pushkin’s fairy tale The Tale about Tsar Soltan: “neitherson nor daughter, but an unknown beasty”. This humorous self-Orientalisation is veryclose to the view of post-colonial statehood advanced by Robert Jackson (1990).
My working hypothesis at the time was that Central Asian states, and in particular,Tajikistan and Uzbekistan ‘simulated’ sovereignty through their interactions with oneanother. These two countries seemed like an interesting case to me for a number ofreasons. Firstly, they were both former ‘colonised’ people under the Russian and thenSoviet rule and became independence without actually really fighting for it. Secondly, incase of Tajikistan there was a history of double-colonisation- both by Moscow andTashkent till 1929. Late 1980s and 1990s saw the rise in number of voices speakingagainst the perceived Uzbek domination of Tajik politics through Leninabad (Khujand)party elite, there was a more open expression of resentment regarding the treatment of
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the ‘Tajik’ minority in Uzbekistan and the loss of Bukhara and Samarkand reflected inrevisionist historiography, art and literature (Guboglo & Chicherina 1990, Khudonazar2004). Thirdly, Tajikistan went through what John Heathershaw called a ‘complex crisisof decolonisation’ in early 1990s (2009). Civil wars are interpreted in political systemas the breakdown in the normal politics, as a state of exception, and the original ‘state ofnature’. A territory where there is no one single sovereign claiming the exclusivelegitimate right to use violence is understood to be a ‘failed’ or ‘collapsed’ state. Thefear of such state failure and the desire to prevent ‘Balkanisation’/’Afghanisation’(meaning ‘Tajikisation’) of the entire region has become for both the Central Asianleaders and the observers from the outside alike a policy objective and an ideology.
The notion of statehood (davlatdori/davlatchilik) has become a normative goal ofpolitics. This goal, however, has been strangely depoliticised. The Ideology of NationalIndependence/Sovereignty [Milliy Istiqlol Mafkurasi] advocated by the regime inUzbekistan and Tajikistan’s Ideology of National Unity both advance the construction ofa strong authoritative centralised state as an end in itself (March 2002, 2003;Heathershaw 2009; Vose’ et al 2007; Shozimov 2003; Mamadazimov 1996; Alimova andRtveladze 2001). Such goals as ‘stability’, ‘unity’, ‘peace’, and ‘development’ aredeclared to be at the heart of the nation-building ideologies. The political space is thusdepoliticised as no one can disagree that stability, peace and development are indeeddesirable common good. The opposition within such authoritative discourse is onlyacceptable if it is ‘constructive’ and helps the government achieve the desired goals onits agenda.
Modern ideological constructions are inherently unstable as they lack a transcendentalmaster signifier representing the ‘truth’. In his work on the authoritative discoursearticulation during the period of late Socialism, Yurchak (2006) explains why thecommunist party’s discourse lost its basis and as a result also its credibility:
One of the central contradictions of socialism is a version of what Claude Lefort called a generalparadox within the ideology of modernity: the split between ideological enunciation (whichreflects the theoretical ideals of the Enlightenment) and ideological rule (manifest in the practicalconcerns of the modern state’s political authority). The paradox, that we will call ‘Lefort’sparadox’, lies in the fact that ideological rule must be ‘abstracted from any question concerningits origins’, thus remaining outside of ideological enunciation and, as a result, rendering thatenunciation deficient. In other words, to fulfil its political function of reproducing power, theideological discourse must claim to represent an ‘objective truth’ that exists outside of it;however, the external nature of this ‘objective truth’ renders the ideological discourse inherently
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lacking in the means to describe it in total, which can ultimately undermine this discourse’slegitimacy and the power that it supports. This inherent contradiction of any version of modernideology, argues Lefort, can be concealed only by the figure of the ‘master’, who, by beingpresented as standing outside ideological discourse and possessing external knowledge of theobjective truth, temporarily conceals the contradiction by allowing it ‘to appear throughhimself’... In other words, modern ideological discourse, gains its legitimacy from an imaginaryposition that is external to it and will experience a crisis of legitimacy if that imaginary externalposition is questioned or destroyed (Yurchak 2006: 10-11).The above quote describes the ideological construction in post-independence Tajikistanand Uzbekistan very well. The post-Soviet societies seem to have an ambivalent attitudetoward ideology. On the one hand, the totalitarian past made them develop a strongdistaste for ‘ideologisation’ (ideologizatsiia) of political and social life. On the other,ideology has come to be perceived as an invisible social force, a sort of a spectre thatdefines and leads a society as a political community, having a life of its own. This isevident in Central Asian elites’ apprehension in the wake of the Soviet era at theabsence of a ‘national idea’ as a vital component/ feature of any society. It seems thatthe Ideology of National Independence/Unity was called into existence by the belief onthe part of the elites in the fundamental necessity for a body politic to acquire a ‘soul’,without which that organic entity would be incapable of functioning. An Ideology thustakes on some transcendental qualities of “quasi-material existence” outside of peoples’minds (McLellan 1995: 28).
The concern with what post-Soviet intellectuals and politicians have termed, “anideological vacuum” (see for instance, Karimov 1998: 7) among the ruling elites of thepost-Soviet Uzbekistan is understandable when one remembers that they weresocialised in a society that could not conceive of a political order without a leadingideology. Time and again in his public speeches and interviews Karimov asserted theorganic necessity of an ideology for survival of any nation, presenting it as an urgentand existential task for the society to achieve. The ‘vacuum’ in ideology can potentiallybe taken advantage of by some external ill-intentioned forces in order to subjugateUzbek people. As Karimov put it: “The absence of one’s own opinion, submission to thewill or the idea of the other is way more dangerous than any kind of economic orpolitical dependence” (1998: 5).
Rahmonov uses identical language when discussing the need for a national ideology. InDecember 1996, before signing the peace agreement with opposition he remarks that
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some of our scholars and politicians call for articulation of a new ideology for the country –national-statehood ideology or some other. This anxiety is related to the vacuum that hasformed, it is assumed, in the consciousness of the people as a result of the events that took placein the end of the 20th century. ... for Tajikistanis there is a danger of the vacuum being filled withradicalism, whereby some people present their extremism as a religion, while others – asdemocracy and democratic opposition. Although, it must be said, both democracy and religionare incompatible with extremism (Rahmonov 1997: 3-4).The need for an ideology is thus two-fold: there is an ‘objective’, quasi-scientific need fora “healthy” ideology in any ‘healthy’ society; and having own ideology is a pre-requisitefor safeguarding one’s independence and identity through acquisition of ‘ideologicalimmunity’:
To form the ideological immunity among our people, especially the young ones, is of utmostimportance in the contemporary conditions of overcoming the ideological vacuum. This workneeds to be done carefully with much consideration, like an experienced white-bearded gardenerwould tenderly and with care grow the young plants. […] The need to take account of theideological situation in the post-Soviet area, the conditions in the Central Asian region,importance of filling in the vacuum that appeared after we denied the old ideology, with the newideology – the ideology of national independence, should be clear to all of us. This should bedone in order to actively oppose the attempts of the alien and destructive ideas to penetrate [oursociety] (Karimov 2001).While achieving ideological immunity through construction of a national ideology isseen as vital and is actively promoted by the state, it was also deemed necessary thatUzbekistan’s Constitution had an article that stipulated that “No ideology shall begranted the status of state ideology” (Constitution of the RUz, Part I, Chapter 2, Article12).6 The texts on the Ideology of National Independence feature such contradictoryelements as a critique of the ‘old’ Soviet ideology as ‘based on force and pressure, liesand hypocrisy’, the warnings against promoting the Ideology of National Independenceto the status of the state official ideology and the arguments in favour of legitimacy ofthe Ideology due to its reflectivity of the interests, values and aspirations of the Uzbeknation (Karimov 1998: 2000).
It is quite obvious, despite all the government disclaimers, that the Ideology enjoys thestatus of an official state-promoted project. In 2001 the president issued a directivethat ordered creation and integration into the state education system at all levels of anacademic discipline of “Ideology of National Independence: main concepts and
6 Article 8 of the Constitution of the Tajik Republic states that “No one ideology, including a religiousideology, can be established as a state ideology”. This wording reflects a particular concern of thegovernment with the possibility of a competition on the part of the Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan(IRPT) as an alternative to the ‘secular statehood’ ideology in the aftermath of the civil war.
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principles”.7 In less than two months, the National Society of Philosophers published atextbook for use in the republic’s educational institutions, based on president’s ideas onthe subject (2001). This obvious contradiction in the nature of the government-ledconscious effort of the elites to articulate a national ideology and the simultaneousproclamations that such attempts are by no means intended to elevate it to the level ofthe state ideology is compounded by their failure to admit that the real content of theIdeology is ethno-nationalism. Nationalism is problematic as a state ideology in theformer USSR, since it bears a lot of negative luggage. There is also a sense of urgency toposition the ‘old’ Soviet ideology and other rival ideologies (such as Islamism andWestern liberalism) as alien and imposed from outside, in stark contrast to the ‘new’one as the only truly authentic, democratic and benign ideology that reflects the goalsand desires of the Uzbek people.
According to the official definition, “In its essence the ideology of national independenceof Uzbekistan is a system of ideas that express the main goals; bind the past and thefuture, and serve to fulfil the dreams of our people”.8 An insightful analysis of theIdeology of National Independence by Andrew March describes the discursive strategybehind this enunciation:
The main strategy is to define the entire state in relation to common goals, to define the goals andaspirations as virtually constitutive of the nation as such, and to equate the regime with theproper articulation and realization of those goals through the state apparatus. These circulardefinitions, linked theoretically by the concept of ‘ideology’, ensure that the acceptance of oneclaim implies the acceptance of all of them and, more importantly, that the opposition to one ofthe parts can be treated as opposition to all of them. The aim is to create an exclusiveidentification between the political community, the state, the goal and the regime, using thetalent and natural legitimacy of the first three to secure the legitimacy of the latter (March 2003:229).The ideology is presented as neutral, above politics. It is denied that it has the officialstate status and serves to legitimate and strengthen the regime in power. It is presentedas an organic progress, a self-evolving and self-correcting social phenomenon thatarises out of the natural dynamics within the society, something of the same order asthe idea of the ‘invisible hand’ that by some inexplicable law of nature brings about
7 Directive of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan from January 18, 2001 “On creation andintroduction into the republic’s education system of a discipline of the ‘Ideology of nationalindependence: main concepts and principles’.8Milliy Istiqlol G’oyasi: Asosiy Tushunchalar va Tamoyillar (The Idea of National Independence: the mainconcepts and principles – in Uzbek). Available on State- and Society- Building Academy under President ofUzbekistan site at http://zamin.freenet.uz/mig/boshi.htm .
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systemic balance. Thus, since the ideology is a set of unproblematic ideas that arepresented as apolitical (or pre-political, according to Gramsci) there is an assumption ofsocietal uniformity and homogeneity of identity within the polity. Any ideologies orideas that question that the regime’s exclusive claim to expertise of achieving theobvious goals of development and progress, or do not share the purportedly universalvalues are othered and included in the list of the serious “ideological threats” thatUzbekistan faces these days, which are:
- Islamic caliphate;
- Re-unification of the newly independent states into the former (Soviet) Union;
- Threats to our history, national values and the essence of our religion;
- Attempts at moral corruption of the people;
- Incitement of regional and international conflicts (Milliy Istiqlol G’oyasi).The first two threats on the list both, although in quite difference ways, question thelegitimacy of the very existence of the post-1991 Uzbekistan. An Islamic Caliphate doesnot base its legitimacy on national identity. Similarly, to question that Uzbekistan’semergence as an independent state resulted from the conscious struggle of the Uzbekpeople for a sovereign statehood or rather was a mere historical accident is dangerousto legitimacy of new Uzbekistan. The Ideology has to ‘bind the past and future’ througha narrative of an ‘Uzbek people’ that always struggled for independence (Alimova andRtveladze 2001). The following two sources of danger on the list create the moralspaces of identity of the ‘inside’ that is marked by the superior understanding of one’shistory, religion and value and the ‘outside’ that strives to corrupt this pure world.
Similar efforts at articulation of a ‘national idea’ have been taking place in Tajikistansince the conclusion of the civil war with a peace accord in 1997. This idea does notsimply include the normative ‘national statehood’ (davlatdori milli) but also givesspecial attention to ‘national unity’ (vahdati milli) (Heathershaw 2009: 70). Rahmonovassigns the responsibility for the event of late 1990s in Tajikistan to the “”external andinternal forces” which had led to “the destruction of statehood, our innumerablemiseries” (1997: 6). He then links the ideology of the “demo-Islamist opposition” withthe geopolitical plans to remove Tajikistan from the zone of CIS into the world of“Islamism”, from where “there is no exist” (7). In sum, the side that triumphed in thecivil war blames the opposition for the “destruction of statehood” and “national unity”
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that Rahmon’s rule has restored. In post-conflict Tajik society any issues considered tobe ‘too political’ are carefully avoided and the discourses of ‘peacekeeping’(international community), mirotvorchestvo (ruling elite) and tinji (popular discourse)create an ideology of authoritative rule that appears to be ‘above and beyond’ politicswhile the alternative to it is the return to the war (Heathershaw 2007: 223-231). Morerecently, the construction of Roghun dam and the power station, has been declared asthe new unifying national idea.
‘The people’ are thus inscribed as a nation that has a right to territorial statehood. Thatstatehood itself is normative, and characterised by a high degree of centralisation ofpower. The ideology of the new states is enunciated by conflation of concepts. Thus thecommon goals and values of an organic and timeless people through centuriesculminate in the consolidation of a strong centralised state ruled by a charismaticfounding-father figure, a sovereign, who impersonates the state power. In bothTajikistan and Uzbekistan sovereign power is “hyper-personified” by the presidents,who ‘depoliticise’ the politics by maintaining a permanent state of emergency, a state ofexception, whereby the possibility of sovereign statehood itself is securitised.
Conclusion
In the beginning of the twenty first century we see the return of the debates of whatconstitutes Tajik and Uzbek identities that a century ago became the basis for creationof these two republics as separate politico-administrative entities within the SovietUnion. Within a decade, the primary political identification of Central Asian populationmoved away from local, tribal, social and ‘mode of life’ identities to those based onnotions of ethnicity and nationhood. The Soviet Union not only introduced the notionsof ethnicity as a political category, but also institutionalized it as the primary mode ofidentification of its subjects. The ‘fifth line’ (pĭataĭa grafa) of Soviet passports has alsobeen adopted by post-Soviet Central Asian bureaucracies as a means of categorizing andgoverning their populations. The federative structure of the Soviet Union is arguablywhat allowed for its relatively peaceful disintegration and the ease of recognition for theconstituent parts that had the status of the Union republics.
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In the first decades after the unexpected independence, Central Asian intellectuals andpoliticians alike looked to the past to find the sources for legitimacy and some authenticdefinitions of who ‘the people’ in whom the sovereignty of the state arises are. Thenationalizing states of Central Asia thus looked to the past not only to understand whatkind of people populated the region and what specifically made them ‘Kazakh’, ‘Kyrgyz’,‘Tajik’, ‘Uzbek’ or ‘Turkmen’ and why is there no state called ‘Sartostan’ betweenTajikistan and Uzbekistan; these new states looked to the past also to find the previousexamples of indigenous “statehood” that existed prior to Russian and Soviet colonialencounters. For Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, the Samanid and the Temurid dynasticstates appeared as the paragons of glory of ‘proto-Tajik’ and ‘proto-Uzbek’ statesrespectively. The above analysis of the emergence of the Tajik and Uzbek identitydemonstrate the inherently dialogic and at the same time Möbian (undeterminable)nature of Central Asian identities that can only exist within the chain of differancebetween signifiers. Thus Tajik is only ‘knowable’ and comes into existence in presenceof ‘Uzbek’ and vice versa. The case of disappearing Sarts, and the debates about whothey ‘really’ were demonstrates most clearly the process of articulation of Tajik andUzbek identities as inseparable dialectically entangled binary pair constituting thesingle side of a Möbius ring. Next chapter looks at the clashing historiographies of thisperiod as debated between scholars and politicians of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan in thepost-independence period.
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Chapter Four
Clashing historiographies of Tajikistan and
Uzbekistan
"Life is not what one lived, but what one remembers and how one
remembers it in order to recount it"(Gabriel García Márquez)
In the previous chapter I discussed the history of emergence of Tajikistan andUzbekistan in their current borders. This chapter deals with the history ofhistoriography in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan as a means to observe the construction ofidentity through the major debates and the shifting preoccupations of both historiansand politicians in these countries. Moreover, we will discover in this chapter howpositive self-image and negative other-image are constructed in the “discursiveencounters” of the competing historiographical debates between Tajik and Uzbekhistorians as well as politicians. One of the main themes in this chapter is theintertwining of politics and historiography in the ‘writing’ of the post-Soviet state inCentral Asia. History writing here is approached not just as any academic field ofenquiry but as a state-lead institutional academic enterprise, which aims to forge unityof a nation, to create an ‘imagined community’, to instil in one pride for their ‘Homeland’and the ‘great ancestors’.
The chapter begins with a discussion of continuity and change in Tajik and Uzbekhistoriographies throughout the Soviet and post-independence periods, which pointsout the politicisation and ideologisation of the discipline and practice of history writingin these two states. It then proceeds directly to analyse the clash of Tajik and Uzbekhistoriographies and the construction and reconstruction of the identity and territorialboundaries within the discourse of history writing. We will see how positive self-identity and negative other-identity is constructed on each side and how thoseidentities are linked or delinked from certain territories in the ‘historiography wars’between two competing narratives of the region’s history. My main argument here is
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that each state’s history writing paradigm is in correspondence with the general modelof their post-independence statehood – ‘external-territory-claiming’ in case of Tajikistanand ‘sovereignty-protecting’ in case of Uzbekistan. In other words, Tajik historiographyjust like Tajik nationalism has to look beyond the borders of the Tajik state in its currentborders to establish both the authentic Tajik identity and the claims (even if onlysentimental and symbolic) with the lost ‘promised land’ of the ancestral Homeland. Thiscomes into the direct conflict with Uzbek historiography and nationalism that isdefensive of the boundaries of the Uzbek identity and state in its current borders. Inshort, Tajik historiography based on ethnic claims threatens the internal cohesivenessof the historical narrative advanced by the Uzbek historians, who follow the territorialprinciple in their approach to history writing. Both sides engage in a dialogic process ofreinterpretation of the Soviet repertoires, narratives and heroes, whereby each oneattempts to legitimise and naturalise the post-Soviet statehood by rooting them inhistorical claims.
Clashing Historiographies of Statehood
After the declarations of independence were made, history writing was summoned tomake sense of their unexpected rise to sovereign statehood. Given that the periodpreceding the disintegration of the USSR was not marked by anti-colonial struggle, ithas become the task of history writing to depict the heroic struggles for independencein the past. The Uzbek and Tajik official pantheon of national heroes is thus filled withfigures of ‘great forefathers’, who fought against foreign domination. Completing thelong line of champions of Tajik and Uzbek statehood are the current presidents of thecountries – Emomali Rahmonov and Islam Karimov.
The leaders of the newly independent Central Asian states universally took it uponthemselves to set the research agendas of their respective Institutes of History withinthe Academy of Sciences -- a structure that each union republic possessed and inheritedwith little or no reform. The respective presidents have ‘authored’ books on historyghost -written by the prominent historians that serve as presidential advisors. This hasalso been in accordance with the Soviet tradition of close cooperation between the
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ruling elites and historians. There has not been any research into how historiansthemselves view their role in constructing the sense of shared past among the membersof the nation. Smith et al suggest that there is a tradition among Central Asianintellectuals “to counter by evasion rather than confrontation the noxious regulationand ideology imposed by overbearing politicians” (Smith et al 1998: 68).
The line between practice of politics and history writing is thus rather blurred. Thereare many examples of historians becoming politicians and politicians assuming the roleof historians. Sadriddin Aini, a prominent Jadid from Bukhara and later a champion ofTajik national statehood, can be considered to be the founder of this tradition(Mamadazimov 1996: 9). In 1923 he published a history of Manghit dynasty,condemning the former rulers as unenlightened despots, which was followed by
Materials for the History of the Bukharan Revolution in 1926 (Bergne 2007: 77-9).Around the same time, Fayzullah Khodjaev, also a Young Bukharan and the founder ofthe Soviet Uzbek state authored a volume pursuing the same goal of delegitimizing therule of the Manghits, written within the Marxist framework and preoccupied with thefate and suffering of the simple toilers. These works, according to Adeeb Khalid, werethe “first examples of a truly modern Central Asian historiography” (Khalid 1999: 447).I would also add that these works, based on personal experiences of the authors of therecent events, were trend-setting not only in their Marxist approach but in theconflation of the roles of politician and historian.
Babajan Gafurov is another example of a historian becoming a first secretary of theCentral Committee of the Communist Party in Tajikistan and then retiring back intoacademia at the end of his service. His books became cornerstones of Tajik nationalismand laid the foundation for the contemporary approach to history writing in Tajikistan(Mamadazimov 1996: 9). Similarly, Rahim Masov, who has become the most vocal andauthoritative voice in Tajik historiography since the 1990s, and is known as the mainideologue of Rahmon(ov)’s regime.
In Uzbekistan historians also serve as advisors to president and are actively involved inthe production of ‘presidential’ publications as well as scholarly articles andmonographs appearing under their own names. I know from personal experience ofliving and studying in three Central Asian states that almost every single high school
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and undergraduate research paper, masters dissertation, doctoral theses, academicarticles and books are often exercises in summarization of the official history,necessarily followed by the list of references a large part of which would consist of thebooks by leader of the day. All history textbooks in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan areapproved by the respective Ministries of Education and become a part of the sole set oftexts used in the classrooms across the country (Keller 2007, Blakkisrud & Nozimova2010). There has been thus a continuity in the merging of the power structures withacademic production in both Soviet and post-Soviet periods.
The Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the development of human society in relation todevelopment of the productive forces constituted the theoretical and methodologicalcornerstone of the Soviet historiography. According to this doctrine, some “backward”societies could skip certain stages of development (namely capitalism) and transferdirectly into the socialist formation (Soviet Encyclopedia 1974: 111). History writingduring this period was periodized according to Marxist concept of formations –primitive-communal, slave-ownership, feudal and capitalist - with special attentionbeing given to the relations of production, history of class struggle and the role of theworking masses in history, as opposed to the writing of history of kings and theirconquests, practiced before (Encyclopedia 1974: 77).
Central Asian rulers before the Great October Revolution were mostly depicted innegative tones and history was written as a narrative of extreme oppression andrebellions against the despotic rule. The development of Tajik and Uzbek cultureswithin the ‘national in form, socialist in content’ framework was to occur with thebrotherly help of the more advanced nation of the Soviet Union, the Great Russianpeople (Radzhabov 1968:7). Marxist theorization of the ‘Oriental mode of production’dependent on artificial irrigation and the state maintenance of the irrigation canals andthe resulting inevitable ‘Oriental despotism’ (Wittfogel 1957), was very much incongruence with the previous Orientalist scholarship on the history of the regionproduced by the Tsarist scholars and administrators (Gafurov 1989).
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The creation of research institutions at the Union level and replication of thosestructures at the level of the republics during the Soviet times1 contributed toprofessionalization of history practice. Despite this, history was still too important to beleft to historians. As a result most of the research tended to be based on secondarysources and lacking in original arguments, approaches or methodology. Especially inthe 1960s and 1970s, mainstream historiographical practices were extremelyconservative and cautious to the extent of becoming plagiaristic rather than engaging inoriginal research. The approach taken was in line with the Marxist views of formationalevolution, with primary focus however being given to the matters of nationality andethnicity. The Central Asian scholars throughout the years could engage in seriousdebates on historiography with each other without ever challenging the underlyingassumptions regarding ethnicity and nationalities. The nationalities and ethnicitieswere considered objective realities whose existence was projected back into the mistsof times, rather than being seen as having its origins in Soviet modernity (Keller 2007:266).
The Soviet nationalities policies attempted to promote Central Asian ethnic cultures asseparate and distinct, thus emphasizing the differences in language, costume andfolklore (Slezkine 1994). Therefore the early indigenous attempt at regionalhistoriography by Bolat (Polat) Saliyef (Saliev) that treated the region as an indivisiblewhole in which ethnicity was of minor importance was denounced by Soviet school ofhistoriography. His book, History of Central Asia, and its continuation published in 1929already as History of Uzbekistan, was rejected as a model for regional historiography. Itwas labelled ‘nationalist and pan-Turkic’ (Usmonov 2006: 9).2
In 1998 Uzbek president gave a speech entitled “There is no future without historicalmemory”, in which he told the historians that the issue of statehood (davlatchilik) wasof utmost political importance. It was essential that the Academy of Sciences’ Institute ofHistory establishes the ancient roots of Uzbek statehood, he declared. Following that
1 Uzbekistan’s Academy of Sciences was created in 1943. Gafurov was instrumental in upgrading of theTajik branch of the Academy of Sciences to the Academy of Sciences of Tajikistan and the creation of theInstitute of History, Archaeology and Ethnography within it in 1951 (TSE 1974, 236).2 Saliyef’s approach was in line with what Adeeb Khalid (1999) calls “Chaghatayism” (from a circle ofJadids “Chaghatay gurungi” that sought to foster a common identity for the Turkic peoples of CentralAsia). Although Chaghatayism was rejected by the official historiography, its traces are still found inUzbekistan’s history writing, as Uzbek identity is equated with Chaghatay heritage.
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meeting with the scholars, the Cabinet of Ministers of Uzbekistan issued a Decree On
improvement of the activity of the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences of the
Republic of Uzbekistan, restructuring the departments and outlining the measures to betaken in pursuit of the new research agenda. Thus, the historic science was tasked withproviding a credible narrative of the long and inevitable teleological progress towardsindependent statehood.
The Uzbek academia followed the conception for the new historiography outlined byKarimov, publishing and drafting a series of publications dedicated to the matter ofstatehood. For instance, in 2000 the Institutes of History and Archaeology of the UzbekAcademy of Sciences started a project of a fundamental multi-volume edition on The
History of Statehood of Uzbekistan, which spans an enormous period of three millenniafrom the late Bronze Age up to the present day (Alimova & Rtveladze, 2001: 5).Establishing the ‘origins’ of the present-day statehood in the distant past has becomethe defining research problem of Uzbek historiography. The Institute of History views“development of a conception of history of Uzbek people and their statehood” as itsprimary task (AN RUz 2006). History writing is also essential for the articulation of theso-called ‘Ideology of National Independence’ (Milliy Istiqlol Mafkurasi) in Uzbekistan,since, as Alimova and Rtveladze point out, the investigation of the history of statehood“is not only of scientific significance, it is an integral part of the national idea, since itestablishes the fact of independent emergence, formation and development of thenational statehood throughout several millennia” (3).
‘Statehood’ within this discourse is a normative category founded in a historicalmaterialist vision of history of humankind. Translating Karimov’s instructions into thehistorical categories, the leading scholars of the Institute of History insisted that “theautochthonism of the emergence and the spontaneity of its development, the traditionalnature of its existence, despite the periods of the domination of the alien statehood,have in the end of the day become the defining factors in the revival of Uzbek statehoodin its new form in the beginning of the 1990s” (2001: 3). For the purposes of schoolteaching curriculum, the Uzbek historical science was to construct a simple narrative,which would be a continuation of the Soviet tradition of teaching the schoolchildrenthat “Uzbeks had lived in Central Asia for millennia, and for millennia had valiantlyfought foreign invaders” (Keller, 2007: 257).
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In contrast to the Uzbek focus on the history of statehood the Institute of History,Archaeology and Ethnography of the Tajik Academy of Sciences has concentrated itsefforts on the production of the six-volume History of Tajik People [Istoriĭa tadzhikskogo naroda/ Ta’rikhi khalqi tojik]. The main concern of the study remains the ethnogenesisof the Tajik people, the emergence of their early statehood and the final formation of thepeople and the Golden Age of their statehood during the Samanid period. The web siteof the Institute underlines that the research into that period “besides its huge scientificvalue is also called upon in order to provide the ideological and cultural support in thestrengthening and development of the independence of the Republic of Tajikistan”.3
The following sections of this chapter deal with instances of ‘discursive encounters’ inhistory writing between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan and their significance to theconstruction of statehood in both republics. These clashes have their antecedents inSoviet historiographical traditions. While the form of history writing in the post-independence period has not undergone significant changes, the content and focus hasshifted to focus on selected periods perceived as the formative and final periods in theprocess of the nation’s ‘ethno-genesis’, which usually coincides with the ‘Golden Age’ ofglory of the past national statehood, as well as lives and achievements of the greatancestors’ associated with those periods. All of the above-mentioned elements ofhistoriographical narrative have been strongly debated in discursive encountersbetween scholars and politicians of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.
Early discursive encounters
The disagreements started well before Tajikistan and Uzbekistan acquiredindependence – during the early years of the Soviet state. In June 1936 there was ascientific forum in the Tajik capital city of Stalinabad (later Dushanbe) regarding theappropriate approach to writing of Tajik history. Historians and Orientalists fromMoscow and Tashkent also took part in the debates. The Uzbek delegation argued
3 Institute of History, Archaeology and Ethnography named after Ahmadi Donish, Academy of Sciences of the
Republic of Tajikistan. The official web page is found at http://www.ant.tj/m17_1_1_3_1_full.htm . Accessed
on 11 December 2008.
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against the ethnic principle for Tajik historiography, arguing that that would give Tajiknationalists a hope for return of the territories not included in the existing state(Ashurov, 2003: 74). The historians from Uzbekistan, headed by V. Ia. Iarotskii, insistedthat Tajik history should be studied within the contemporary geographical boundariesof the republic, i.e. “from Regar to Vahan” (Ashurov, 2003: 75). This discussion wascontinued at the region-wide Central Asian Congress of Historians and Scholars thatcongregated in Samarkand in 1936 (Usmonov, 2006: 9).
The Congress discussed whether the ethnic or the territorial principle should beadopted to organise the historical studies of the region. As it proved virtuallyimpossible to separate regional history neatly into separate slots and label them as‘Uzbek’, ‘Tajik’ or ‘Turkmen’ (Smith et al, 1998: 70), for each Central Asian titular groupto get parcels of their own history with accompanying symbols, a combination of thetwo principles had to be applied. As all of the Turkic peoples of the region wereconsidered to be the descendants of the Turkic-Mongol tribes that settled in the regionin waves throughout centuries and some of them still lead a nomadic lifestyle, theterritorial principle of historiography allowed for consideration of all the stateformations that ever existed on the territory of the new republics as part of theirrespective national histories (Keller, 2007: 267).
During the 1938-39 Stalinist purges there was less tolerance for visions of Central Asiaas a single whole. As a result, the process of nomination of “an extremely limited set ofsafe heroes” for each republic was started by the historians (Smith et al, 1998: 71).These heroes had to meet certain criteria to qualify. The chosen ones tended to beapolitical, peaceful, a-religious settled persons, who could not be belligerent to Russia.They were also required to have made a contribution to the ‘treasure throve of globalcivilization’, not only to Central Asian or Muslim culture. As a result, most of CentralAsian heroes came from the periods of the rule of the Samanid and Temurid medievaldynasties, which had Bukhara and Samarkand as their centres, now found in theterritory of Uzbekistan (Keller, 2007: 268; Hidoyatov, 1990). However, since thecultural and historical heritage of the Samanid and Temurid states was considered byTajiks as their own, contradictions emerged regarding the assignment of the heroes toeither to Uzbek or Tajik history (Khudonazar 2004). This emphasis on certain periodsand persona has led to debates regarding the ‘real’ ethnicity of a certain historic
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personalities and attribution of ‘ownership’ of cultural and scientific achievements ofpast state formations to an ethnic group. This happened because Tajik and Uzbekschools of historiography chose opposing principles to guide their studies: Tajikistanadopted the ethnic principle while Uzbekistan has used territorial principle for itshistory writing.4
There are four intimately intertwined intellectual issues at stake in the discursiveencounters between Tajik and Uzbek historiographies: first, the issue of ethnogenesis,the study of the process of emergence of a particular ethnic group; second, and logicallyfollowing the first one, the issue of the proper attribution of the Central Asiancivilization to either Uzbek or Tajik people, based on their status as the most ancient
autochthon people of the region; third, the discussions of ethnogenesis and ethnicautochthonism lead to racialization of the differences between Tajiks and Uzbeks, whichnaturalised and essentialised the constructed groups; fourth and finally, the proper
boundaries of ethnic homelands of these groups are drawn on the basis of the discursiveconstructions of identity based on the principles of ethnogenesis, autochthonism andracialized difference between these two ethnic groups.
All of the above intellectual issues have roots in the Soviet ethnographic andhistoriographical traditions and are necessary building blocks in the post-Sovietdiscourse of ‘statehood’. It is thus instrumental for each group to ‘prove’ through thefindings of archaeology and (physical) ethnography that: (1) the process ofethnogenesis of their particular ethnic group was completed before the other group’s;(2) this process of ethnogenesis was autochthon to the territory of the claimed rightfulethnic homeland; and (3) the objective racial phenotypical differences (correspondingto the linguistic characteristics of the group) preclude the confusion regarding theproper attribution of those ‘proto-ethnic’ groups to the contemporarily existing ethnicgroups.
Within this paradigm the most beneficial strategy for the Tajiks was to pursue theethnic principle in historiography as the Iranian cultural heritage of the region could be
4 Blakkisrud and Nozimova note that while school history textbooks during the Soviet period narrated the
history of the territory of the Tajik SSR, post-independence history-writing is entirely focused on the history of
the Tajik people or nation (2010: 177).
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claimed as ‘proto’-Tajik. Moreover, the sedentary lifestyle of Tajiks allowed them toclaim the title of the indigenous people of the region, thus by implication portraying allthe Turkic peoples in the region as recent arrivals (Masov, 1991: 4; Mamadazimov,1996: 12; Usmonov, 2006: 24). This was also in line with the general bias in Soviethistoriography toward settled people with written culture over peoples with nomadiclifestyle who did not possess written history.
Significant works in Tajik nationalist historiography initially appeared in 1970-1980sand sought to establish the unique identity of respective ethnic groups based on adistinguished and ancient pre-history, thus legitimating claims for certain heritage andhomeland. Bobojon Gafurov’s monumental work entitled The Tajiks: Archaic, Ancient
and Medieval History (1970) immediately became a bestseller and a ‘bible’ for everyTajik intellectual. The work was immediately acclaimed for the excellence of researchand introduction of exhaustive archaeological and numismatic evidence, whichqualitatively differed from the scholarship produced before that on the subject.
This work was, however, greeted with much discontent in Uzbekistan. The Tajikstatesman-turned-historian wrote a history of an ethnic group, not of the territory ofthe republic created in 1929. The review of the first edition by the academiciansOkladnikov and Piotrovskii, however, pointed out that the title of the work – The Tajiks– “was not very appropriate as most of the Central Asian history discussed in the book isattributed to the period, when Tajiks had not been formed as people yet” (Ashurov,2003: 73). The leadership and academic community of the neighboring Uzbekistanwrote letters to the Central Committee of the Communist Party and all of the centralperiodicals, condemning Gafurov. Uzbek colleagues were especially annoyed by the factthat Abu Ali Ibn Sino (Avicenna), Al-Khwarizmi, Al-Ferghani and Beruni werementioned in the context of Tajik history (Ashurov, 2003: 77). Moreover, what wasmost objectionable, the 1972 edition of The Tajiks included a discussion of theethnogenesis of the Uzbek people that states that they only formed as a group quitetardily in the late Middle Ages with the arrival of the tribal confederation that gave theethnic group its name.
In direct contradiction to the Tajik historians’ position, in 1970s and 1980s Uzbekhistorians went as far as to deny any Iranian presence in the region during the Samanid
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period and argued that the entire region, including Bukhara and Samarkand, waspopulated by Turkic tribes, with Arabic being the language of administration andvarious Turkic dialects being the tongue of everyday use (Askarov, 1986: 7-10;Shaniyazov, 1974: 9).
Late 1980s and early 1990s were characterized by the rise of nationalisthistoriographies. The increased ethno-national consciousness, combined with the waveof democratization impulse among the intelligentsia during perestroika has leadcreation of multiple discussion clubs and political organizations. The names of theseorganizations usually appealed to the historical symbolism of the glorious past. Thus,for instance, the women’s wing of Birlik movement in Uzbekistan was called “Tumaris”,after the legendary queen of the Massaget people. Similarly, civic movements inTajikistan included those with such general names as ‘Rastokhez’ [Rebirth], ‘The Peopleof Samani’ as well as more regionally-aligned Eh’yoyi Hujand [Rebirth of Khujand](Guboglo & Chicherina, 1990). All of these movements saw the study of history of theCentral Asian people as part of liberalization and sovereignisation processes in theUnion republics.
Moreover, the burgeoning civil society of late perestroika in Tajikistan had a significanttransnational element to it. Among the socio-cultural centers registered in the republicin 1990 one sees such associations as “Samarkand”, and the national-cultural centre ofPersians and Tajiks of Bukhara called “Oftobi Sugdiyon” [The Sun of Sogdiana](Chicherina, 1990). Both of the above movements sought to improve the situation withcultural and linguistic rights of the Tajik minority in Uzbekistan by demanding that theaccurate statistical information regarding their numbers be established and advocatingfor the possibility of re-recording one-self as a Tajik in practice, not only on paper. Someof the emboldened representatives of the nationalistically-minded democratizing forceseven went as far as to claim Samarkand and Bukhara as rightfully Tajik cities thatshould be therefore “returned” into Tajikistan’s fold.
It was at this point (1991), on the eve of the Soviet Union’s disintegration, that RahimMasov published his notorious book entitled Istoriĭa topornogo razdeleniĭa [History ofCrude Division]. This book, the first in the trilogy of the revisionist historiography ofthe national delimitation of the 1920s, was subsequently banned in Uzbekistan (Masov
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1991, 1995, 2003). Masov’s writing since the publication of the History of Crude Divisionhas become the voice of resentment towards Uzbekistan within the official discourse.The main theses of Masov’s works can be summarized as follows. The Great OctoberRevolution of the Bolshevik party that took place in 1917 was the greatest event in thehistory of Tajik people. While the project of the national territorial delimitation wasjustified and necessary, what the Bolsheviks envisaged did not translate into reality.Many fatal mistakes were made in large part due to careerism and lack of national self-consciousness of Tajiks themselves, who were “poisoned” by the venom of Pan-Turkism.The Pan-Turkists (or “Great Uzbek chauvinists”) initiated “in essence, genocide of Tajikpeople” (Masov, 1991: 11). Uzbeks (Turks) pushed Tajiks into the mountainous parts ofthe region, assimilated them [Tajiks], took their lands away, appropriated their cultureand achievements. In the 1920s Uzbeks tried to prevent the emergence of Tajikstatehood by all means. Tajiks within Uzbekistan were subjected to a process ofassimilation, which was “very dangerous” and amounted to “overt [neprikrytyĭ]genocide” (77). Even though there were no mass killings, i.e. no genocide in theconventional sense of the word, it was still a genocide “not physical, but documentary”,as a result of which “Tajiks as people no longer existed in Uzbekistan” (78).
Despite its contribution to scholarship in revealing the complex dynamics that were atwork during the early period of Sovietisation of Central Asia, I personally find Masov’swriting quite objectionable as it is premised on ideas of racial superiority of the Tajiksand projects the animosity between Tajiks and Uzbeks back into the mists of time. Hequotes several Russian anthropologists and historians, who wrote that Tajiks are of“pure Aryan stock”, and himself makes a note of the racial difference between the Tajiksand the rest of the population in the region, saying that Tajiks “have more in commonwith the Slavic and the Indo-European peoples rather than with Turks” (1991: 23).Quite understandably, the Uzbek establishment have reacted to Masov’s writingextremely negatively, referring to his arguments as ‘crazy dreams of Hitler’ and‘chauvinistic hypotheses and ideas’ (Gafurov, 2003:-42). Since independence Masov’sideas came into even more prominence in Tajikistan as he was appointed as the head ofthe Institute of History. His ideas regarding the origins of Tajiks reached theirgrotesque conclusion in the celebration of the Year of the Aryan Civilisation inTajikistan in 2006.
114
The Aryanism Debates
Tajik historiography in the years following the civil war, has concentrated on the pre-Islamic aspects of Tajik identity, namely the Aryan origins of the people and theZoroastrian heritage. The focus of the Tajik state on Aryanism of Tajiks serves severalrhetorical purposes. First, it pushes the starting point of ethnogenesis extremely farinto antiquity, giving Tajiks an edge over the rest of the region’s peoples. Second, itfirmly grounds the claims for ethnic autochthonism of Tajiks as descendants of theAryans that inhabited the perceived homeland of Tajiks long before any of the Turkicpeople arrived in the region. Third, the Aryans having the perceived link to theEuropean peoples (as is Farsi/Tojiki said to be related to other Indo-Europeanlanguages) makes Tajiks racially distinct and superior to their Turkic neighbors. Lastbut not least, Aryan discourse serves the internal political purposes as a secular markerof identity that counters the Islamic opposition’s vision of Tajik identity as primarilyMuslim.5
The celebration of 2006 as the Year of the Aryan Civilization in Tajikistan was met withmuch indignation and satire in Uzbekistan. Since the Tajik government alreadyannounced the plan to celebrate the Aryan civilization in 2001, historians from bothsides engaged in heated debates. In 2003 a scholar from Uzbekistan, Gershenzondenounced the interest in Aryanism in Tajikistan as a revival of misguided ‘mythology’of the racial superiority, which has been discredited not only by the tragic events of theSecond World War but also by the findings of the linguistics, archaeology and evengenetics (Gershenzon, 2003).
The final round of controversy was set in motion by the publication in 2005 of an articleby Ahmadali Askarov (Asqarov) entitled The Aryan issue: New Approaches and New
Thoughts (Asqarov, 2005). The work is notable in its extreme ideologisation ofarchaeology. In a surprising move, Askarov turns the Aryanism discourse of Tajikcolleagues on its head and claims the Aryan heritage for Uzbekistan. By inverting thearguments of the opposing side, which he brands ‘pan-Iranist’ in direct contrast to
5 It should be noted here that initially (1990-1992) the theme of Zoroastranism and Aryanism was a part of the
opposition’s historical discourse. It was then appropriated by the government in the aftermath of the civil war
(Source: interview with Asadullaev, Dushanbe, summer 2008).
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Masov’s ‘pan-Turkist’ label, Askarov reinterprets the archaeological and linguisticsources as signifiers of the Turkic essence of Aryans. He argues that Aryans wereTurkic-speakers, equates shamanism with Zoroastrianism, interprets Andronov cultureas Turkic and insists that the Achaemenid dynasty was a Turkic dynasty that, only later,was Iranised under the linguistic influence of the local population. The publication ofthe article on the Internet was followed by a ‘historiographic war’ on the CentrAsia.ruwebsite throughout 2006. Masov was the first to respond, followed by other notablescholars from both sides. The text of the posts by Masov during the exchange wassubsequently published by Merosi niyogon journal, of which Rahim Masov is the chiefeditor, the entire issue of which was dedicated to the ‘Aryan question’.
The Aryan discourse is by no means new or freshly invented by the post-independenceregime and its court intellectuals, but has its roots in the Soviet, and even before that, inthe tsarist Orientalist scholarship that was guilty of what Vassili Barthold called‘tajikophily’ and ‘ariophily’ (Laruelle, 2007: 55). This tendency resurfaced after theSecond World War when the Soviet scholars became increasingly preoccupied with theissues of ‘ethnogenesis’ (Slezkine, 1996: 858). The Marxist visions of nations as theoutcome of evolution in the means of production were replaced by the explicitlynationalist search for ethno-racial origins and timeless essences in order to establishthe autochthonism of the Soviet nationalities.
For Tajiks the search for ethnogenesis took them from the Samanids to the Aryans.Shortly after being appointed the First Secretary of the Tajik Communist Party BobojonGafurov wrote his first work on history of the Tajik people Istoriĭa tadzhikov (1947), inwhich he discussed the importance of Indo-European issue for Tajik identity in order toprove the ancient presence of Tajiks’ ancestors in Central Asia. The creation of theSamanid state, according to Gafurov, was the end point of the process of ethnogenesis ofthe Tajiks, beginning from which one starts to speak of Tajiks rather than ‘ancestors ofTajik people’. This approach was productive in two ways. First of all, it differentiatedTajiks from Persians, arguing that although the Tajiks are of Persian stock, they havehad an independent path in history and that it would be unfair to attribute all Persianheritage to contemporary Iran alone. Secondly, this approach went beyond the bordersof Soviet Tajikistan expanding into the entire region. This went against the
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‘geographical’ (territorial) principle of history writing propagated by Uzbekistan’shistorians.
The importance of statehood: the Samanids versus the Temurids
Thus, in the Tajik historiographical discourse the first instance of ‘statehood’[gosudarstvennost’/ davlatdori] among the Iranian-speaking tribes in the region waspushed back to the times of Avesta and Zoroastranism (first millennium BOE). Forinstance, in an article by a Tajik scholar, Avesta is treated as a historical source fromwhich one is to gain knowledge regarding the roots of Tajik identity and ‘the process ofthe ethnogenesis of Tajiks’ (Mumindzhanov, 2003: 89-97). In order to demonstrate thecontinuity in the regional tradition of statehood, the Samanid dynasty’s rule is describedas guided by the ‘principles of Avesta’ and in-line with the civilizing mission of theTajiks in the region. Besides, the Arab and Mongol invasions are thought of asdestructive for the true identity of the local population and their influences (especiallythat of Islam) are silenced in the historiographic discourse.
In August of 1996, a pamphlet entitled The Tajiks in the Mirror of History by PresidentEmomali Rahmonov was published.6 The main theses of the article were that Tajiks arethe original autochthon people of Central Asia who are Aryan in their origins (46).According to Rahmonov, the Tajiks achieved the heights of sovereign statehood beforethe Mongolian invasion. In more recent history, Rahmonov writes: “Our enemies did notwant the construction of Tajik statehood and rejected the existence of Tajik people andTajik language altogether” (Rahmonov, 1997: 47). This is an explicit reference toMasov’s thesis of the ‘crude division’ and victimization of the Tajik people.
In 2006 an Uzbek historian Academician Rtveladze wrote a review to Rahmonov’s The
Tajiks in the Mirror of History calling it a work of a dilatant based on a fascist-style viewof the region’s history (Rtveladze, 2006: 75-80). His critique of the book Rtveladze
6 During my interview with a prominent academic in the of summer 2008, he claimed the authorship of at least
one of Rahmon(ov) pamphlets on history – “Tajiks yesterday and today” from 1996.
117
makes an insightful (and rather courageous) observation regarding the newly emergingtrend in the historiography of Central Asian states. He writes:
… we are seeing a new conception of Central Asian history in the making, which I have dubbedthe “conception of ethnic exceptionalism”. The main features of this conception, regardlesswhether the scholar advancing it is of Iranian or Turkic background, are: 1. Assertion of one’sown people as having the most ancient history of statehood in Central Asia. 2. One’s own peopleare necessarily the most ancient indigenous people of the region, as well is the name of thepeople itself. 3. Exaggerated scope of the past states’ boundaries and the territories of thatpeople’s habitat. 4. Unjustified glorification of one’s own people and playing down of thesignificance of other people, one’s own people have a civilizing mission in relation to other‘barbarian’ people. To these principles I would add the fifth – the search for the enemy of one’speople (Rtveladze, 2006: 75-76).All of these features are indeed found in both the Tajik and Uzbek post-independencehistorical narratives. While the Samanid state has been singled out as the ‘Golden Age’of the national statehood in Tajikistan, the Temurid dynasty’s rule over the region istreated similarly in Uzbekistan.
In 1999 the 1100th anniversary of the Samanid State was celebrated in Tajikistan. Thememorial complex comprising an imposing 11-meter statue of Ismoil Somoni (thefounder of the Samanid state), a gilded arch representing “a signpost, symbol, image ofthe nation” and two lions to the sides of the ruler, guarding him was opened on theeighth anniversary of Tajikistan’s independence, on the 9th of September 1999(Nourzhanov, 2006). Present-day Tajik statehood is understood as the directcontinuation of the Samanids’ state, which was destroyed by the invading Turkic (read‘Uzbek’) tribes in the 10thcentury:
The Samanid state has for us, Tajiks, a special historical meaning. It is during this period that thefactors and conditions necessary for the completion of the Tajik people’s formation process wereaccomplished.It is during this period that literary Tajik language, which has the foundational significance forthe unification of Tajiks into a single people, was formed.We did not have our own statehood in a thousand years since then, but within this period manygreat empires and states of Central Asia have chosen this language, the Tajik language, as thestate language of theirs.Furthermore, this was the period of formation of the new Tajik culture, which determined theself-consciousness, uniqueness and historic fate of Tajik people. It is only thanks to their culturethat Tajiks, who found themselves within other ethnic states would preserve their uniqueidentity (samobitnost’), and could found their own independent state – the Republic ofTajikistan– in the twentieth century. (Rahmonov in UNESCO, 1999: 13-14).The Samanid state is the high point within narrative of uninterrupted ascent of the Tajikpeople from their supposed Aryan roots to the culmination found in the acquisition ofindependence. Academician Numon Negmatov, the author of a monograph on the
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Samanid State (1977 in Russian, 1989 in Tajik), coined the term ‘historical Tajikistan’7to refer to extensive territories of Central Asia where, at the times of the Samanid state,the “ethno-genesis of the Tajiks took place” (Negmatov, 1992: 6). According to him theconcept was developed “since this territory that in the past was the area of ethnicformation of Tajik people and its first political statehood does not coincide withcontemporary geopolitical realities (ob’ektivnostiu) of Central Asia, in order to expressthe concrete truths and concrete realities of the evolutional processes of history”(Negmatov, 1997: 22). The essence of the Tajik nation, according to Negmatov is inwhat he calls ‘the Tajik phenomenon’. The Tajik phenomenon is that ability of the Tajiknation, and namely its timeless essence expressed in its language and culture, to survivethe absence of political sovereign statehood, despite the conquests of barbarian nomads(i.e. Uzbeks), while also performing a civilizing mission in the region, whereby theuncultured conquerors would adopt the language and culture of the conquered peace-loving Tajiks (Negmatov, 1997: 12).
The introduction to a special issue of Merosi niyogon (Heritage of Ancestors) historyjournal by the President of Tajikistan Emomali Rahmonov (1999) is a further exampleof such construction of Tajik statehood:
History of each people has a fateful (sud’bonosnyĭ) critical turning point (perelomnyĭ etap), whenthis people, which emerged from a colorful mesh of ethnic groups (pĭostrogo sotsvetiĭa etnosov),for the first time realize themselves to be a single whole and, having been winged (okrylĭonnyĭ) bya powerful passionate (passionarnoĭ) energy of unity, steps onto the path of creating its ownintellectual, civilisational, material and spiritual potential. The Samanid state – the first statecreated and headed by a national Tajik dynasty - became such an event in history of Tajik people.And its history convincingly manifests that throughout its existence it never practiced the cult ofthe sword, conquest, pillage and destruction of the other’s territories. After the fall of theSamanids there were states in the history of Central Asia that have, without doubt, contributedsignificantly to further development of culture and arts of the region’s peoples, but, at the sametime, they, unfortunately, gave birth to “bloody geniuses”, who destroyed other countries andpeoples with sword and fire. Hundreds of thousands of innocent people, out of whose severedheads artificial hills were made, perished in those bloody conquests (1999: 3).The text above represents the Samanid state (and by implication the Tajik people) aspeace-loving and civilized in contrast to the state of the Temurids (i.e. Uzbeks) ruled by
7 The territory of ‘Historical Tajikistan’ is defined as that of the “first Tajik state of Samanids with absolutely
predominant Tajik population and Tajik state language of administration, science, literature and art”. This state
occupied territories “from Afghan Pandjsher, Ghazni and Herat, Iranian Horasan in the south, to Khorezm in
north-west, Isfidjab and Khaftrud (Semirechie) in the north, to the limits of oasises and valleys of Kashgar and
Pamir in the east” (Negmatov 1992: 6).
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cruel barbarians. In a few sentences, Rahmonov creates a powerful image, familiar to allthose who studied history by the Soviet history textbooks. This is an example of hiddendialogicality of the Tajik historiographical discourse. The image that is being evoked isthe painting by Russian Orientalist artist Vasili Vereshchagin8 Apotheosis of war (1870-71, Tretiakov gallery), which initially was called Tamerlane’s triumph and which was anillustration that accompanied the pages dedicated to Tamerlane’s rule in Soviet historybooks (Hidoyatov, 1990: 157). By making reference to mounts of severed headsRahmonov makes a clear and direct link to the persona of Tamerlane. In Soviethistoriography Tamerlane was viewed as a ‘second Genghis Khan’, a mercilessconqueror, whose invasions destroyed cities and cultural heritage of entire countries(Hidoyatov, 1990: 156). In the post-independence Uzbekistan, however, Tamerlanebecame a national hero, a symbol of a strong centralized statehood and past glory(Djuraev & Fayzullaev, 2002: 166-169).
Figure 4.1. V. Vereshchagin (1871), Apofeoz Voĭny [Apotheosis of War], State Tretyakov Gallery.9
8 Vasilii Vereshchagin was an artist-in-residence with the colonial mission led by General van Kaufman in
Turkestan. He travelled to Turkestan “on special commission” of the governor-general in 1858 and 1870, after
which completed his famous Orientalist series-- the Barbarians and Turkestan -- depicting battles, architecture,
historical paintings and portraits of the locals, such as Uzbek Elder, A Kirgiz, A Sart Woman, etc.9 Image retrieved February 4, 2008, fromhttp://www.artrussia.ru/russian/artists/picture.php?rarity=1&pic_id=174&foa=f&list=1.
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Temurid epoch is seen as the ‘Golden Age’ to which contemporary Uzbek statehood istraced. The stature of Amir Temur has replaced the monument to Karl Marx in thecentre of Tashkent in 1993, other statures of him were erected in Samarqand andShahrisabz; the State museum of Temurid Dynasty’s History was built nearby in 1996;and the 660th anniversary of Temurid State celebrated widely in the same year. Eventhough, as it has been said above, the pantheon of state-nominated heroes has remainedvirtually unchanged throughout and after the Soviet period, Amir Temur has been anotable exception in becoming an official national hero after independence. Theglorification of Temur and the empire founded by him is a serious break with the Sovietwriting of history, although one can trace the symbolic use of his persona back to Jadidtimes (Khalid, 1999: 448).
The figure of Tamerlane reappeared in Soviet period historiography in 1968, whenAcademician Muminov presented a research paper at the meeting of the Academy ofSciences in Tashkent (Smith et al, 1998: 72). The paper, which was followed bypublications of brochures in both Russian and Uzbeks attempted to re-evaluate the roleof Tamerlane in Central Asian history. It was not, however, until 1972, when twopublications regarding the different aspects of Tamerlane’s rule were published that awide public reaction from within the Uzbek academia arrived. Muminov’s work wasbranded as glorifying and idealising the figure and actions of the cruel conqueror, whichin people’s minds came second only to Genghis Khan as an epitome of a barbariannomadic warrior.
The depiction of Amir Temur as a savage and tyrant is vehemently resisted in the post-independence Uzbekistan. In his 1998 speech Karimov rejects the negative image ofAmir Temur as a cruel conqueror, calling him a founder of a great state, a person ofimmense creative abilities and a patron of arts and sciences. The President rejected thecriticism of Tamerlane’s cruelty as absurd, exclaiming: “A man cannot be a creator and abarbarian at one and the same time. What beautiful madrasas and mosques, whatamazing palaces he built, supported the scientists and the educators! A man, whoknows the Holy Quran by heart, cannot be a barbarian. Can a blood-thirsty individualcome up with the aphorism such as ‘The strength is in justice’?!” (Karimov, 1998: 15-16).
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Further, Karimov emphasizes the necessity of asserting the autochthonism of the Uzbekpeople to the territory of Uzbekistan by denying that they ever led a nomadic lifestyle.The Uzbek people, according to Karimov, have always been sedentary. He then rejectsthe Soviet tradition of dating the culmination of the ethnogenesis of the Uzbek peoplewith the moment of acquisition by them of their contemporary name from one of theKypchak tribes that invaded the region in 16thcentury.
But surely somebody lived in Mawarannahr, the territory between two rivers, before thatinvasion. Or perhaps those people belonged to another nation? Where is logic here? If we acceptthis version, we have inherited from the Soviet epoch, then a wrong conclusion follows that thehistory of our nation started with the coming of another wave of conquerors? In that case, whereis our ancient history? If Samarkand, Bukhara and Khiva belong to Uzbeks, if there was an Uzbekstate here, why should we start recording our history from the XVI century, from the period,when the aliens, who had come to our lands, left their names here? Surely there were sedentarypeople here before they arrived! And those sedentary people surely had their own culture!Whoever invaded the region, for instance, the Mongols, who ruled from the 1220s to 1570s,mutual penetration of cultures would occur, but still the culture of the local population remainedthe dominant one. We know a people not by their name, but by their culture, through theirspirituality, looking into the origins of its history (Karimov, 1998: 17-18).In contrast with the Tajik narrative of an uninterrupted survival of the Tajik ‘spirit’throughout conquest through preservation of the courtly Persian language and culture,Karimov appeals to the continuity of the local culture through attachment to the land.Both approaches project current conceptions of ethnic, national and state identities intothe past.
The focus on the Samanid state in Tajikistan can also be explained by some of thefollowing reasons, in accordance with the principles of historiography of ‘ethnicexceptionalism’. First, chronologically Samanids precede Temurids by four centuries.Therefore, the claims for earlier ethno-genesis and acquisition of national self-consciousness during that period make Tajiks the most ancient indigenous people of theregion. Second, the Samanid period coincided with what is commonly referred to as“Muslim Renaissance”, which Negmatov goes on to rename ‘Tajik Ehyo’ (TajikRenaissance). This allows the contemporary Tajik nation to claim the enormous culturaland artistic heritage produced within the region during that period. Finally, it isconsistent with the positive self–image of Tajik people as peace-loving cultured citydwellers, whose civilization is first ransacked and then stolen from them by the hordesof nomad barbarians, who sow devastation on their way and leave pyramids of skullsbehind. In this account of history, the Samanid period not only temporarily precedes
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the Temurid state, it is also the condition of the Temurid state’s possibility. This point isbest illustrated by another excerpt from Rahmonov’s introduction to the special issue of“Merosi niyogon” (1999: 7-8):
If we are to talk about the civilizing (tsivilizatsionnom) contribution of the Samanid epoch on theregional Central Asian level, here, first of all, we must bear in mind that Tajiks, being the far-mostnorth-eastern “wing” of the vast in its spread Aryan habitat, took upon themselves a hardest but ablessed role of enlightening within the environment of Turco-Mongolian nomadic world. Thisprocess was going on continuously, having an effect on multiple Turkic nomadic tribes, whichinhabited the region’s territory. Beginning from the end of the X century, with the invasion ofregion by new nomadic tribes, this process takes on an intensive and diverse character. … And,although, the period, which followed the fall of the Samanid dynasty did not encourage growth ofscience and culture, the creative potential that was accumulated during that [Samanid]epoch…turned out to be sufficient for the preservation of the accomplishments of the greatcivilization and did not allow them to wither. The heritage of the Samanid epoch especially wasrelatively continued during the period of rule of the Temurids. Naturally, it inherited andpreserved the Samanid traditions I all spheres of culture and arts.Rahmonov earlier in that piece lists most of the great figures of medieval Central AsianRenaissance (which was part of the global ‘Muslim Renaissance’) as part of SamanidState’s heritage. Among those figures are such world-renowned encyclopedic scientistsas Muhammad al-Khwarizmi, Abu-Nasr al-Farabi, Zachariah ar-Razi (Razes), Abu Aliibn-Sino (Avicenna), Abu Reyhan al-Beruni, Abu Abdullah Rudaki, Abu Mansur Dakiki,and Abulkosim Firdausi. Rahmonov then goes on to say:
These and many more played a definitive role in nurturing and flourishing of the culture, scienceand art not only of the Tajik people, but all other peoples of Central Asia. And we in this respectmust not forget about their origins, their national (ethnic) identity/belonging; we must not turnthem into rootless (bez rodu i plemeni) cosmopolites only emphasizing their belonging to thewhole humanity (obshechelovecheskuĭu prinadlezhnost’), which goes without saying.Tajik Academician Mehammadjan Shukurov, in a foreword he wrote to NumonNegmatov’s Tajik Phenomenon (1997) makes the same point. He strongly disagreeswith Negmatov’s statement that “Temurid civilization was Central Asian-MiddleEastern, syncretic, Turkic-Tajik – Persian -Indian”. Shukurov writes:
It is necessary to emphasize that [despite partial syncretism] the development did not lose aconcrete cultural basis, it [the basis] was not replaced by another ethno-cultural basis, and thatthis civilization was mainly Tajik-Persian, Iranian, the continuation of the renaissance processesof the Samanid epoch and XI-XII centuries, which were disrupted by Mongolian invasion, butwhich found a second breath during the Temurids. The rise during the Temurid times in itscontent and in its form of expression had Iranian character It is necessary to be cautious ofoverestimating the mutual influence and interdependence of cultures. They do not form somenationally unidentifiable entity, something multi-nationally a-national / multiethnic and non-ethnic at the same time (mnogonatsional’no-beznatsional’noie). … Ehyo is a concretely ethnic, adeeply national phenomenon (Shukurov in Negmatov, 1997: 14-15).
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This text designates Temurid heritage as belonging to Tajik culture, regardless of thecurrent attribution of their successes to history of Uzbek nation and statehood,distancing, however, that positive heritage of the Timurid state from the persona ofAmir Timur-Tamerlane himself. Shukurov, along with other authors in Tajikistan,hyphenates ‘Tajik’, ‘Persian’, ‘Iranian’, ‘Farsi’ thus making them equivalent. The culturalachievements of the empire that dominated large portions of the Eurasian continent andhad Samarkand as its capital are thus represented as only made possible by theSamanid state. This way, it can also be claimed that Samarkand was a Tajik city sincetime immemorial. During the Soviet period, the Samanid state was already imagined asthe prototype of centralized ethnic statehood of Tajiks, however it did not have theprominence it has taken on after the end of Tajik civil war.
The national identity in Tajikistan post-independence had to be constructed with theuse of the resources that could justify the sovereign statehood of Tajikistan, albeit in theborders that do not coincide with those of ‘historical Tajikistan’. However, the fact thatthe most significant architectural artifacts of the Samanid epoch are found in theSamanid state’s capital Bukhara, which is nowadays found on the territory ofUzbekistan serves as a constant reminder that the Tajikistan of today is not a full-bloodied embodiment of what Tajik statehood could potentially be. This poignant senseof loss and of betrayal is also a part of the national ideology, which relies on conspiracytheories to create an image of a besieged ad vulnerable nation-state under a constantthreat from within and without.
Anaita Khudonazar (2004) argues that the image of Uzbek “other” has been cultivated inTajik literature since the 1970s and 1980s and was rooted in the perceived injusticesdone to Tajik nation in the 1920s. In particular, mourning of the loss of Bukhara andSamarkand is the recurrent theme of such literary expressions of Tajik nationalism. Shecites a poem by Bozor Sobir, a famous Tajik poet, entitled Mother Tongue:
Everything he [the Tajik] had in this world he gave awayThe lands of Balkh and Bukhara he had, he gave awayHonorable customs and collections of poems he had, he gave away,Throne of Samanids he had, he gave away.His enemy – beggarly in knowledge, “Donish” of Sino took away,His enemy – devoid of [his own] traditions, divan of Mavlono took away,His enemy – art dealer, the art of Behzod took away,
124
His homeless enemy took his place in his house.He let the club of Rustam and Suhrob out of his handsUseless barbarians he made strong,His own name as the grave of Rudaki was forgotten,He glorified his assassins in the whole world,Low height of ManghitRose above the minaret of Khorasan,Low steppes of Kipchak,Became higher than the mountains of Badakhshan.… In the eyes of those whose eyes are narrow,Years of oppression he sawAt times in flames,At times in water,Layer by layer with the burned [ruins] of Sogdian minaret he burned, heburned,With collapsed walls of Afrosiyab gates he collapsed (Sobir 1982: 15).
Bozor Sobir here refers not only to the lost cities and homelands of Tajiks taken away byUzbeks (‘his enemy’), but also the persona of Abu Ali ibn Sino (Avicenna), the heateddebates regarding the proper ethnic attribution of whom accompanied the celebrationsin relation to his 1000th anniversary in 1980. The Uzbek Other is referred to as anenemy’, who is ‘beggary in knowledge’, ‘devoid of tradition’, an ‘art dealer’, who stoleTajik’s cultural heritage for his own profit and being ‘homeless’ (i.e. nomadic) took awayhis home; a ‘useless barbarian’, ‘assassin”’, a short ‘Manghit’ (from the name of UzbekManghit dynasty) with narrow eyes, who took away ‘the throne of Samanids’ anddestroyed Tajik cultural heritage (the images of torture, ruins and burning). Once againwe see a hidden reference to mankurtism here in the line that mentions that “his ownname as Rudaki’s grave has forgotten” (reference to the fact that the grave of Rudakiwas not discovered until 1956; a mausoleum to him was constructed in Pendjikent in1958). The link between remembering one’s ancestors and maintaining one’s identity isemphasized here again. Moreover, what Sobir’s poem does is primordialise the conflictbetween Tajiks and Uzbeks back to the times when the events depicted in Shahnameepic took place. It calls upon Tajiks to pick up the club of legendary Rustam and Suhroband fight the aggressors.
In a short story called A Song of Someone, Who Has a Noose Around his Neck (1991) apopular Tajik writer Bahmanyor creates another depiction of history based on
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juxtaposition of the Tajik and the Uzbek projected back into the Temurid period. Thestory takes place in a Samarkand’s square, where two Tajik poets are about to beexecuted, following the order from Tamerlane himself. The ruler of the great empire isannoyed at the number of people, who gathered to see the execution, which to himmeant the support of the poets by the Samarkandi population. As the poet performs hislast song, Tamerlane is taken back in his memories to the peaceful times of hischildhood. When asked by the cruel ruler what the name of the song was, the poetreplies that is was a song of someone who has got a noose on his neck. Tamerlane isinfuriated by the bold answer, “but he already perceived one truth: no matter how manypeople of this tribe he killed, how many pyramids he built out of their bodies, how manyvillages and cities he razed to the ground sowing with barley, these people would revivelike steppe grass comes to life in spring …” (Bahmaniyor 1991: 11).
This quote ties back to the discussion above of the powerful image of the pyramid ofskulls from Vereshagin’s “Apotheosis of war”, which is a shorthand for genocide. Therehave been photographic images since Vereshagin’s painting of other genocides (theHolocaust and the Pol Pot atrocities being stark examples) with pyramids of severedheads or dead bodies. What was expressed rather vaguely in Rahmonov’s speechregarding the ‘bloody geniuses’, who built pyramids out of severed heads, becomes clearthrough the reading of Negmatov’s claim that Temur-Tamerlane committed genocideagainst Tajiks, while the ancestors of Uzbeks could ‘breath with ease’ and the referencein Bahmanyor’s short story to the pyramids of dead bodies. The positive self-portrayalof Tajiks as peace-loving poets and artisans in opposition to the negativerepresentations of the barbarian genocidal Uzbeks emerges with new force here.
In response to the celebrations of the Year of the Samanids in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan’sfamous historian Goga Hidoyatov wrote a book entitled Krushenie Samanidov [The Fallof the Samanids] (2004), which sparked another spiral of controversy between the Tajikand Uzbek scholars, which found its expression on the CentrAsia.ru website. Hidoyatovdoes not agree with the terms such as ‘Tajik-Iranian literature’ or ‘Tajik-Persian poetry’,and with the assertions that Rudaki, Firdawsi, Omar Khayyam, Saadi, Hafiz, Jami andothers are the representatives of the classic Tajik literature. He writes:
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First of all, it is a national shame to claim others’ cultural and historical heritage, this onlyhappens when one does not possess their own and is called ‘theft’; secondly, how could theTajiks, who in their majority resided in the mountains of Pamir and Hindukush could be Iranian,who lived thousands of kilometers away from them, had their own history, culture and classicalpoetry, in which Tajiks were not present (Hidoyatov 2004: 27, quoted in Usmonov, 2006).Hidoyatov writes that the celebrations of the ‘historically insignificant’ Samanid state(despite the refusal of the UNESCO to sponsor the anniversary) in Tajikistan was theoutcome “of the political games of the politicians of Tajikistan, objectively targetedagainst the neighbouring Uzbekistan” (Hidoyatov 2007).
A strong legitimizing aspect of the Samanid state as an ideology of nationalindependence in Tajikistan is the narrative of national unity that it offers to the currentregime. Rahmonov builds his legitimacy on his image as the peace-maker, who broughtthe warring brothers together and restored Tajik statehood. As Rahmonov put it in hisspeech at the opening of international seminar dedicated to 1100th anniversary of theSamanid state:
For contemporary Independent States of Central Asia, especially for Tajikistan, the lessons of thefall of the Samanid state are of special educational value (pouchitel’ny). … first of all, a state cannever be stable, effectively influence social processes, if internal conflict and regionalcontradictions are intense within. These negative phenomena, which intensified in the Samanidstate, especially in the second half of X century, eventually led to its fall. Something of similarnature was observed in our country in the 1990s. If we want to have a sovereign, single unitedand developed Tajikistan then we – the Government of the republic, the other political forcesshould work towards further elimination (izzhivanie) of all of the phenomena and factors, whichcould weaken our young independent state (1999: 14).
Vahdat (unity, reconciliation) has become one of the key components in legitimatingdiscourse of the regime along with discourses of tinji (peace) and mirotvotchestvo(peace-making) (Heathershaw 2006). The narrative that normatively asserts statesovereignty as the prerequisite for peace, prosperity and the very survival of nationalculture is necessary for the creation of an ‘imagined’ Tajik community. There have beenand continue to be, however, simultaneously with the narrative of national unity, moreregion-specific examples of history-writing in Tajikistan.
The Tajik civil war and Regionalization of Historiography
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The late Soviet and post-independence periods in Tajikistan were marked not only bythe revitalisation of national consciousness as fixed in the Soviet institutions andpractices, such as established census categories, ethnic maps and the designations ofidentity in passports. Regional consciousness was also awakened and propelled by theexisting Soviet linguistic and ethnographic research of the ‘sub-ethnic’ groups, such asYaghnobis and Lakays (Wennberg 2002: 403-410). Such demands for greater regionalautonomy in the form of an “upgrade” of a territorial-administrative unit within therepublic, expressed in Soviet terminology, were also voiced by Hisar rayon (whichwanted to be made into an oblast), the Autonomous Oblast of Gorno-Badakhshan(partly as an agenda of La’li Badakhshon organisation) demanded a status of anAutonomous Republic. Leninabad Oblast also demanded to be converted into anAutonomous Republic. Subsequently, the region even went as far as to threaten tosecede from the republic completely (Martin 1997). Similar sentiments reigned inanother major region of the republic - Kulob - which demanded a restoration of a Kuloboblast separate from Khatlon oblast it was a part of at the time. Finally, Gharm region(with the popular front Ashkara [Glasnost] in its avant-garde) demanded a totalautonomy, or rather independence – it was declared an Islamic republic in December1992 (Wennberg 2002: 406).
All of these regions appealed to historic symbols and figures to support their claims forgreater autonomy/independence. As Wennberg reports, Gharm was the first Lenin-freetown in Tajikistan already in 1991, when the largest statue of Lenin was replaced bythat of Nasratulla Makhdum, the first Soviet leader of Tajikistan. Both Hisar andKhujand (which threw off the old name Leninabad under leadership of the Eh’yoyi
Hujand organization) took turns in celebrating the 2500 years anniversaries ofthe cities’founding. Khujand took special pride in its being founded by Alexander the Great, whileHisar was grounding its claims for increased autonomy in its past status as the capital ofEastern Bukhara.
During the Tajik civil war (1992-1997) president Rahmonov emerged as the new leaderof the republic, with the Kulob (Kulyab) region behind him as his main support base.There has thus been a tendency in the historiography during, and in the aftermath of,the inter-Tajik conflict to celebrate the great figures that came from the region and theland of Khatlon (the ancient name for Kulob) itself as a cradle of ancient culture and
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civilization. Thus, Ashakara wanted to celebrate the prominent Islamic mystic AliHamadani, whose tomb is located in Kulob, to ground their initial claims for autonomy.The anniversary was celebrated on the Independence Day in 1995, while initially havingbeen scheduled for 1994. Franz Wennberg described the exhibition dedicated to the‘Heroes of the Tajik nation’ in Kulob’s local history museum, which was on duringHamadani’s anniversary festivities in Kulab:
While one floor was devoted to the celebrations of Ali Hamadani another floor was devoted tolocal ‘heroes of the Tajik people’. This exhibition began with mementoes of victims from Khatlan(the area around Kulab) who had died fighting for the establishment of Soviet power in Tajikistanin the 1920s, continuing with those who had died fighting against the ‘German fascists’ in theSecond World War, and ending with the present president, Emomali Rahmonov. Kulab had alsobeen decorated with the busts of the Kulabi warlord sangak Safarov, who played an importantrole in the civil war in 1992, and the leader of Ashkara, Rostami Abdurahim, as well as amonument of Sangak Safarov on the wall of the restaurant where he worked. Both of them wereproclaimed the Heroes of the Tajik People (Wennberg 2002: 407).Also the year 2005 was celebrated under the aegis of UNESCO as the 2,700thanniversary of Kulob city.
The representatives of the marginalised Leninabad (Khujand) region, which wasrenamed into Sughd region after historical Sogdiana in 2000, have also tried to writehistory of their region. One notable example is the writing of Khujandnama by ArifjanYahyazad Khujandi described by Stephane Dudoignon (2004). We can observe thereforethat the ‘revival’ of national and regional consciousness appealed to the projections ofthe present identities into the distant mythical past to lend them credibility andlegitimacy (Medvedev 1993, Abashin 2007).
The identities and the claims to entitlement to spatial sovereignty (increasedautonomy) were articulated in Soviet vocabulary, based on the Soviet principles ofhierarchical organisation of sovereignties within the matrioshka of territorial-administrative units. These identities and claims were however serving a differentpurpose in the changed conditions of the post-Soviet transition and civil war. Regionalactors used these seemingly timeless identities and Soviet framework for making claimsin order to negotiate their position in the new structure of relations of power within therepublic. The paradigm of ‘clans’ applied by many researchers to assert an argumentthat Tajikistan was not a nation in a true sense but rather a conglomeration ofprimordial ‘tribes’ or kinship groups, therefore, does not stand, as these
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reconfigurations of identity and territorial boundaries were creatively synthesizinghistorical symbols with the practices of the recent past in order to bargain for powerwithin the existing boundaries of the Tajik state, rather than challenging thoseboundaries.
Dealing with Independence
While the Tajik ideas of statehood after the civil war are based on the notions of unityand peace and the heroic role of the president in achieving both, the Uzbek state hasconsciously developed an Ideology of National Independence that raises sovereigntyitself to the status of national ideology. A narrative of a centuries-long anti-colonialstruggle of the Uzbeks is the foundation of this state ideology. The figure of thepresident here as well is that of a national leader who championed sovereignty andindependence for Uzbekistan even under the oppressive regime of the ‘Red Empire’. Letus, for example, consider some excerpts from a book written by two of the leadingacademics at the Institute of History within the Uzbek Academy of Sciences. In theirbook, Uzbekistan in the period between 1917-1990’s: the struggle of ideas and ideologies(2002), Dilorom Alimova’s and Aleksandr Golovanov’s write:
Since times immemorial the unbeatable spirit of freedom and independence was an unalienablepart of the moral ethical ideas that were being formed during and leading the society of earlyUzbek states, an important feature of the developing national character and national self-consciousness of Uzbek people. The ideals of freedom invariably inspired Uzbek people, served asa firm spiritual-patriotic bridge connecting the past and the future. From generation togeneration, the names of those, who valued independence and prosperity of Motherland aboveall; those, who sacrificed their lives for it. Through millennia and ages the tales of heroism ofnational patriots -Shirak, Spitamen, Mukanna, Djaloliddin Manguberdi and many other brave[muzhestvennykh] fighters for independence- have reached us (Alimova and Golovanov 2002: 6).The book directly connects the ideology of national independence with the practice ofhistory writing through representation of the entire history of humankind as thestruggle between ideas and ideologies. The ideologies are in hierarchical relations withone another with some being ‘good’ and others ‘evil’, and correspondingly, ‘genuine’ and‘false’, ‘indigenous’ and ‘foreign’, ‘creative’ and ‘destructive’. The book especially seeksto demonstrate that Soviet ideology, being alien to the ‘national mentality of Uzbekpeople’, had only negative consequences for its ‘historical development’. Alimova and
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Golovanov emphasize that throughout the Soviet period, the fight of the Uzbek peoplefor “free self-determination and restoration of national statehood” never ceased.
The whole history of humanity is punctured [pronizana] by the never-ending struggle betweenthe forward (progressive) and antihuman ideas and ideologies, reflecting the multiplicity of goalsand interests of different social strata, political movements, nations and peoples, separate statesand societal systems. The dialectic of this side of the historical process has found its expressionin the compressed formula of the global antagonism between “good” and “evil”, which wasformed at the very dawn of humanity (Alimova and Golovanov 2002: 3).Within this Manichean narrative of world history, the trope of “mankurt” crops upalmost invariably, when talking about the Soviet period in particular. Alimova andGolovanov write:
During more than 70-year experience of existence [of the USSR], the Soviet authorities havevividly demonstrated that the communist ideology was programmed to alienate a person fromeverything: from property, from culture, from their own nation. Its [communist ideology’s]philosophy was genetically foreign to the national idea, mentality of Uzbek people (Alimova andGolovanov, 2002: 9).Not recognizing the Soviet efforts of state-building in the region as the channel ofgenuine self-determination of the local peoples Alimova and Golovanov endorseTurkiston muhtoriyati (Turkestan/Kokand Autonomy) as the paradigmatic case ofgenuine model of national state building, reflecting the conceptual principles developedby the indigenous nationalist elite, the Jadids (Alimova and Golovanov, 2002: 21).
Similarly, in the eleventh grade history textbook History of Uzbekistan: Period of
National Independence (2002), Narzulla Djuraev and Tursunbay Fayzullaev refer to theperiod beginning in 1991 as the ‘renaissance epoch’. According to the authors, Uzbekpeople have always strove and fought for independent statehood. They write:
The collapse of the USSR and the rebirth of the independent Uzbekistan were both events thatwere to be expected [nosit zakonomernyĭ kharakter]. Uzbek people always strove to resurrecttheir independence. This fact has been emphasized by president Islam Karimov in his speecheson many occasions: “Uzbek people since the times immemorial lived and fought for itsindependence. History itself bears evidence to that. The truth regarding the history of our peoplemust become known to the civilized world and first of all our young generation must learn aboutit. To leaf through and to learn the pages of our history is the obligation of each patriot” (Djuraevand Fayzullaev, 2002: 7).The authors themselves define the tasks of the post-independence historical science asto “explain the inevitability and regularity (zakonomernost’) of the emergence ofsovereign Uzbekistan, whose experience of statehood counts many millennia, on the
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political map of the world” and to “study the historical continuity (preemstvennost’) inthe rebirth of sovereign Uzbekistan” (Djuraev and Fayzullaev, 2002: 4).
The goal of the authors of the new state is to assert that there was nothing accidental orcontingent in the emergence of sovereign Uzbekistan on the word map. They, therefore,interpret the outcomes of the referendum of the 17th of March 199110 in the followingway:
The evidence to the gradual movement towards the republic’s independence by the leadershipand the Uzbek people are the results of the referendum that took place on March 17th 1991.Besides the questions approved by the Higher Council of the USSR, a new question was added tothe main list on the ballot papers. It asked from people the following: “Do you agree thatUzbekistan will enter the renewed union (Federation) as a (ravnopravnaia) republic enjoyingequal rights [with others]?” 93.9% of the voters expressed their opinion as being in favour. Thus,the referendum demonstrated that the overwhelming majority of the voters gave their voice infavour of independence and therefore expressed their full support to the policies conducted bythe leadership of the republic (Djuraev and Fayzullaev, 2002: 18).Alimova and Golovanov report the results of the same referendum in a similar fashion:
We can judge about the political mood among the population of Uzbekistan, their real will at thattime by the outcomes of the referendum regarding the future of the republic that was conductedin the beginning of 1991. To the question on the ballot paper: “Do you agree that Uzbekistanremains within the renewed Union (Federation) as a sovereign republic?” 93.9% of all those whocast their votes expressed support to independence and to equality (ravnopravnii) of Uzbekistan.This clearly expressed support of the idea of sovereignty on the part of the multiethnicpopulation of Uzbekistan gave the leadership of the republic a firm confidence in the rightfulnessof the chosen political course, of the difficult struggle with imperial forces of the Centre (Alimovaand Golovanov, 2002: 78).Therefore, the official representations interpret the results of the referendum of March17th 1991 as the manifestation of the will of Uzbek people for sovereignty. Byemphasizing the part of the wording in the ballot question that defined the role of themember states in the renewed Union as ‘sovereign’ or ‘enjoying equal rights’, theyequate the affirmative answer with the desire for political independence. The outcomes
10The decision to conduct a referendum on preservation of the Soviet Union, which asked the electorate“Do you consider it necessary to preserve the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics as a renewed federation
of equal sovereign republics, in which the rights and freedoms of people of all nationalities will be
guaranteed in full measure?” was adopted in December of 1990 at the Fourth all-Union Convention of thePeople’s Deputies (s’ezd narodnih deputatov). In many republics the main question was accompanied byadditional questions, often contradicting the main one. Six out of fifteen Union republics – Lithuania,Latvia, Estonia, Armenia, Moldavia and Georgia – refused to take part in the referendum. The ambiguouswording of the main question, inclusion of additional questions, and failure to make a reference to thenew Union treaty make it hard to interpret the results of the referendum unequivocally.
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of the referendum, according to such interpretation, are in exact opposition to howthose, who formulated the question, intended it to sound.
Illustrative of this logic is the reaction expressed by Islam Karimov in his speech, givenon the day following the adoption by Russian Duma of the decree that declared thedissolution of the Soviet Union illegal and in violation of the will of the majority ofpopulation, as expressed in the referendum of the 17th of March 1991:
Let us have a look at the referendum that took place on the 17th of March 1991, which they referto. Then it was the Soviet period – the period of the totalitarian regime. And the referendum ofthe 17th of March was conducted in the conditions of pressure. At that time in Uzbekistan, asecond ballot paper was included. For the citizens of Uzbekistan on the territory of our countrywe offered the second ballot paper. In other words, along with the question offered by the all-union referendum, offered by the Center, we put forward our own as well. In its essence, ourquestion was in contradiction with the question asked by the Centre, and they mutually cancelledone another, they were mutually exclusive. We asked that question from people. That is why, wecan say with the full evidence, that the attitude of the people of Uzbekistan to the question askedby the referendum of the 17th of March 1991 was expressed at that time clearly and firmly(Karimov 1996).Whereas the textbook version does not even mention that the referendum was on thepreservation of the Soviet Union rather than independence of Uzbekistan, Karimov’sspeech was a response to the argument by the Russian parliamentarians that thedissolution was illegal as it ignored the will of the people as expressed in the results ofthe referendum.
The work that Karimov speech did, initially, was to assert the independence ofUzbekistan as legitimized by the results of the 17th of March referendum, rather thanbeing questioned by those results. In order to achieve this rhetorical goal, Karimov firstsays that the referendum was conducted ‘under the conditions of pressure’ during the‘period of a totalitarian regime’ and, therefore, those results are not to be trusted as thegenuine expression of the will of the people. Second, Karimov then says that Uzbekcitizens were offered an alternative question that contradicted the main question of thereferendum formulated by the Centre. He omits the actual wordings of the questionsfrom his line of argumentation. Neither does he explain why the question offered by theUzbek authorities was not subject to the ‘conditions of pressure’ of the totalitarianregime under which the referendum was taking place.
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This initial discursive construction by Karimov in reaction to a suggestion of theprospect of resurrection of the USSR was then elaborated by the historians, who simplytook the word “sovereign” out of the original context of the question regarding whetherthe Union should be preserved in some new form and whether Uzbekistan shouldbecome a member of that union as a ‘sovereign’ republic. The inevitability ofindependence of Uzbekistan cannot be questioned in the official discourse.Independence, according to the authoritative history discourse in Uzbekistan, was aresult of the prolonged and bitter struggle of Uzbeks for sovereign statehood, anoutcome of the natural course of history. In the same speech give on March 16th 1996,Karimov said:
Our reply is short and decisive: your will is in your hands, but the path of Uzbekistan is known.The people of Uzbekistan will never and in no way allow chaining them, to return to the oldregime. This is clearer than a bright day. I will say it again: the wheel of history cannot be spunbackwards. This is nature, this is life, this is history. Who can deny this centuries-old law ofnature? (Karimov 1996).In summation, the official historiographical discourse in Uzbekistan provides us withthe narrative of an eternal existence of Uzbek nation as a source for sovereignstatehood. Therefore, the acquisition of independence in 1991 as a result of the collapseof the USSR is still interpreted as a “rebirth” of national sovereign statehood rather thanits accidental “birth”, even despite the absence of an independence movement and theresults of the referendum of March 17th.
Conclusion
The historiographies of post-independence Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have beenconsistent with the post-independence models of their statehood. On the Tajik sidethere is an emotional longing and grief for the loss of the cities of Bukhara andSamarkand and a refusal by many representatives of the intelligentsia, especiallyhistorians and writers to accept the existing boundaries of the designated Tajikhomeland. Uzbekistan’s historiography, on the other hand, has been on the defensive,asserting and protecting the right of the Uzbek people for independent statehood on theterritories that have been designated as their ethnic homeland in 1929 (the
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‘sovereignty-protecting’ model). Both positions are informed by the specifically Sovietconceptions of ethnicity and national self-determination.
In this chapter, the discursive practices of sovereignty-assertion were analysed bymeans of predicate, metaphor and narrative analysis. The Möbian play of differancewithin historiographical discursive encounters allows each side to advance theirconception of self, based on the established repertoires of Soviet history writing. TheSoviet theory of ‘ethnos’, and tradition of writing ‘ethno-genesis’ have provided Tajikand Uzbek politicians and academics with a “post-factum justification for theinevitability of ‘the empire’s disintegration’ and ‘acquisition of independence’” (Abashin,2007: 298). In other words, the language of ‘ethnos’, ‘ethnonym’, and ‘ethno-genesis’ hasbeen re-appropriated by the politicians, journalists and wider circles of academia inorder to legitimise the very existence of the new states in Central Asia.
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Chapter Five
The Roghun controversy
“Roghun is the symbol of being of our nation.
It stands for life or death of the Tajik state!”
(Siddikov 2010)
This chapter presents the second ‘discursive encounter’ and explores the spatialdimension of sovereignty construction. In this case study, I am interested in ways inwhich sovereignty and identity, security and territoriality are intertwined in the dailybusiness of constructing and maintaining a state. In particular I am examining the on-going controversy that has surrounded the plans by the Tajik government to resume theconstruction of the Roghun hydropower station on the Vakhsh river. If completedaccording to the original Soviet project of 1965, it will become the highest dam in theworld (335 meters) and is projected to produce 13.3 TW/h (terawatt/hour) of energyannually, which is promised to cover the internal households’ and industrial consumerneeds and sufficient excess for export to the Asian markets. Such source of energy isadvocated by the government as a means of overcoming the dependence on Uzbekenergy and infrastructure as well as a jumpstart to the republic’s economy. Uzbekistan,which is located downstream from the projected dam and hydropower plant, has beenvehemently objecting to the construction. This has resulted in a series of heateddiplomatic exchanges, a railroad blockade of Tajik goods, electricity and gas suppliescuts, posturing and hostile behaviour on the borders as well as ‘information warfare’ inthe press of the respective states.
Soviet ‘hydraulic mission’ in Central Asia
136
Roghun hydropower station project was initially concieved and planned by the centralwater management authorities of the USSR. In the Soviet Union, dam construction wasa state-controlled enterprise, which until its transfer to the Ministry of Energy in 1960,was under the jurisdiction of the KGB. Therefore, the construction of large dams was atreated as an issue of ‘state security’. The symbols of progress and achievement of thesocialist labour were also the testimony to the oppressive and violent side of the state,with prisoners of gulags providing the slave labour necessary for contruction of gianthydroprojects of the industrialising Soviet state (McCully 2001: 17).
Central Asia was the site of the most ambitious projects of the Soviet ‘hydraulic mission’,its main focus being expansion of cotton cultivation and electricity-intensive industriessuch as aluminium production. Hydraulic projects were seen as central tomodernisation and Sovietisation of Central Asia. It was arguably an extension of thecolonialist exploitation of the region as a gargantuan cotton plantation, but it was alsopart of any modern state’s agenda of modernisation, progress and development. When,in the 1930s, two senior party officials questioned the wisdom of the party policy ofconverting vast expanses of Central Asian deserts into cotton plantations, they wereprosecuted for ‘bourgeois nationalism’ and executed as the enemies of the people(McCully 2001: 18). Perhaps, the most extreme illustration of the impact of waterdiversions for cotton production is the desiccation of the Aral Sea. Since the 1960s, theflow of Amu Darya and Syr Darya into the Aral Sea has completely stopped due to thecomplex web of dams, reservoirs, and canals used for cultivation of cotton in the region.In the 1990s the Aral Sea was reduced to less than half of its size in 1960. These days,the remaining area of the Sea is reduced to three hyper-saline and rapidly shrinkingpools.1
1 The Aral Sea tragedy is normally seen as an unexpected consequence of the ineffective and myopicSoviet water management policies. However, some authors have argued that the Soviet policy-makersactually planned the disappearance of the Aral Sea. It was the opinion of Joseph Stalin that ‘water which isallowed to enter the sea is wasted’ (McCully 2001: 237). Pearce writes at a museum in Nukus he had seena series of maps drawn in 1970s by the Soviet planners that projected total disappearance of the see bythe year 2000 and designated newly-available lands for rice and cotton cultivation (Pearce 1992: 204-5).McCully confirms that a map issued by the USSR’s Academy of Sciences in 1981 indeed projected the seato be dry before 2000 and that a 1987 magazine article proclaimed: “May the Aral Sea die in a beautifulmanner. It is useless.” (McCully 2001: 44-45).
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Everywhere in the world the massive irrigation projects had detrimental impact onenvironment and livelihoods of local people. They resulted in the loss of lands, and withthem of architechtural and archeological artefacts, led to dissappearance of indigenouslifestyles and cultures, negatively affected the environment, water quality and wild-life.Moreover, large dam projects demanded enourmous economic and labour resourcesand mass displacement of people. Mid-1980s saw the emergence of a global movementopposing the dam-building practices. This worldwide anti-dam movement was echoedduring the perestroika era in the Soviet Union (Dams 2000). The protests against dams’construction were a part of the larger Union-wide phenomenon of eco-nationalism asthe union republics were trying to carve out greater sovereignty from the centre.2
In Central Asia, eco-nationalism during perestroika focused mostly on the effects of thecotton monoculture and nuclear and biological weapons testing sites on theenvironment and health of the population. The new ‘informal’ political movements inTajikistan during perestroika opposed the construction of the Roghun dam and theflooding of villages and the population resettlements that would result from it(Khudonazar 2004: 19). Such population resettlements took place in Soviet Tajikistanmostly either due to inundation of the lands after damming or to populate the newlyirrigated areas. This had disastrous consequences for the highlanders forcefullydislocated onto the plains where they had to cultivate cotton (Schoeberlein 2000, Roy2000; Sodiqov 2009). The Yaghnob valley dwellers whose tradiational way of life wasdestroyed by the 1970s policy of forced relocation of the people to the plains enduredmuch hardship as a result (Schoeberlein 2000: 43). Populations of Gharm, Darvaz andKarategin were relocated to the Republic’s southeastern region of Qurghonteppa in the1950s.
From 1965 to 1978, the first feasibility study and a design for construction of theRoghun project were developed by the Soviet design institute Hydroproject Tashkent.
2In Latvia, for example, the campaign against the construction of the hydrodam on the Daugava River in1986 was the harbinger of organised dissent against the Soviet Union. The river became the symbol ofthe nation, its natural beauty and the ancestoral burial grounds that were about to be violated by the damcontruction stirred up eco-nationalism, thus making Daugavpils campaign the ‘dress rehearsal for thePopular Front’ (McCully 2001: 292). Similar campaign took place in Georgia where eco-nationalistsstaged protests against the Khudoni Dam which brought about a complete halt in the construction in1989.
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Preparatory construction works began in 1979 and the main construction activitiesstarted in 1982. The scope of work implemented from 1976 to 1990 constitutes asignificant volume of construction, comprising both underground work and surfacefacilities. However, the ecological organisations, people from the flooding zone, andrepresentatives of intellegentsia’s technical and scientific circles, expressed theiropposition to the construction and reservations concerning the reliability of theprincipal technical solutions of the project. In the 1980s, the Gharmis who wereexpected to relocate to make room for Roghun reservoir opposed the policy. There wasa short-lived debate around the issue of involuntary resettlement of people whichmobilised the disenfranchised Gharmis politically and was arguably one of thecontributing factors in the breakout of the Tajik civil war (Sodiqov 2009). As a resultan independent expert assessment under a state committee within Gosplan wasconducted. The assessment confirmed the reliability of the existing project. However,the previous momentum of the construction was lost (RusAl 2005). During a flood in1993, the diversion tunnels were blocked, which caused overtopping of the 45 meterhigh upstream embankment cofferdam, which was subsequently washed away.
It is estimated that the Roghun project would force the resettlement of over 30,000people. The Tajik authorities started the resettlement of people from Nurobod districtin Rasht valley to Dangara in late May 2009. The first 232 families have already beenrelocated as their houses will be submerged by the water filling up the Roghunreservoir. Although some Tajik commentators have been reported to warn againstdisplacement of people in light of the recent Tajik history of inter-regional conflict, theissue has been conspiciously absent from public discussions around Roghunconstruction (Sodiqov 2009). There seems to be no opposition on the part of theoustees nor outcry from human rights activists. In contrast to pre-independencedebates, there seems to be a remarkable consensus regarding the desirability andfeasibility of the project within Tajik society. This chapter offers an analysis of howsuch consensus is manufactured by the political actors in Tajikistan and what part theconfrontation with Uzbekistan plays in solidifying the seeming public unanimity on thispotentially contentious issue.
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The Vakhsh River cascade
The projected Roghun hydropower plant (HPP) is part of the cascade of dams andreservoirs on the Vakhsh River located in Tajikistan. Once completed the dam would beone of the tallest in the world at 335 meters and would be 1,500 meters wide. Thereservoir would have a total storage volume of 13.5 million cubic meters over 10.3 km3.It is projected to produce three million 600 thousand megawatt of electricity each year.It is estimated that it would take seven to twelve years for the Vakhsh River to fill thereservoir (Leon 2010). The cascade includes 600-MW Baipaza, 240-MW Golovnaya, 24-MW Perepadnaya, 15-MW Tsentral’naya and 3,000-MW Nurek stations. Underconstruction within the cascade are the 3,600-MW Roghun, 670-MW Sangtuda-1 and220-MW Sangtuda-2. Moreover, two more projects have been proposed within thecascade: the 200-MW Nurobod-2 and 850-MW Shurob (PennEnergy 2009). The damwhich is currently the world’s highest, Nurek3, located on the Vakhsh River in Tajikistan,was completed in 1975. It is an artificial mountain of earth and rock 300 meters high(McCully 2001: 5), which was created by a giant explosion that basically broke off a partof a mountain. Since a structure made of metal and cement was too expensive toconstruct, the ‘use of local materials was preferred’.4
The Roghun project was conceived during the Soviet period as a dual-purpose project:as means of regulating the irrigation water management at Amu-Darya River as well asthe station for generation of hydroelectricity. It was projected to be located onlyseventy kilometres upstream from Nurek to form a part of a cascade of hydropowerplants on the Vakhsh River. A newspaper article from the time emphasised theimportance of the project for further expansion of production of cotton in the region:
Nurek artificial sea has already given the farmers millions of cubic meters of water. But it isincapable of providing the vital moisture in necessary quantities. The problem will solved whenthe Roghun Sea is here. Without that [reservoir] the capacity of Amu Darya to irrigate the lands
3 Nurek construction displaced at least 1,800 people (official data). The reservoir area is 9,800 ha. Theinstalled capacity of the generators is 2,700 megawatt. Like Roghun, Nurek is a multipurpose dam(energy and irrigation use).4 Otahon Latifi, “Gora polegla poperek Vakhsha”, 1968. This journalistic report from the site ofconstruction is filled with certain romance and poetry. The author exhorts the might of the explosion, thepower of the man to stop the flow of river and the zeal of socialist workers are all combined with areference to Central Asian legend of Farhad and Shirin. According to the legend, Farhad brought water tothe people by cutting a channel through a rock mountain, as a reward he was given the hand of a beautifulgirl called Shirin. The article reports: “These days the address of Farhad is Vakhsh. On the lands, whichsince the times immemorial have not ‘seen’ any water other than snow and rain, we shall grow cotton!”
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will be completely exhausted by year 1985. Karshi, Amu-Bukhara and Karakum canals [located inUzbekistan --MS] will receive enough water and under the hot sun of Middle Asia new oases willgreen...5Both Nurek and Roghun were conceived, however, not only as means to regulate theflow of water for irrigation purposes. These dams were planned in conjunction withconstruction of the aluminium plant in Regar in order to supply the smelter with cheapelectricity. Unlike other forms of smelting, which rely on heat, the production ofaluminium requires passing a powerful electric current through alumina (processedfrom the ore, bauxite). Electricity is the second biggest cost factor in aluminiumproduction after raw materials. The hydroelectric and aluminium industries have beeninextricably linked since both first emerged. Aluminium smelters are the largestcustomers for many of the world’s most powerful dams (McCully 2001).
Both aluminium industry and the hydropower in Tajikistan are still formally state-owned. However, after closer scrutiny, it appears that the governing elites have‘privatised’ the state (Avesta.tj 2010, March 31). Thus, the Tajik Aluminium Company’s(TALCO) director is the president’s son-in-law and the earnings are deposited in an off-shore account and thus no tax is paid to the Tajik state (Heathershaw 2011: 158). Themajor foreign currency source for the Republic, the TALCO Aluminium Plant, consumesup to 40% of all electricity produced by the Republic. It is therefore not surprising thataluminium industry, as the main potential beneficiary of the Roghun is closelyconnected with the revival of the project. In October 2004, Russian Aluminium (RusAl)and the Government of Tajikistan reached an agreement to resume work with the aim ofcompleting construction of the first stage of the project, primarily for the supply ofpower for existing and new aluminium smelters in Tajikistan. In February 2005 RusAlcommissioned Lehmeyer International of Germany to carry out a bankable feasibilitystudy for Stage 1 completion of the scheme. The final report of this study was issued inDecember 2006 (Schmidt 2008: 30).
The Aral Sea basin water management institutions
5 Otahon Latifi, “Ryadom s orlinnym gnezdom”[Near the Eagle’s Nest], from The Last Spring of Otahon
Latifi: Book of Memory, 2006, pp. 98-101
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The Aral Sea basin in which all Central Asian states are located is formed by two largerivers – the Amu Darya and Syr Darya. Vakhsh is a tributary of the Amu Darya Riverwhich originates in the territory of Afghanistan, then continues its flow in Tajikistan,forming its southern border with Afghanistan, flows into Turkmenistan and ends up inUzbekistan.
Figure 5. 1. The Aral Sea basin
The system of management of the surface water resources formed in the basin of theAmu Darya and Syr Darya was only introduced by the federal centre in mid-1980s(Polat 2002: 136). These structures were tasked with calculating the needs of water foragricultural purposes and establishing consumption quotas as well as energyreimbursement to the upstream republics during the winter months. This system wascarried on into the independent statehood period. Following the breakup of the USSR,on February 18, 1992, the new states of Central Asia agreed to maintain the Sovietsystem of water management in the region. As a result of this agreement the InterstateCommission for Water Coordination (ICWC) with Secretariat in Khojent, Tajikistan andScientific Information Centre in Tashkent, Uzbekistan was established.
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The water resources management in the Amu Darya River basin is characterised by thepersistence of the mechanisms of water distribution that have been carried on from theSoviet system designed in 1980s. Wegerich writes that, rather than being guided by thenew paradigm of integrated water resources management (IWRM) based on theprinciples of water management according to hydrological rather than administrativeboundaries and equitable distribution of water among the riparian states (with the Aralsea being considered as one of the ‘users’ of water), the present water management hasbeen driven by the increased demands on water in both upstream and downstreamstates (Wegerich 2010: 44). Water utilisation in the Amu Darya basin has remainedbiased towards the agricultural needs of Uzbekistan. Even though officially an annualwater quota has been allocated to the Aral Sea as one of the riparian users, in realitydata suggests that no water has in fact reached the Aral Sea in the past two decades. Asa result of the policy of food self-sufficiency after independence in both Tajikistan andUzbekistan, even more water than before is being withdrawn for wheat cultivation.
Overall, observers have noted that the water management system in Central Asia isunbalanced. The very fact that the research institute holding vital information regardingthe water flows and other regional water management institutions are physicallylocated in Uzbekistan makes other states suspicious of their integrity (Horsman 2001).Moreover, it has been noted that that the system does not provide for a mechanism fordispute resolution (Wegerich 2010; Weinthal 2001; Vinogradov and Langford 2001).The 1992 agreement refers water disputes to the relevant ministries in the fiverepublics, but fails to designate a mechanism in case the respective ministries do notsucceed in resolving the disagreements.
The points of contention since independence
The fundamental disagreement between the states in Central Asia stems from theconflict of interests between the upstream and downstream states. According to theWorld Bank, ninety six percent of volume of the region’s two great rivers’ flow is utilisedin watering of the eight million hectares of the irrigated land in the basin (Abdullaev2001). Irrigated land provides ninety percent of all crops produced in the region.
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Cotton, which is responsible for 76 percent of Uzbekistan’s hard currency revenue,occupied the total area of 1.33 million hectares (approximately 35.9 percent of totalirrigated land area – my estimate) in 2004 (International Crisis Group 2005).
Under the existing water agreements the three downstream states – Kazakhstan,Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – receive 73 % of total withdrawals from the Aral SeaBasin. While Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan – the region’s upstream states – are the sourceof 90 % of all water in the Aral Sea basin, they are entitled to only 12.2 % and 0.6 %,respectively. Uzbekistan is believed to consume in excess of the allocated 43 % of theAmu Darya’s flow, while Tajikistan is only entitled to 13.6 % (see table below).
Table 5.1. The ICWC water allocation plan in the Aral Sea basin, April 6, 1992, and areas of
irrigation (Source: Polat 2002: 140).
Amu DaryaAllocation
(% of volume)
Syr DaryaAllocation
(% of volume)
Aral Sea Basin
(% of volume)
Aral Sea BasinIrrigated Areas(ha)
Kazakhstan -- 38.1 12 786,200Kyrgyzstan 0.4 1 0.6 422,000Tajikistan 13.6 9.2 12.2 719,000Turkmenistan 43 ---- 29.4 1,735,000Uzbekistan 43 51.7 45.7 4,233,000
Timing is also of essence in the patterns of water consumption between the upstreamand downstream states. Since the downstream states want to maximise the water flowduring the vegetation periods and avoid flooding caused by winter release of water forenergy projection upstream, Central Asian states had developed a system of barterexchanges – ‘water for energy’ schemes. Uzbekistan and Tajikistan made a series ofdeals that obligated Uzbekistan to supply Tajikistan with energy (natural gas, oil andelectricity) during the winter months in exchange for a steady supply of water in thewinter months. Such deals have been fraught with complications. Deals have beenfrequently suspended or broken unilaterally thus causing considerable tensions in thebi-lateral relations.
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Even though international law is often invoked in the debates regarding the properwater use in the region, the agreements signed among Central Asian states were notgiven the status of international law (Horsman 2001). Moreover, the regional watermanagement institutions located in Uzbekistan are not recognised by state legislaturesand therefore lack legitimacy. There are also problems with the institutional set up ofwater managing ministries within the republics. For instance, Wegerich found that themerger of the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Melioration and WaterManagement in 1997 in Uzbekistan resulted in the subordination of water managementunder the needs of agriculture, namely, the government demands for cotton and wheatproduction (Wegerich 2010: viii).
These tensions were exacerbated by the draught of 2000 when the annual volume ofAmu Darya and Syr Darya was significantly reduced (Abdullaev 2001: 28-29). Thedesire of the upstream states to increase their area of their irrigated lands and toincrease the use of hydropower had led many analysts to consider the risks of conflictsover water in the region. Various international agencies’ programmes aim at reducingtensions through cooperation projects bringing different ethnic communities togetherto deal with water management matters in the Ferghana Valley (Bichsel 2009).
Furthermore, the extremely cold winter of 2008 resulted in an energy crisis in theregion with the hydrocarbon-rich downstream states withholding energy supplies tothe poor upstream states in order to meet domestic needs. The governments inKyrgyzstan and Tajikistan had to release water from their reservoirs to produce energythus causing floods downstream. Because of the breakdown of the regional system ofenergy exchanges during that harsh winter weather, the population in Tajikistansuffered from lack of heating and electricity. Reportedly new-born infants and patientson life support machines at the unheated hospitals died. The Tajik government uses thedesperate situation on the consumer market to justify the plans of further developmentof their hydropower projects.6
Securitisation of Roghun
6 Over 50 percent of both Kyrgyzstan’s and Tajikistan’s electricity production is generated by hydropowerplants.
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During the first week of March 2010 Roghun was the main subject in all the main Uzbeknewspapers. Almost all of the articles talk of the “serious concerns of the society” thatthe decision of the Tajik government to start the construction of the Roghun HPP hasstirred up and the potential threat to the security of many millions of people in theregion such construction may entail. UzA agency’s Projects of gigantic HPPs in the
Central Asian region are a threat to the security of millions of people was published inpractically all the newspapers. An article by a Kyrgyz observer Aleksandr Knyazev, whocompared the construction of Roghun to Kyrgyzstan’s own great HPP project inKambarata, was discussed in the UzA’s piece. Knyazyev is quoted calling both of theprojects “crimes, directed against own and neighbour-states’ populations”. Milliy
Tiklanish newspaper on the 3rd of March printed an article called Harm to nature talkingof the “great threats” of the construction of Roghun and evoking the traditions ofcenturies-long shared water use of the great grandfathers. XXI Asr on the 5th of Marchpublished an opinion piece called “A dangerous path”, in which the issue is referred toas a “matter of life and death”. The Roghun construction is therefore securitised as anexistential threat by state actors in Uzbekistan. Various sources of danger and threatemanating from the project are emphasised. Should it be implemented, according toUzbek side, Roghun construction would lead to real threats to human andenvironmental security. Within this discourse of danger a number of metaphors andmodes of talking on the issue are employed.
In his work Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of IdentityDavid Campbell (1998) pointed out the link between state and body, security andidentity. In his discussion of the ‘discourses of danger’ as central to the constitution ofstate identity and articulation of ‘national interests’ and issues of security, Campbellrefers to the trope of the body as a vital discursive device, which helps delineate theboundaries between the inside and outside, the self and other (9). Therefore, thediscourse of illness and madness as threats to the integrity and health of the body politicand medical intervention is the staple of the ‘discourses of danger’. Thus, thecleanliness and health of the body and soul are likened to the vitality and morality of astate and the people. This conflation of health and cleanliness issues with morality andtheir expression though water metaphors is also observed by Strang (2004).
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Water is involved in the homological metaphor of belonging as the ‘essence’ of socialconnections – blood. Veronica Strang’s research on water in Dorset suggests that ‘waterplays a vital part in the construction of identity’ at all levels – from local to national tothe ideas of shared humanity (Strang 2004: 5). The importance of ‘blood’ in theconstruction of kinship, ethnic, racial, local and national identities has long beenestablished. Water in this discursive encounter acts as a ‘source of life’, essential for‘development’ of a nation-state, its ‘integrity’ and ‘independence’ for its ‘cycles of lifeand death’ (Strang 2004: 79).
In our discursive encounter between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan we also observe thecentrality of water as a purifying substance and the essence of life. Water is essentialfor life and therefore is seen as the essence of life (it is a ‘life and death matter’ bothliterally and symbolically).7 The rivers and channels are likened to ‘arteries’8 carryingthe life-giving force of water. By the extension of this metaphor the dams are ‘thrombi’blocking the arteries and preventing the ‘self-purification’ and natural rejuvenation ofthe ‘blood’ of the rivers, leading to ‘stagnation’. 9 The body trope extends to the racialand biological essence of the nation inhabiting the territory of the state as well asemotionally charged link to the earth and ‘Mother nature’. The pollution of the earthand other elements are depicted as direct harm to the natural habitat of the organicnature and damaging the ‘genofond’ (genome fund/biodiversity) of the nation.10
Society itself is thus imagined as a corporate body in which order or ‘health’ is maintained by themovements, actions of the individuals who share its identity or substance. These are familiarmetaphors: discourses about identity (and particularly race) have long employed terms such as‘purity’, and ‘dilution’ or ‘adulteration’ to express the sameness or difference of groups of people(Strang 2004: 123).Strang quotes Tuan (1968) who pointed out how the above metaphor of rivers as bloodvessels works both ways in the logic that equates microcosms with macrocosms(synecdoche and metonymy), which is recurrent in theological and scientific texts:“[Man’s] blood, which disperseth itself by the branches of veins through all the body,
7 A satirical depiction of water as the essence of one’s being, as defining one’s identity, is found in StanleyKubrick’s Dr Strangelove (1964), where deranged general Jack D. Ripper gives the following speech: “Ican no longer sit back and allow communist infiltration, communist indoctrination, communistsubversion and the International Communist Conspiracy to sap and impurify all of our precious bodilyfluids”.8 “Controlling the arteries, which bring life”, Qishloq Hayoti newspaper, 25 March 20099 “Thrombi of the dams. Who will estimate the consequences?”, Pravda Vostoka, 15 September 2009?10 “Held hostage by a poisonous executioner”, XXI Asr newspaper, 30 April 2009
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may be resembled to those waters which are carried by brooks and rivers all over theearth” (Ralegh in Tuan 1968:59).
The human body lends itself perfectly to organic systemic metaphors. Bodily fluids,especially such symbolically significant ones as blood, allow metaphorical leaps fromthe microcosm of human body to the macrocosm of human environment, from humanhealth to issues of environmental balance and sustainability. By the same logic, theissues of pollution and other ecological harm are often metaphorically and analyticallycouched in terms of bodily disease, while social and political issues are often discussedin terms of madness and spiritual decay. Once again we see the issues of health,cleanliness and morality as well as the notions of sin, death and pollution conflated inthe discourse (Strang 2004: 92).
Such discursive moves create moral geographies of inside and outside, self and other.Recent research on the media coverage of the boundary dispute between Uzbekistanand Kyrgyzstan in 1999-2000 explores the issues of moral geographies in a discursiveencounter between the two countries (Megoran 2004). In particular, Megoran findsfrom his analysis of Uzbek press coverage of the matters related to the border, thatinter-state boundaries are not just lines on the map or physically delineated structureson the ground – they represent moral boundaries between a ‘series of binary dualisms:order and disorder, progress and backwardness, stability and chaos, wealth andpoverty’ (Megoran 2004: 740). The ‘skin’ of the body politic of the state therefore is inconstant danger of being penetrated by all sorts of ‘pollution’ -- be it environmentalpollution from the Tajik aluminium plant or infestation of locust, moral pollution ofpornography, Islamism, extremism and drug trafficking.
Christine Bichsel in her work on irrigation disputes in the Ferghana valley has explored‘interdependence of irrigation, territoriality and construction of nations’ in Central Asia(Bichsel 2009: 11). Looking at how people attribute meaning to water locally, sheexamined several case studies through the paradigm of local sayings and proverbsabout water. One of the proverbs she used as a prism of her analysis was “El bashybolgucha, suu bashy bol”, which in translation from Kyrgyz means “Better be the head ofthe water than the head of the people” (Bichsel 2009: 49).
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The same scheme works on the regional scale. A metaphor of the entire region ‘as asingle organism’ is applied in order to articulate threats (’harm’, ‘suffering’, and ‘trials’)to that collective body in terms of one’s position in relation to the origin (head) of water.On the 3rd of March 2009 the Uzbek newspaper Qishloq hayoti published a piece entitled
Between two rivers: the basins of Amu Darya and Syr Darya need to be viewed a single
whole. The same article was reprinted by Halq so’zi and Narodnoye slovo11 newspapers:
The territories within the basins of these two rivers have always been reliably provided by water.This is a single organism, at the very least because these rivers end their route falling into theAral sea, and speaking in modern terms, historically constituted a united hydrological system ofCentral Asia. 12The geopolitics of water use in Central Asia are also characterised by competing needsand interests of the upstream (Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan) and downstream(Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) states. The saying ‘Rather than being thehead of a nation, be the head of water’ underlines the importance of ‘being at the head ofthe water’, the position of economic, social and political power and advantage. InCentral Asia, such position of potential power over the flow of water is enjoyed by thetwo poorest and weakest states, which have not been blessed with rich deposits ofhydrocarbon resources and whose territory is primarily mountainous, and thereforelending very limited opportunities for agricultural cultivation. Water as an artefact iscommonly appropriated by people as a symbol possessing powerful imagery and isoften used as a ‘metaphor for many aspects of human experience, including the powerrelations expressed in its control and management’ (Strang 2004: 6). In the Uzbek pressthe issue of the upstream control of the flow of water is often framed through themetaphor of conflict and warfare with ‘water as a weapon’ being one of the moreubiquitous comparisons made.13
Historically, the downstream states have been privileged in the water distributionschemes as they have plenty of lands usable for irrigated agriculture. The post-Sovietinstitutional arrangements for water resources management preserved the preferentialtreatment of the uses of water for agriculture, thus ignoring the development needs ofthe upstream states, which wanted to expand the use of water for energy production as
11Narodnoe Slovo is the Russian language version of the Halq So’zi newspaper in Uzbekistan.12 “Between two rivers: the Amu Darya and Syr Darya basins need to be viewed as a single whole”, Qishloq
Hayoti, March 3, 2009.13 “Water – weapon of political pressure”, XXI Asr, 26 March 2008.
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the ‘water-for-energy’ swaps that were previously regulated by the centre wereimpossible to uphold in the post-Soviet conditions. Thus, the upstream states see theirlocation ‘at the head of the water’ as their only advantage, leverage and opportunity toovercome their dependence on the downstream states and achieve ‘real’ sovereignty.
Competing meanings of water
Water is not a Commodity (Water as a common good)
The reluctance of the downstream states to pay for water stems from the tradition ofviewing water as a God-given common good, which creates a sense of entitlementamong its users in the region. Water is not only a sacred and purifying substance (oftenwater springs, wells and waterfalls are the sacred sites of spiritual visitations; water isused in religious rituals of purification, and is part of the process of haram substancestransforming into halal14), but also is life-giving essence vital for human survival andnatural cycles of death and rejuvenation. The shari’a law prohibits the sale of flowingwater in rivers and canals as opposed to drinking water in containers (Allan 2002: 113).The arrival of water in the form of rain is seen as God’s blessing and the drought asdivine punishment in many cultures. In absence of water in the form of rain, the wateris expected to be provided by other sovereign agents such as states (Allan 2002). Thisform of state sovereignty stemming from the organised provision of irrigationinfrastructure and the resulting bureaucratic structures has given rise to the ‘Orientaldespotism’ hypothesis (Wittfogel 1957).
The two doctrines that most commonly inform the appeals to international norms indiscursive exchanges between Central Asian states are the doctrines of priorappropriation, which privileges the historical uses of water resources and the so called‘do no harm’ doctrine (expressed in the Latin maxim ‘sic utere tuo ut alienum no laedas’meaning ‘so use what is yours so as not to injure what is another’s’) (Polat 2002: 108).The prior appropriation doctrine can be utilised to perpetuate the existing inequalitybetween states, which is the result of the terrain of the upstream states being
14 An Uzbek proverb “Oqar suvning haromi yo’q” [There is nothing ‘forbidden’ in the flowing water], forexample, confirms the belief in water’s purifying qualities
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unfavourable to agriculture. In recent years, during the disputes regarding the waterresources management, the downstream states have also referred to the internationalnorm that asserts the ‘right to water’ (including for the production of food) as afundamental human right.
For instance, the Uzbek press reporting on the Fifth Water Forum that took place inIstanbul in March 2008, quotes the president of the United Nations General Assembly(UNGA) Miguel d’Escoto Brockman who underlined during the meeting that “those whoare engaged in privatisation of water, turning it into a commodity, like oil, are deprivingpeople of the right, as basic as the right to air we breathe” (UzA). In another instance,Uzbekistan’s Jahon news agency15 published an article entitled Water is a common good
of the whole humanity and cannot be anyone’s property in discussing the plans ofKyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to build large dams on their sections of the region’s rivers(Jahon, April 10, 2008). Continuing the theme, Jamiyat newspaper reported on aroundtable discussion at the Oliy Majlis with an article entitled “Water is not acommodity for sale” (Jamiyat, April 21, 2008). Finally, Uzbekistan Today newspaperquoted the director of the research centre of the Interstate Water ManagementCommittee (IWMC), Viktor Dukhovniy, who commented on the necessity of anindependent international assessment of the upstream hydro projects, in the articleentitled Water has always been a common good of all peoples and should remain
so(Uzbekistan Today, May 2, 2008).
Thus in Uzbekistan’s press the notion that water could be sold is treated with ridicule,indignation and contempt as it is viewed as common sense that water is God’s gift andtherefore is free for everyone. The appeals to ‘centuries-long history’ of peacefulcoexistence, common identity and shared use of water are commonly made in thearticles of Uzbek press: “The Almighty did not create the rivers of Central Asia for onestate only. Using water for one’s mercantile interests is nothing other than betrayal ofthe whole Turkestani community” (Mohiyat, September 5, 2008).
Water is a Commodity (Water as a Valuable Economic Resource)
15Jahon is the international news agency functioning under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Uzbekistan.
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Valuing water as an economic resource is fraught with many difficulties. One of which isthat only water in some parts of hydrosphere has been conceptualised as a commodity,while some waters are ‘more valued than others’ (Allan 2002: 111).The upstream stateshave been advancing the notion that water, like the natural gas and oil deposits of thedownstream states, is a valuable mineral resource and an economic commodity in itsown right as well as a service, the delivery of which requires constant maintenance ofinfrastructure and entails other costs. Speaking at the International conference Central
Asia, Russia and the EU: A Concept for the Dialogue on the Water and Energy Issues heldin Berlin (28 June 2010), Salimzoda, a scholar and a deputy of the Tajik parliamentquoted the opinion of the director of the third department on the CIS countries of theMFA of Russia, Maksim Peshkov. The Russian diplomat suggested that the Central Asianstates start paying for the use of water as a mechanism of efficient utilisation of thewater resources in the region.
Just like oil and gas - Peshkov finds - water is also a natural wealth and a ‘god’s gift’. Forit to be taken to the consumers, colossal material, technical, financial, human and otherresources are mobilised. To maintain the infrastructure of the hydro-industry in aproper condition and to ensure the steady flow of water, concluded Peshkov, it isimportant to introduce procedures of monetary compensation in the issues of water useamong the Central Asian states. Salimzoda concludes by saying that
until recently no one would even think that a time would come when water would become acommodity to pay for, even where there is plenty of it. Nowadays, we can often hear the ideas ofturning hydro-resources into an economic unit, which should be viewed through the prism ofmonetary relations. Such are the conditions of the market relations and we cannot, it seems, runaway from them any longer, which is evidenced by the above-mentioned positions of theauthoritative experts from the EU, Russia and Central Asia (Salimzoda 2010, July 9).Similarly, Jalol Saidzoda, a specialist of the water industry of Tajikistan on the issue ofthe construction of the hydro-energy plants in Tajikistan and Tajik-Uzbek relationsexpressed an opinion that the water from the reservoirs in Tajikistan should be paid forby the downstream countries so that the Tajik side is compensated for maintaining theinfrastructure for the irrigation in neighbouring countries. He also says that watersupplies during the summer season can be withdrawn in case of non-payment of thefees, just as is the case with Uzbek gas to Tajikistan.
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Everyone should get used to the fact that the whole world, including the post-Soviet republics,live by the rules of the market, and that water must be paid for just like gas, electricity and otherservices. God gave some natural gas, oil and other riches, and to us and the Kyrgyz – water,mountains and the mineral wealth. From these premises we should engage in mutually beneficialcooperation under the conditions of the market. Water, like bread, should be the most valuedgoods and priced accordingly. We know from the international practice that water is also acommodity and should be paid for, as is the practice in all normal civilised countries (Anorova2010, March 8).In some instances Tajikistan’s recent discourse regarding the use of water originating inthe glaciers on its territory started to resemble the doctrine of the absolute territorialsovereignty [also known as Harmon doctrine], which ‘bestows upon the upstreamriparian the right to unilaterally control the flow of shared waters without a legalobligation to have regard for the interests of the downstream neighbour’ (Polat 2002:105). This is expressed in the statements of some politicians and analysts, which makea case that the Vakhsh River (a tributary of the Amu Darya) is entirely located withinthe territory of Tajikistan and is thus not subject to international norms regulating theuse of trans boundary water resources. Such statements not only reassert Tajikistan’sstatus as a sovereign state, but can be a significant bargaining tool as the extreme butnonetheless legitimate default position backed by the fundamental international normof the territorial sovereignty of a state.
The notion of equitable utilisation is in conflict with the no-harm principle. It alsocontradicts the notion of territorial sovereignty. Allan argues that “in the rough andready world upstreamers cleave to sovereignty and downstreamers to no-harm.Equitable distribution is not seen as a compromise position by either group” (Allan2002: 301).
Uzbekistan has advanced the following arguments in opposition to the desirability ofconstruction of the Roghun HPP and similarly grandiose hydro-projects in Kyrgyzstan:
1. Historical appropriation and ‘no-harm’ norms/water as God-given common good/
water as a human right: as discussed above Uzbekistan has claimed the right toappropriate most of the region’s water resources for irrigation due to certainnorms of international law and the sense of entitlement to water stemming frommetaphor of water as a god-given common good, which must be free because it isso precious
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2. Environmental and safety concerns: Uzbekistan has objected to the project on thegrounds of its questionable feasibility from the point of view of safety andenvironmental impact of the dam. Uzbekistan has been demanding suspensionof all construction work until an independent international assessment of theproject is conducted. The leadership of Uzbekistan is convinced that the Sovietassessment was not based on safety and environmental concerns but was basedon economic and ideological considerations. Uzbekistan has deployed a numberof ‘sovereign’ and discursive acts in attempting to exert pressure on Tajikistanregarding this matter.3. Roghun as a weapon of political control/pressure: Uzbek authorities haveexpressed concern over the possibility of the upstream Tajikistan using thecontrol of the water flow as political leverage over downstream states.Tajikistan reiterated its good will and purity of intentions in construction of theHPP many times.
Demands for independent international assessment of Roghun16
Much of the discursive encounter around the construction of Roghun has been based onthe Uzbek side listing all of the potential dangers of the dam (decreased flow todownstream states and further desiccation of the Aral Sea, increased risks of seismicity
16There have been so far two such assessments – one during the Soviet period (1965-78) and one in2005-6 by Lehmeyer International commissioned by RusAl. Both studies have been concealed from publicview as industrial or state secrets. Both studies have also been discarded by Uzbekistan as biased or nottaking into consideration environmental concerns. There has been, therefore, no real public debateinvolving a substatial cost-benefit analysis of the project based on a balanced, well-informed and peer-reviewed study of the problem.Rationale for dams construction is often rooted in political motivations ofthe ruling elites, business interests of consultancy and dam-building companies and the internationalfinancial organisations such as the World Bank. Water ‘expertise’ only comes into the discourse whenpolitical considerations call for it. The ‘technical’ opinion is conspiciously absent from the Roghundiscursive encounter with existing feasibility assessments (Lehmeyer) shrouded in secrecy. Thefeasibility and environmental impact assessments are part of the dam construction business with thefirms undertaking the assessments either being directly involved in the sector or being subsidaries of theconstruction and engineering firms (McCully 2001: 54-5). Lehmeyer International in particular is one ofthese companies which is directly involved in the dam building business and which has been previouslyimplicated in corrupt practices. Even when the consultancies are ‘independent’ they have a vestedinterest in providing an over-optimistic reports, which over-estimate the potential benefits and under-estimate or fail to take into account the costs. The environmental impact assessment has turned into anindustry which governments and dam builders have coopted as a rubber stamping mechanism for alreadyapproved projects (See McCully 2001 for a very detailed discussion of how water expertise is implicatedin corrupt practices).
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and possible overflowing of the reservoir; and floods downstream, a technogeniccatastrophe)17 and the reservoir and the Tajik side refuting all such concerns asunfounded. Uzbekistan’s government has been demanding that an ‘independentinternational assessment’ of the economic, social and ecological impacts of the dam beconducted, while Tajikistan’s representatives have insisted that all possible assessmentshave already been undertaken during the Soviet era by the Hydroproject researchinstitute based in Tashkent as well as by Lehmeyer International Assessment in 2005-6.Tashkent dismissed the Soviet era assessment as biased and dated and the LehmeyerInternational’s assessment as not taking into account the environmental impact of thesite.
During the 2009 forum of the International Fund to Save the Aral Sea (IFAS) held inAlmaty, the Tajik and Uzbek presidents had a rather heated exchange on the causes ofthe disappearance of the Aral Sea and the current disagreements regarding the propermanagement of the water resources. On the matter of the need of an independentinternational assessment of Roghun HPP, Karimov said:
I am convinced and this conviction is supported by facts that not a single one of these so called‘great projects’ was seriously thought-through, undergone serious expert let alone internationalassessment. ‘Decisions of the Party – to life!’ – was the slogan behind this thoughtless work,which created in our region and across the vast expanses of the former Soviet Union so manyproblems which to date hugely frustrate and infuriate environmentalists (Karimov 2009, April28).As a counter-argument for the need to conduct the assessments of the hydro projects inthe upstream states, on December 17, 2009 President Rahmon proposed independentassessment of the system of water use in Central Asia and the establishment of an
17 See for example, Pravda Vostoka, September 4, Narodnoe Slovo, September 8, Pravda Vostoka,September 11 and Xalq So’zi, September 12 for discussions of the dangers of Toktogul and Roghun in theaftermath of a fatal incident and failure at the Sayano-Shushensk hydropower station in Russia. “Thecatastrophe that has taken place in Russia has direct implications for our region. The large scale HPPs inCentral Asia – Toktogul in Kyrgyzstan and Roghun in Tajikistan – suffer from the same shortcomings asthe Sayano-Shushensk cascade since they were all designed practically by the same people”, quotes thearticle expert opinion of the secretary of the Institute of Seismology of the Academy of Sciences ofUzbekistan in the article entitled “Criminal carelessness and irresponsibility” in the 23rd of Septemberissue of Pravda Vostoka. On the 8th of April 2010, news agency Jahon published an article entitled “Specialattention to energy security” quoting an article from a Kyrgyz site Pravda.kg “Safety of the HPPs inKyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Political ambitions take priority”. The failure at the Russian HPP in Sayano-Shushensk has led to speculations regarding the possibility of a similar catastrophe occurring at one ofthe giant HPPs of Central Asia. The article quotes expert opinion that both Roghun and Kambarata HPPsare located at the fault-lines of the major tectonic plates and are likely to be affected by powerfulearthquakes (up to 10 degrees on the Richter scale).
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International Fund to Save Glaciers at the International Climate Change conference inCopenhagen.
In February 2010, Uzbek Prime Minister Shavkat Mirziyoyev sent a letter to his Tajikcounterpart demanding an independent examination of the possible consequences ofthe dam. Tajik Prime Minister, Akil Akilov, responded in an open letter saying thatVakhsh is an internal river of Tajikistan and that Tajikistan will exercise her sovereignright to manage her own water resources:
As for the water balance, it is known that the flow of the internal river of Tajikistan – Vakhsh,where the HPP is being built, is 28.6% of the average multi-year flow of Amu Darya river, andthat the filling up of the reservoir will take place over fifteen years at the expense of the yearlyallowance of Tajikistan, and the regulation of the flow of Vakhsh will be undertaken within theframework of the existing regional mechanisms. That is why the construction of the project willnot affect the regime of flow of the water and will not pose a threat to peoples’ lives. Thus, as youcan see, all the issues of environment, water balance and threats of technological catastrophes,are fully taken into consideration by Tajikistan, while the erection of such objects is a sovereignright of each and every state in full compliance with the international law (Avesta.tj 2010,February 7).On the 10th of February, Uzbekistan’s official sister-newspapers Xalq so’zi/Narodnoe
slovo and Milliy tiklanish returned to the topic. On the 13th of February 2010, Avesta.tjpublishes an article entitled Akilov: the completion of the construction of the Roghun HPP
is our right. The Tajik Prime Minister is reported to say to the BBC: “Tajikistan isprepared for a dialogue with Uzbekistan on the hydro-energy issues”. Akilov respondedto the demands of an independent international expert assessment of the Roghunproject by saying: “Our position on this issue is clear and has been expresses more thanonce. Should such an assessment be undertaken, it must be conducted on all hydro-power structures of the region. As for the construction of the Roghun HPP – it is ourright based on the Helsinki convention of 1972”. “I have offered the Uzbek side to senda competent delegation to Dushanbe so that we could discuss the matter face to face,rather than through polemics. There has been no response yet, but I am waiting”.
Uzbek newspaper Jamiyat on April 9 published a long piece entitled Transboundary
rivers: let them not muddy the waters of wisdom and mutual understanding. The authoranalyses the foreign media coverage of the problem and expresses concern over the“emotional outbursts” from the Tajik colleagues. In his words, that state expresses adesire to nationalise regional water resources.
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They call the indivisible part of Amu Darya – Vakhsh – Tajikistan’s internal river and even gofurther calling these waters the waters of Tajik nation. This surprises not only the specialists butalso the ordinary people. No one in the world has ever heard that a river can be labelled with aname of any one nation. If this goes on, we can assume that the neighbours will be next claimingthe wind blowing from their side, nationalising the air, demanding money for them.On April 15, 2010, Avesta.tj reported the director of the Centre for Strategic Studies ofthe Republic of Tajikistan Sukhrob Sharipov to have said at a press conference that theWB assessment of the Roghun HPP project should alleviate all contradictions betweenUzbekistan and Tajikistan. “We are convinced that the results of the expert assessmentwill be in Tajikistan’s favour as the project had undergone all possible assessment in thepast. However, there might be some changes to the project, but they will be concerningthe use of new technologies”, Sharipov said.
Uzbekistan quits Unified Energy System of Central Asia
In 2009 Uzbekistan left the Central Asian electricity grid, the system inherited from theSoviet Union, which was a major blow to Tajikistan, restricting its ability to exportelectricity and receive fossil fuel from neighbouring republics in exchange.
All of the official newspapers (Xalq so’zi, Narodnoe Slovo and Pravda Vostoka) publishedan article entitled Security, reliability and stability of work of the national energy systems
– main priority signed by the representative of the Uzbek Energy agency (Uzbekenergo)on 5 November. The essence of the piece is that Uzbekistan is not satisfied with thework of the Unified energy System of CA (UES CA), which “is starting to exhaust itself, isbecoming a source of conflictual situations among the member-states on the issues ofmaintenance of sustainable work of national energy systems. Under the currentconditions of work of the UES CA there is a real threat to the stable and safe functioningof energy system of Uzbekistan, which puts the possibility of the exit from this systemand autonomous regime of work on the agenda”.
On the 11th of November Pravda Vostoka in the article titled Remnant of the unitary state(meaning ‘totalitarian Soviet state’) which criticised the work of the UES CA:
the existing UES was created in strict accordance with the logic of development of the formerUSSR, i.e. a unitary state, in which the former Soviet republics did not have any autonomy and
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were viewed as only part of the whole territory. ... the functioning of the UES CA in the post-Soviet period was based on sheer trust, not backed by any authority or rights and the systembecame extremely vulnerable so that certain members could uncontrollably and with impunityengage in appropriation of energy in their own interests.From this the author concludes that Uzbekistan’s membership in the system is nolonger desirable or feasible and that all further arrangements on energy exchanges inthe region should take place within bi-lateral and multi-lateral agreements as is theinternational practice.
In early December 2009 almost all media outlets published Jahon agency’s article-response to the report of the Russian news channel Vesti 24 reportedly prepared byTajik TV on the exit of Uzbekistan from UES CA “which attempts to portray the eventand the background of the story in a distorted fashion”. The article points out that itwas a ‘united’, not ‘unified’ energy system of the region and it was a legacy of the unitarysoviet system. The conclusion states that “it is time that prejudiced forces behind thisscenario realised that all such attempts are doomed to failure”.
Continuing the commentary on Uzbekistan’s exit from the UES CA, Xalq so’zi/Narodnoe
slovo on the 10th of December published a long article entitled “Energy security: time forresolute action”. The article denied that exit from the system was politically motivated,but calls Tajikistan’s energy system “the main source of destabilisation of the system”.The paper then reports that “Uzbek energy-suppliers are prepared to conductnegotiations with the Tajik counterparts to develop the conditions for resumption ofparallel functioning of energy systems of both states”.
Pravda Vostoka, also on the 10th of December published an article called Wildcat trade inwhich Uzbekistan’s decision to withdraw from the Unified Energy System of CentralAsia is discussed once again. “Neighbouring country from time to time ‘helped itself’from the common pocket. However, the Tajik energy holding Barki Tojik argue thatsuch facts cannot be called theft. Moreover, deputy head of the holding Aleksei Silantievhad the audacity to call Uzbekistan’s decision a political measure, means to exertpressure on Tajikistan, which suffers from energy shortages during fall-winter periods.Sadly, this point of view becomes a trump card, played by the state-mongers of theneighbouring state”, the author writes. “Having sown the wind, Tajik politicians are nowreaping the whirlwind. It is unfortunate that they lack the courage to explain to their
158
people the reason the lights went out in the country and to name the real offenders whotook part in the wildcat ‘trade’ within the network of the UES”, the paper concludes.
‘Railroad war’
From November 2009, Uzbekistan started delaying rail road freight destined foraluminium industry and the building materials for the construction of the Roghun HPPin its territory. This started the so-called ‘railroad war’ between two countries. March22 the MFA of Tajikistan presented a note of protests to the Ambassador of Uzbekistanin Dushanbe due to interruptions of railway cargos for Tajikistan across Uzbekistan.Tajikistan’s prime minister Akil Akilov then complained about the situation during hisvisit to the UN headquarters in New York, stating that “Tashkent impedes the transit ofgoods to Tajikistan intentionally”. Finally, the president of Tajikistan appealed to theUN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon during the latter’s official visit to Tajikistan,requesting help to resolve the conflict between the two countries (Majidov 2010, April14).
Andrei Tropin, the representative of the state company Tajik railroads, claimed that “theblockade [sic] of Tajikistan started more than two months ago with the stopping ofrailcars with cement for the Roghun hydropower station”. According to him, currentlyabout 2,000 railcars headed for Tajikistan are stopped not only on the border but alongthe whole railroad of Uzbekistan. The blocked cargos include not only equipment andmachinery for the construction of Roghun, but also materials for an aluminium plant,fuel, wheat and other provisions and goods.
Representatives of Tajikistan’s business community made a joint statement to theinternational community: “Uzbekistan intentionally impedes the transit of fuels,fertilisers and other agricultural input going to Tajikistan in the run-up to the sowingseason in Tajikistan, while about 70 % of the population depends on agriculture fortheir livelihood”.
The 9th of February 2010 Avesta.tj article reported: “Uzbekistan is forcibly isolating thesystems of transport, air and energy communications with Tajikistan. This is happening
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not entirely legally, against the existing inter-state agreements signed within theframework of the CIS and international norms. The decisions made are completelyagainst the spirit of good neighbourly relations. For Tajikistan it is becoming ratherexpensive to receive railroad freight via the railroads crossing Uzbekistan. Hundreds ofcars are standing at the sorting stations in Termez, Denau and Sariosiyo. The customsservices of Uzbekistan delay the trains bound for Tajikistan without any good reason”.
The average delay of the freights is thirty days. Large fees are levied on each car. Partsof the goods are confiscated under the pretext of the attempts to transport over thedeclared amount. The businesses in Tajikistan suffer great losses as a result ofdiminished amounts and quality of the goods. Some goods never make it to their finaldestination points. For example, fire trucks destined for the fire department of theSoghd oblast, which were detained at the Uzbek border as equipment of possible dualuse.
Tajik passenger trains in transit through Uzbekistan are also subject to cynicalharassment. The same applies to other means of transport crossing the border witheach car and truck taking up to 6 hours to make to the other side of the border post(Sultonov 2010, February 9).
On 1 April an Uzbek paper XXI Asr printed another in the series of articles on‘informational warfare’ entitled Black paint, in which the coverage in Tajik media of therailroad blockage of the goods destined for the construction of the Roghun HPP wascalled ‘information attacks’, while in fact the delays in freight deliveries “were caused bythe overload of freight on the railroads”. The 29 March 2010, in the Press-uz.info report“Legal freight is not delayed on the Uzbek border” by Toshpulat Samadov, the authorcondemns the ‘hysteria’ in the Tajik press regarding the delays of the Tajik freight anddenies that such occurrences take place due to Uzbek government’s opposition to theconstruction of the HPPs in Tajikistan. The Uzbek customs officers are professional andimpartial and only stop the freight that is being transported without regard for theexisting rules and legal regulations of the Republic of Tajikistan.
Ecological Movement of Uzbekistan and TALCO
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The Ecological Movement of Uzbekistan was created in August 2008 and is a classicexample of a Government-Organized Non-Governmental Organization(GONGO) set upby the Uzbek government to deal with issues of trans boundary water management bymeans of staging ‘popular’ protests and other ‘grassroots’ environmental initiatives.Before the parliamentary elections in Uzbekistan in 2008, the government introducedamendments to the constitutional law on elections to give the Ecological Movement ofUzbekistan a quota of 15 seats in the new parliament (the total number of deputies tobe elected was increased from 120 to 150 with 135 members of parliament elected inelectoral districts and 15 seats allocated to the movement). The EMU has been veryactive in supporting the government’s line on Roghun and organising protests againstthe pollution caused by TALCO in Surkhandarya region of Uzbekistan.
For instance, Jamiyat newspaper (Uzbekistan) on 26th of March of this year publishedtwo articles -- A threat of a great disaster and Don’t hurt nature... – both of themdiscussing the concerns of the ‘international community’ and the domestic public inUzbekistan over the construction of the great dams. The articles mention the protestsagainst the harm from the chemical emissions and waste from the aluminiumproduction at Tajikistan’s TALCO plant, which was organised by the EcologicalMovement of Uzbekistan among the students of the Termez National University. Overthe past two years Jamiyat, Narodnoe slovo and other official papers had continuouscoverage of the multiple protests against TALCO organised by the EMU in Surkhandaryaoblast of Uzbekistan. Jamiyat on 9 July 2010 printed an article with reference to theEMU “Justified demands of the Surkhandarya-dwellers”. The authors write of thedissatisfaction of the population of Surkhandarya oblast by the work of the TajikAluminium plant which causes harm to the environment. They noted that during Marchthere have been multiple protest rallies and over 160,000 people signed a petition tointernational organisations, “but the Tajik side does not pay any attention to theprotests of the people planning to increase the production of aluminium”.
More protests against TALCO in Surkhandarya reported by Jamiyat took place on 9, 12,13 and 14th of July in various places bordering Tajikistan. Zerkalo newspaper continuedthe theme with the article called “TALCO: a live pain of Surkhandarya”.
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A response by an Aleksandra Jaborova was published on CentrAsia.ru on the 24th ofMarch 2010 entitled Tajikistan is not a source of pollution and environmental disaster. Afurther response appeared on press-uz.info on the 5th of April 2010. In an articleentitled Delirium instead of a response the author, Obidhon Mamatov, a political scientistand a lecturer at the Namangan University, asks: “Is the intension of official Dushanbe toterrorise the neighbours by means of the ill-begotten HPP behind the ignoring of theinternational norms of the transboundary rivers water use? ”
30 March, Avesta.tj published Yaxshi piket: The environmentalists live up to their
president’s expectations. The article is about the anti-TALCO protests in theSurkhandarya oblast of Uzbekistan organised by the Environmentalist Movement ofUzbekistan:
... according to the decision of president Islam Karimov during the last parliamentary electioncampaign which took place in the end of last year the representatives of the EMU wereguaranteed a quota of 15 seats. Experts opine that the main mission of the group is to put socialand political pressure on Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, first and foremost, on the issue of hydro-energy and aluminium production.Besides the protests, according to the Tajik side, Uzbekistan illegally blocks themovement of the international railroad freight across its territory. In the particular, theconstruction equipment for the Roghun HPP project, and the fuel and alumina for theneeds of TALCO, were delayed as a result of the informal blockade, which almost led tothe stop of the production cycle at the aluminium plant. The administration of TALCOinsists that a modern system of purification of the waste materials is installed at theplant, and it was updated by a French company several years ago. Tajik environmentaland medical specialists constantly monitor the environment and public health and notethat the emissions into the air and the pollution levels in the surrounding areas do notexceed international norms.
The 14th of March 2010 issue of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Analyst article byErkin Ahmadov entitled “Uzbekistan’s Ecological Movement Demonstrates against TajikAluminium Company” reported on the demonstrations in the Surhkandarya region ofUzbekistan. A response from the head of the press-service of TALCO, SayokhatKadyrova followed, promising that the company will conduct an evaluation in thecoming summer to assess the effects on the environment the plant would have after the
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completion of its modernisation that had been going on for the previous four years andcost the company about 196 million US dollars.
Many analysts commented that behind the protests is the government of Uzbekistanwho are using this important source of foreign currency for Tajikistan (up to 60 percentof export revenues come from aluminium sales) to put pressure on their neighbour onthe issue of its grand hydro-power projects. The head of Tajikistan’s Ecological Clubmovement, Alikhon Latifi commented on the protests saying they were not genuineexpressions of the Uzbek people’s concern but efforts initiated by state authorities.
Roghun as the national idea
For Tajik government and intellectuals, Roghun has taken on significance beyond thestated technical purpose of the project. It is seen as a ‘silver bullet’ solution to alleconomic problems of the country, but above all it is seen as an escape from thestructural dependence of Tajikistan on Uzbek infrastructure and energy. History playsan important role in the perceptions of Uzbekistan as a malevolent neighbour (seeChapter Four). The project is also seen as having the potential to unite the dividedpeople of Tajikistan under the banner of the joint heroic effort and collective sacrificerequired for completion of the project. A Tajik political scientist Sattori has argued that“a real political pan-national consensus has been formed on the most importantstrategic issue of further development of the country. ... It seems that we have foundthe proverbial national idea, which is talked and written about so much in the countriesof the post-Soviet space” (Sattori 2010, January 18).
Allan observes that water engineering can be part of powerful ‘fantasies of a nation orcommunity’ (Allan 2002). The colonial encounters with their civilising mission werealso accompanied by a ‘hydraulic mission’, such as Stalinist great channels and damprojects, as well Khrushchev’s virgin lands campaign. Many post-colonial states alsoembraced large hydro-projects with great enthusiasm, seeing them as symbols of thenation’s might. The completion of the dam construction thus becomes the rite ofpassage into adulthood of full sovereignty for ‘adolescent’ nations.
163
State sovereignty is performative, and is often manifested in spectacles of power,culture and modernity. Water engineering -- the large dams and reservoirs-- is at theheart of the most megalomaniac spectacles of the state of the past century. Giant damshad a special appeal to the Soviet state; their construction was seen as the height ofmodernist efficiency, the narrative of Man conquering and mastering Nature for his ownbenefit. Feaux de la Croix, who studied old and new dams in Kyrgyzstan, notes thatdams were viewed with almost religious reverence during the Soviet time: “Becausedams are symbols of such great effort and investment, they can be described as ‘sacred’(set apart, revered) objects. ... In the Socialist era, labour was a quasi-sacred activity thatcreated celebrated artefacts” (Feaux de la Croix 2010: 7).
Large dams are monumental and quasi-sacred spectacles of the state, ‘temples’ or‘shrines’ to modernity and nation-state (Baviskar 2007, McCully 2001). Pushed to raisethe money necessary for completion of the project, the Tajik government launched a‘voluntary-compulsory’ campaign of the sale of Roghun shares to the population.President Emomali Rahmon asked ‘every son of the nation, every patriot and ourcountrymen abroad to support Tajikistan’, to show moral and financial support to theproject and purchase a share in the Roghun Hydropower Project. The purchase ofshares was declared the duty of each citizen and ‘good Muslim’. “It is our national goalto accomplish this important project”, said Rahmon in a televised address, “It will be notonly our main source of light and power, but also our national pride and the bulwarks ofour statehood” (UPI Energy 2010, April 27). “Roghun is our all – motherland, faith,future, unity”, President Rahmon addressed the population calling on them to supportthe construction of the Roghun HPP. According to him, such support would be ‘holy andnoble’. As the President of the International Forum of Tajiks, he also called on all theTajiks in the world to contribute to the drive for the construction of this ‘palace of light’:
By building Roghun we secure the today and the tomorrow of Tajikistan. Roghun is the greatleap forward in the industry and economy of the state; it means warmth and heat in every Tajikhousehold; it means dignified standards of living and social welfare of each Tajik citizen. Supportfor Roghun is the duty of every Muslim of Tajikistan. We should all come together, tighten ourbelts and overcome the hardship. I wish us perseverance in this difficult but sacred undertaking,The state apparatus applied all of its coercive mechanisms to make people buy theshares. Portions of public service workers’ salaries, state-funded students’ stipends andother payments from the state to citizens were withheld as part of a ‘voluntary’ popular
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effort. Moreover, pressure was exerted on all major tax-paying private companies topurchase Roghun shares. On the 24th of December 2009, Avesta,tj reported that“Dushanbe-dwellers will celebrate the Day of Unity in Construction of Roghun onJanuary 6”. In February, the national energy company, Barki Tojik conducted a majorcampaign among its employees, 12,000 of whom were compelled to purchase sharesworth 29 million somoni. In March 2010, before the celebration of the InternationalWomen’s Day (renamed ‘Mothers’ Day’) and Navro’z (Central Asian New Year), the cityadministration of Dushanbe announced that women-activists will be rewarded withRoghun shares. People’s deputies of the capital’s Majlis decided to spend 10 millionsomoni from the city’s budget to purchase shares in the Roghun HPP. They alsodeclared the 6th of January 2010 the Day of Unity in Construction of Roghun. Thegovernment also declared an amnesty on money invested in Roghun (CACBW 2010,March 2).
Five million shares and certificates have been issued for a total sum of six billion somoni(about $1.3 billion), which is the estimated cost to complete the project.18 Each familywas ‘asked’ to buy at least 3,000 somoni ($690) worth of shares, though the poorestfamilies were exempted. By the end of January 2010 nearly 701 million somonis ($162million) had been collected and by March the number reached 770 million somonis($178 million) (Leon 2010). However, there is still a problem of converting the moneyraised from sale to the population into hard currency (Samiev 2010, January 8).19
However, there have been voices of scepticism regarding Tajikistan’s new foundnational idea emerging from the neighbouring republic. Uzbekistan’s Ishonchnewspaper on the 13th of March printed an article called “Another idea, but is it the
18 The estimated project costs range between USD 1.3 billion to 6 billion. Moreover, the large damprojects are notorious for cost and construction time overruns and, given Uzbek opposition to the projectand the transport blockade of the past year, there is all likelihood of Roghun construction dragging on forat least another decade.19 Rustam Samiev argues that the only optimal and possible way to convert the money earned by the saleof shares of the Roghun HPP from somoni into the US dollars or Euros is to the currency from the sale ofthe Tajik aluminium and the government were planning to use this mechanism from the very beginning,says the independent political scientist Rustam Samiev. “However, the currency that TALCO brings intothe economy of Tajikistan (about 30-40 m USD) is insufficient to convert all the ’Roghun monies’, whichnow already comprise 300 m USD for 2010. The Tajik state would need to tap into the currency reservesheld at the off-shore accounts, including those of the “Oriyonbonk” in Dushanbe”. According to theexpert’s estimates, over the ‘post-Ansol’ period the off-shore accounts of TALCO should have accumulatedup to USD 1.5 billion, which is sufficient for conversion of all the money made from the sale of the Roghunshares (Avesta.tj, 8 January 2010).
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national idea?” about the campaign in Tajikistan to raise money for the construction ofthe Roghun HPP through sale of shares to the population, whereby people are deprivedof their salaries, pensions and student stipends. “Is the ‘unifying’ national idea of theTajik people really to be found in the protests of pensioners, quiet angst of the businesspeople, despair of students and unpromising futures of teacher and doctors, who are toreceive the major part of their salaries in shares of the Roghun HPP? We do think thatsuch ‘beating out’ of money can unite the people, the majority of whom live below thepoverty line?” questions the journalist rhetorically.
On the 13th of May, XXI Asr paper turned its attention to the current issue of RoghunHPP in Tajikistan in the article “One hundred somoni for Roghun”, which reports that agroup of illegal migrant workers from Tajikistan was arrested in the Dzhizzak oblast ofUzbekistan. The arrested told of the hardships they suffer back at home. The authorquotes the words of the Tajiks about joblessness and the demands of the governmentfrom each family to pay a hundred somoni for the construction of the Roghun HPP,forcing people to work at the construction without paying them.
Historical references
History is brought up continuously in this discursive encounter. It is commonly referredto, mentioning the inequitable delimitation of the republics’ boundaries, wherebyTajikistan only got the mountains, unusable for agriculture. Tajik analysts also suspectthat Uzbekistan is trying to prevent real sovereignty and independence of the formerquasi-colonial subject: referring to the period between 1924 and 1929 when the TajikASSR was a part of the Uzbek SSR (see chapters three and four for more background onthis). In one article the author writes:
...the leadership of that country [Uzbekistan -MS], striving for regional domination does not wantTajikistan to be rid of its influence, to gain economic strength and acquired greater (in allrespects) independence. It seems sometimes Tashkent forgets that Tajikistan has ceased to beUzbekistan’s autonomy in 1929. All of the recent actions of Uzbekistan against Tajikistan ... are allaimed at preventing the economic development of Tajikistan.... Uzbekistan prefers the politicaladvantage of keeping Tajikistan dependent despite the costs to its own and its neighbours’economy. And the Roghun HPP is the perfect excuse to prevent the economic development of theneighbour. If it weren’t for Roghun, they would have found another reason. In other words, it isneither environment, nor other earthly issues that concern Uzbekistan. Simply some cannotmake peace with the growth of prosperity of the close neighbour (Kosimov 2010, April 2).
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Another commentator in Tajikistan takes the historical reference further back in time:
This is quite simply jealousy that the neighbours are becoming more independent in matters oftransport and energy and that they will have to pay for water and equal cooperation. The peoplesof Central Asia in their politics are returning to the medieval practices whereby the aliens,including the Mongol barbarians under the leadership of Genghis Khan turned Central Asia intoruins, and his follower, also of the Mongol Barlas tribe – Tamerlane turned not only this regionbut many other countries and peoples into a real hell. The barbarians left, but the peoples ofCentral Asia, including its indigenous people, the Tajiks, stayed. And thus it will always be. Doeshistory teach us nothing? The policy of economic blockade of Tajikistan which has been going onfor seventeen years now and other unfriendly actions from the Uzbek side confirm that historyteaches the Uzbek authorities nothing (Anorova 2010, March 8).Another example of the same type of commentary is an article by Bahriddin Sultonov:
The demarches of Uzbekistan have their historical roots. Since the 1920s, when Tajikistan wasgranted the status of a union republic, the official Tashkent is manifesting a jealous attitude to allpositive changes in the neighbouring republic. Tashkent, as much as it did in 1924, wants to seeTajikistan as an autonomous subject within Uzbekistan. They want to preserve the ability toinfluence the processes in Tajikistan as was the case during the Soviet Union. History has provedthat the Uzbek party nomenclature threw Nasratullo Mahsum, who spoke of the importance ofTajik language, into the jaws of the Stalinist repressions. The diseased Rahmon Nabiev on the eveof the civil war spoke of the construction of the Roghun HPP and his presidency tragically ended.With the spin of the Uzbek authorities, he has been portrayed as a drunk, a debaucher, a soft andindecisive man. The kind of insinuations and lies distributed about the current president,Emomali Rahmon, are evident on many Internet pages, behind which, without doubt, there isTashkent’s hand. Uzbekistan must understand that the path to strengthening Tajikistan’sindependence is irreversible. The times and conditions have substantially changed and theactions and pressure from the position of the ‘big brother’ do not cut it anymore” (Sultonov 2010,February 9).Finally, on December 10, 2009 Tajik president Emomali Rahmon was reported(unconfirmed) to have said at a press conference with Tajik journalists that Roghun is a“matter of life and death” for Tajikistan, but that Uzbekistan and the Uzbek presidentKarimov personally are “fighting against all things Tajik... not wanting the developmentof our country, they close the highways and railroads, turn off electricity during coldwinters” (Dubnov 2009, December 10). The issue of the construction of Roghun istherefore woven into the narrative of the continuing struggle for Tajik sovereignty andindependence from the scheming neighbour who aims to undermine Tajik statehood.
Conclusion
The ‘discursive encounter’ over geopolitics of water use in Central Asia is central to theconstruction of state sovereignties through its territorial, security and identity aspects.
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The controversy surrounding the intention of the Tajik government to complete theconstruction of the Roghun HPP illustrates how sovereignty is constructed through theinterplay between these three aspects of sovereignty discourse. This is establishedthrough the central metaphor of ‘state as a person’ and the accompanying metaphors ofwater, which are vital for articulation of identity, territoriality and security through theuse of ‘body and soul’ tropes.
The Roghun discursive encounter demonstrates how dialogic interactions are vital inconstructions of identity. This chapter has demonstrated how various discursivestrategies, speech acts and performances are deployed in order to achieve the goals ofinteraction, which go beyond the ascertainment of the truth-value of claims andcounter-claims within a dialogic encounter. There are also obvious silences and hiddenscripts behind the official open discourse. The plight of the displacement of largecommunities and the fact that Roghun construction is likely to enrich a small group ofelite rather than the entire nation are concealed from the public discourse. Thesesilences are significant and ‘speak volumes’.
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Chapter Six
Conclusions
This concluding chapter looks back onto the thesis and presents its main findings aswell as draws out the implications for the wider field of Central Asian studies andInternational Relations. First, it summarises the arguments presented in the previouschapters. Findings regarding the dialogic narrative construction of sovereignty throughdiscourses of historiography and practice of geopolitics are presented. Second, thechapter discusses what has been achieved by this research project and whatcontributions have been made. I then evaluate the advantages and limitations of‘discursive encounter’ as a method of discourse analysis. Finally, the chapter suggeststhe future lines of enquiry into the matters of state-creation and maintenance in post-Soviet Central Asia in particular and more broadly in post-colonial contexts.
Two defining periods of state-creation in Central Asia are analysed as periods of acomplex struggle to define the terms of the state of exception. The on-going case ofRoghun controversy is then placed within the broader context of global and regionalpolitics during the first decade of the twenty first century. The states and zones ofexception created by the United States’ ‘War on Terror’ and the increased securitisationof politics in Central Asia (Colour revolutions, Great game, and Islamic Extremismthreats) have created the conditions for institutionalisation of emergency politics.
1. Dissertation summary
The theoretical framework presented in Chapter 2 traces the historical emergence ofthe concept of sovereignty in general and theorisation of post-colonial and post-Sovietsovereignties in particular. It is argued that the discussions of the nature of sovereigntyin the post-colonial conditions in many respects mirror the debates on the
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characteristics of post-colonial nationalisms. Both are premised on a series ofjuxtapositions between organic, naturally ‘evolved’ model of the Westphalian nation-state to the artificiality of post-colonial ‘quasi’ state-nation. The post-colonial and post-Soviet sovereignties are thus conceptualised as found within the zone of permanentstate of exception from the international ‘norm’ of sovereignty. Sovereignty then wasdefined as a paradoxical concept, composed of a chain of signifiers which collapseterritoriality, ethnicity, nationality, popular sovereignty and governmentalitytechniques into a single whole with a built-in, yet tacit, claim to an ultimatetranscendental signified. Sovereignty therefore is not found in any one or a combinationof its purportedly objectively existing manifestations. Rather, it is found within thedialogic process of asserting sovereignty and its recognition or contestation, thuscreating the alibi for the sovereign subjects, the realms of ‘domestic’ and ‘international’.
I offer a metaphor for sovereignty based on the topological shape of a Möbius strip, aparadoxical one-sided surface with only one boundary folding in on itself. The variousalibis for sovereignty keep deferring revealing the ultimate signified behind the chain ofsignifiers.
The chapter further discusses ontological and epistemological assumptions of thedissertation through the discussion of the methodology of the enquiry that has led to itsproduction. The method of discourse analysis is discussed in brief. This dissertationuses a combination of various discourse analytic tools. The central philosophy of theenquiry is to explore relations between two states through their interaction rather thana one-sided process of representation of a self in relation and opposition to another. Themethod used in this thesis is a dialogic approach of analysing ‘discursive encounters’between actors speaking on behalf of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. As part of the processof discursive encounter analysis (DEA) such methods as metaphor, narrative andpredicate analysis, as well as dialogical analysis are utilised.
The rationale behind the choice of the combination of these methods is that any identityconstruction is found in the social dialogic process of negotiation and sanctions of thecompeting narratives of the self, which heavily depend on reception and acceptance by
170
the ‘audience’. The construction of the self depends on the successful use of discursivestrategies which allow the speaker to advance a desired identity for themselves andresist the negative/undesired constructions offered by others. This explains why thesame events are talked of differently by different actors, and also why the same actorsmay choose to narrate the same events differently in different contexts. The DEA, as amethod, adds value to the discourse analytic approaches by presenting a more dynamicpicture of identity articulation, vividly illustrating the process of alteration of framing,argumentation, predication and even referential practices as the end-point of thecontinuing narrative of the self is adjusted to take into account the most recent politicalpower reconfigurations, turning events and shifts in dominant paradigms. This is apains-taking approach which might require linguistic proficiency in more than oneforeign language and close familiarity with case studies in question, but it offers ameans to account for discursive shifts that can in turn be correlated to the broaderpolitical contexts.
The methodology appendix section offers a ‘narrative’ of the research process bydisclosing the sources, fieldwork encounters of the author and why the particular casestudies were chosen. The transparency of the research process in InternationalRelations is advocated. The use of auto-ethnography as a means of honest and self-aware authoring is suggested as a potentially productive way for understanding howthe International Relations scholarship has been constructed through a combination ofinstitutional arrangements, norms and expectations and the unique experiences of eachresearcher.
The third chapter provides a narrative of the emergence of the Tajik and Uzbek SSRs asnational homelands for people defined as ‘Tajiks’ and ‘Uzbeks’ within the Soviet Union’sfederative structure. Far from a comprehensive account of the region’s history, thischapter offered a brief overview of the diverse, hybrid and ambiguous identities fromtsarist Russia’s colonisation of the region till the emergence of independent states ofCentral Asia in 1991.The complex intertwining of history of Persian and Turkic speakingpeoples in the region, the imperial encounter and the Soviet state and nation-makingendeavour of the Marxist ‘civilising mission’; provide the context for all post-independence interactions between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.
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The Tajik and Uzbek states emerged out of the complex discursive encounter betweenthe various groups claiming to represent and speak on behalf of the indigenous peoplesof the region. The contemporary debates can in large part be traced to that first definingperiod of state-creation between 1924 and 1929. The ambition of the chapter is not toprovide a comprehensive version of history of the region and the peoples populating it,but to explore the ambiguity, hybridity and multiplicity of identities behind the labels ofTajik and Uzbek. The goal here is to problematise the facile labels justifying theexistence of titular states containing eponymous peoples defined in terms of ethnicity.It is the ambiguity of where the ‘Tajik’ identity ends and ‘Uzbek’ one begins that isbehind the discursive encounters discussed chapters four and five. In the Möbius stripof identity/difference to be Uzbek means not to be Tajik and vice versa, but there is noultimate signified on the other side of the ribbon, as there is no other side.
The fourth chapter presents the first case study, the discursive encounter aroundhistorical narratives produced by actors speaking on behalf of the nation and state inpost-Soviet Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Historiography is examined as the medium forarticulation of a narrative of statehood. The post-Soviet state-creation is rationalisedthrough the repertoires of ‘ethno-genesis’ and ‘historiography of statehood’ based onthe projection of modern conceptions of identity onto the past. This process is akin to‘biographical narratives’ by means of which people construct a coherent and continuoussense of self. Once again, the metaphor of the state as a person becomes apparent in thediscursive practices that give both the land and the people a quasi-organic corporeality,whereby both the nation/state is imagined as a living breathing organism, but alsopeople, statures and collectivities come to embody the state.
Various texts, including history textbooks, official speeches, monuments and internetfora are analysed within dialogical framework to see how competing narratives areadvanced by various actors to make statements about the racial supremacy and culturalsuperiority, make territorial claims and to justify the very right to existence of thecurrent nation-states. Numerous repertoires and discursive dialogic strategies areutilised to assert one’s claim to sovereignty in its territorial, existential and moralincarnations.
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We find, therefore, that the narrative of Tajik history deeply depends on the Uzbekother for the construction of the self and vice versa. The two narratives are in constantdialogue and the process of negotiation whereby each actor’s goal is to present anoptimal representation of their social self to the interlocutor and other possibleaudiences, to justify one’s actions, and to resist negative representations of the self bythe others. While Tajikistan’s history is a narrative of an imagined ethnic/racialcommunity, Uzbekistan’s historical narrative is based on the attachment to a particularterritory, land, encircled by the boundaries created in the 1920-30s delimitation of theSoviet Socialist republics. These two radical narratives of the same events, peoples andterritories illustrate differing sources of sovereignty in the two states, irreconcilable onthe current terms of discourse, yet fundamentally interdependent. The current andfuture relations of these two states are fundamentally shaped by the stories that aretold about their pasts.
These historical narratives are also the underlying basis for the articulation of the post-Soviet ‘national ideologies’. In Uzbekistan this takes the form of the Ideology of StateIndependence/Sovereignty [Milliy istiqlol mafkurasi]. In Tajikistan the ideas of ‘Unity’[vahdat] and ‘Peace’ [tinji] are closely intertwined in the post-civil war political contextas the central ‘national idea’ for the Tajik state. History is seen as the source of self-knowledge, the loss of memory of which would lead to the dissolution of nationalidentity as expressed in the warning of the threat of mankurtisation. Knowing one’strue self [hudshinosi/o’zlikni anglash], according to Central Asian politicians andintelligentsia, provides protection from the foreign attempts to enslave and strip one oftheir humanity. The only way for the ‘true self’, defined in ethno-national terms, tosurvive within this historical narrative is to have a ‘strong centralised state’ led by anauthoritative paternalistic figure. The form of a sovereign independent authoritarianstate thus became a normative construct advanced in the post-Soviet countries,including Central Asian states of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.
In the fifth chapter our attention shifts from the temporal (narrative identity over time)to spatial (geopolitics of water use) articulation of sovereignty in Tajik-Uzbek dialogicinteractions. The chapter focuses on the on-going controversy between the Tajik andthe Uzbek governments and expert communities over the plans of the Tajik governmentto resume the construction of the Roghun hydropower project on the Vakhsh River,
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which the Uzbek government has been vehemently objecting to. This case studyexamines concrete dialogic strategies and moves that each side’s actors take to asserttheir sovereignty.
Despite it being called ‘discursive encounter analysis’, there is an important aspect ofinteraction implied in the concept of ‘dialogic’ identity construction. Both sides engagein a series of dialogic moves constrained by their overall purpose and general contextwithin that interaction occurs as well as previous and anticipated moves and reactionsof their interlocutor and other audiences. The dialogic moves are accompanied by whatI call ‘sovereign acts’ – moves aimed at asserting sovereignty. Protests against theconstruction of the dam, the mobilisation of resources through the Roghun shares sale,stopping of the railroad traffic of the goods destined for the Roghun and TALCO,exchange of diplomatic notes of protests and refusal to attend regional leaders’ forum –are all examples of such ‘sovereign acts’. They are indeed ‘performances’ of sovereignty.
All these dialogic interactions ultimately pursue three strategic goals. First, they aim toadvance a positive representation of self and negative portrayal of the other. Second,they want to resist the negative portrayal of the self by the other. Finally, they attemptto influence the opinions of relevant onlookers/audiences, to add to their prestige andestablish favourable relations of power. These interactions, moreover, take place withinthe broader context of geopolitical imagining of the region from both within andoutside.
The final section of this concluding chapter examines how the broader global contextmay be used to account for the predominance of geopolitical thinking in foreign policyformulation, implementation and interpretation in Central Asia. Since the Roghuncontroversy is an on-going case, the directions for further research are suggested.
2. Dialogic narratives of self and other: identity, historiography and
geopolitics
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Chapters 4 and 5, discussing the dialogic articulation of sovereignty, sought todemonstrate how the practice of international relations in post-Soviet Central Asiaconstitutes the personhood of the states as entities with a continued existence throughdifferent historical periods and imagined as part of certain geopolitical configurationsthat have significance for statehood. I attempted to demonstrate the mechanism bywhich the imagining and assertion of post-Soviet identity, statehood and sovereigntytakes place. For this I have applied a linguistically-inspired approach of analysis ofpolitical discourse as a dialogue between the self and the significant others. Thenarrative-creation has thus been analysed as a dialogic and interactive process.
Creation of narrative meaning is a mental process that helps people to combinedisparate episodes, events and actions into meaningful and coherent stories thusmaking sense of the world around them and helping one understand his or her place inthe narrative and therefore in the world as well. Not only does narrative constructionhave this sense-making function but it also serves as the subject-constituting cognitivemechanism. In order to be part of a story, one has to have a coherent and continuousidentity which is more or less constant. Thus ‘biographical narratives’ on an individuallevel help construct one’s life story as that of a coherent subject; collective narratives(or myths) have a function of sustaining shared beliefs and upholding communal valuesand thus are important for societal cohesion. There are six main cognitive mechanismsby means of which the human mind assimilates the elements of awareness of thematerial world around us and assembles those elements into meaningful schemata andnarratives (Polkinghorne 1986: 4). I add to that model the element of dialogicality toenrich our understanding of the construction as a social phenomenon rather than awork of a lone mind or a group-think of all-powerful elites. The mechanism of dialogicsovereignty formation therefore would consist of the following stages:
1. Identity and alteritya. Constructive – strategies that are aimed at constructing (national)identities (referential/nomination, predication);b. Preservative/ justificatory – strategies that are used to preserve orreproduce (national) identities (argumentation);c. Transformative – strategies that seek to change (national) identities(mitigation, intensification, connotation, synonymisation, redefinition)
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d. Destructive – discursive strategies that aim to dismantle (national)identities (deconstruction, denial, censorship, ban, silence)2. Similarity and dissimilarity (tropes and metaphors, and the types of metaphorssuch as simile, synecdoche, allegory, and metonymy)3. Categorisation and classification (order)4. Representation (signs, symbols, icons or indexes)5. Example (one is an instance of another)6. Causation (narrative)
First, the various elements of awareness are perceived as either the same or not thesame as others (identity and alterity). Secondly, things are perceived as either similaror dissimilar to other things and this relationship is expressed in language as tropes andmetaphors (and the types of metaphors such as simile, synecdoche, allegory, andmetonymy). Thirdly, some elements are understood as constituting a part of otherelements thus helping us understand the relationship between the whole and itscomposite parts and categorise and catalogue things into an orderly universe. Fourth,we understand that some things stand for others as signs, symbols, icons or indexes.Fifth, some elements of the perceived reality are an instance of another. And finally, andmost importantly, one element can be understood as causing another thus connectingtwo episodes in a meaningful way.
Construction of in-groups and out-groups by means of articulation of identity/samenessand difference (cultural, ideological or that based on ‘objective’ interests) is the basis ofpolitics. In the cases examined in this dissertation, the boundary between identity anddifference is not always obvious and needs to be articulated through discursivestrategies and practices that name the in-group and out-group, assign them qualitiesthrough clear and implicit predication and the narratives of self and other thatemphasize either commonalities or differences between the groups. It is shown that the‘other’ is constructed as either very similar to the self (brethren peoples) or radicallydifferent (ethnic animosity), depending on the speaker and the circumstances ofutterances. To make such switch from difference to similarity possible there must exista spectrum of meaning along which the signs of identity and alterity can be placed. Thisspectrum consists of clusters of synonymously used terms and their connotations. Forinstance, ‘Tajik’ is used synonymously with ‘Persian’ and ‘Iranian’, which have a number
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of historical and cultural connotations. These connotations in turn overlap with thosethat correspond to the signifier ‘Uzbek’ and its synonyms, such as ‘sedentary’, ‘Muslim’,and so on. The designation ‘Sart’ used to occupy this space of subtle differences,hybridity, ambiguity and undecidability on the spectrum of identity and differencebetween Tajik and Uzbek. After the delimitation, this designation was removed and thegap between commonalities and differences was filled with the common membership inthe imagined community of the ‘Soviet people’ and the ‘proletariat’. In the absence ofthose signifiers, it can be filled contextually with various signifiers indicating religion,locality, economic interests, and political views. This space in between can be shrunkand expanded depending on the political context.
The total erasure of the difference, however, is seen as an existential threat by moreradical groups of intellectuals. Rahim Masov’s thesis of the constant struggle of theTajik people against territorial dislocation from ancestral homeland and cultural andracial assimilation is the expression of this ontological anxiety on the part of someinfluential elites in Tajikistan. Uzbek conception of self-identity is more ‘elastic’ andready to subsume a diversity of past and present identities under the label of ‘Uzbek’.The tables below demonstrate the extremes of the discursive construction of self as‘Tajik’ and ‘Uzbek’ and not the whole spectrum of alterity and identity that I have justdiscussed. They represent the ideal-type constructions in the official discourse, but arenot static and dogmatic as the rigid structure of a table suggests. Therefore, an identityor the ‘self’ is a dynamic dialogical process rather than a static ‘thing’. The ‘self’ dependson the configuring of past events into a historical narrative which imparts onto an‘imagined community’ a unity and continuity. Such narratives not only allow for themaking of sense of the present state of affairs by looking at the past but also byanticipating the future. The ideologies of state in Central Asia therefore are reliant onhistorical narratives in order not only to justify their post-Soviet existence but also toimagine the future and to substitute the domestic politics with the normative narrativeof state-idea arising from such historical narratives.
All elements in a narrative are evaluated according to their contribution to the finalresolution of the story, or its ‘point’. A well-articulated narrative would normallyestablish (1) a valued end point, (2) events relevant to the end point, (3) a certain orderin which events occurred chronologically, and, most importantly, (5) causal links
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between those events. Negative or positive evaluation of the meaning of a narrative isbased on the degree to which the hero(es) progress toward the desired valued endpoint of the narrative such as happiness, wealth, or the fulfilment of prophesy. Innationalist discourse, such a desired end point of historical narrative is the creation ofan independent state the boundaries of which would contain the national ‘homeland’territory, thus containing the all the people with the same ‘identity’ within a single bodypolitic. Oftentimes narratives can be retrospectively rearranged, their respectiveelements re-evaluated in the light of the eventual outcome of the story. Once the finaloutcome is known, all elements are connected retrospectively within a plot highlightingeach individual element’s contribution to the development and resolution of the storyand the achievement of the final outcome of the story. In nationalist discourse there isnever a complete end to the story as the protagonists are seen to continue theirexistence in ‘the people’, the narrative can always be updated and re-evaluated if newfacts and interpretations of the past events are introduced into the evaluation.
In the case of a national identity the narrative can progress in a number of ways, thefour basic plots being comedy, tragedy, heroic saga and the ’happily-ever-after’ (Gergen2009: 38-40). In each narrative trajectory the final outcome is judged based on the finalpoint of the story. If the perceived desired or inevitable endpoint of the narrative isunderstood to be the achievement of independent statehood and sovereignty within anational homeland as defined by the representative of a nation, then the progression ofthe historical events would be evaluated by whether or not that ultimate point wasreached. In the tragic scenario the protagonist (Tajik people) first fail to recognise andexpress their desire to be recognised as a separate nation striving for territorialstatehood, their very existence as a people is denied by their arch-nemesis (Uzbeks,pan-Turkists). Although Tajiks do achieve recognition of their national rights firstwithin the Uzbek SSR and then as a separate union republic, their true potential fornational territorial self-determination is forever
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Table 6.1. Discursive self- and other-construction (Tajik Uzbek& UzbekTajik)
Strategy Objectives Devices Self Other
Referential /Nomination Construction of in-groups andout-groups Membership categorization;biological, naturalizing anddepersonalizing; metaphorsand metonymies; synecdoche(pars pro toto, totum propars)
Tojik/TajikFors/PersianIranAryan/Indo-EuropeanAboriginalUpstream
Uzbek /’Uzbak’TurkicTuranMongoloidInvaderDownstream
Predication Labeling social actors more orless positively or negatively,deprecatorily orappreciatively
Stereotypical, evaluativeattributions of negative orpositive traits; Implicit andexplicit predicates
CivilizedSettledCulturedPeace-loving and gentlePoor (impoverished by other’sconquest)Handsome
UncivilizedNomadicUnculturedViolent and cruelRich (enriched from looting ofthe indigenes’ property)Ugly
Argumentation Justification of positive ornegative attributions Topoi used to justify politicalinclusion or exclusion,discrimination or preferentialtreatment
Physical appearance, blood, kinship, body metaphors, emotiveconnection to the land, perception of historical injustice to self,language
Perspectivation, framing or
discourse representation
Expressing involvement;Positioning speaker’s point ofview Reporting, description,narration or quotation ofevents and utterances Almost all actions of the other in relation to self are explainedthrough timeless narrative of persecution and existential threat.
Intensification, mitigation Modifying the epistemic statusof a proposition Intensifying or mitigating theillocutionary force ofutterances Mitigation of ‘ethnic animosity’ narrative by ‘brethren peoples’discourse, whereby the good ‘common [Uzbek] people’ aredelinked from the government.
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Strategy Objectives Devices Self Other
Referential /Nomination Construction of in-groups andout-groups Membership categorization;biological, naturalizing anddepersonalizing; metaphorsand metonymies; synecdoche(pars pro toto, totum propars)
Uzbek (O’zbegim, o’zbekchilik)Heir to great civilizations ofthe past (Afrosiyob, Orhun,Temurids, Jadids)
Tojik/TajikMountain people (Galcha)
Predication Labeling social actors more orless positively or negatively,deprecatorily orappreciatively
Stereotypical, evaluativeattributions of negative orpositive traits; Implicit andexplicit predicates
Peace- and freedom-loving,Always fought forindependent statehood
Adhering to proper moderateIslam in accordance withO’zbekchilikGovernment is one withpeople, wise and patriarchal
War-like and not capable ofself-government afterindependence (absence of astrong leader)Religious fundamentalists(Wahabbis)Government is weak, corruptand makes unwise decisionsthat harm ‘common people’
Argumentation Justification of positive ornegative attributions Topoi used to justify politicalinclusion or exclusion,discrimination or preferentialtreatment
Kinship metaphors (greatancestors, ‘our grandfathers’),past shared suffering(wounded body and anguishmetaphor), exile and loss ofmemory and therefore senseof self (mankurtism).
‘Discourses of danger’Other is represented as asource of danger and physical,environmental, ideologicaland moral pollution and harm
Intensification, mitigation Modifying the epistemic statusof a proposition Intensifying or mitigating theillocutionary force ofutterances Eternal friendship (‘One people speaking two differentlanguages’).Differentiation between Tajik government and people, whereasthe Uzbek people and the government are represented asspeaking in one voice.
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thwarted by the decision of the Soviet authorities to give the ‘ancestral’ cultural centresof Bukhara and Samarkand to Uzbekistan (Tragedy).
The ‘happily-ever-after’ plot presents a story of a consistent progress towards thedesired end. In a comedic plot the protagonists find themselves in difficult conditionsinitially, but having suffered, they succeed in achieving their desired goal. Thus, forinstance, the official Uzbek historiographic narrative of the centuries-long struggle ofprimordial Uzbek people towards achievement of independence can only be convincingtentatively and only if articulated in the most general and ambiguous terms. As long asthe shifting identities, boundaries and principles of formation behind various state-structures remain subsumed under the label of ‘history of the peoples of the territory ofUzbekistan’ a link can be established that teleologically brings together the disparateelements into a single narrative of struggle for sovereign statehood and it ultimateculmination after acquisition of independence in 1991. Moreover, the circumstances ofbecoming independent need to be concealed within this heroic discourse as well asdemonstrated in the discussion of the interpretation of the March 1991 referendumresults in Uzbekistan.
The most convincing and appealing version of the nationalist narrative is the ‘heroicsaga’, whereby the protagonist(s) start off being happy (past instances of gloriousstatehood such as the Samanid or Temurid state, or past civilisational achievements ofAryans, or other ancient peoples that populated the region) but then encounter a tragicturn of events reversing their luck (inclusion in the Russian empire and the USSR) untilthey achieve a happy resolution of the story (independence), which is threatened again(by a civil war or terrorist threat).The heroes are required to go through many trials. Infact, in a heroic saga, the trials may never end, since the protagonists may be calledupon at any time to perform more heroic deeds in the never-ending struggle betweenthe good and the evil.
181Figure 6.1.Tragedy. Source: Gergen 2009: 40.
182Figure 6.2. Happilly ever after. Source: Gergen 2009: 40.
183Figure 6.3. Comedy. Source: Gergen 2009: 40.
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Figure Figure 6.4. Herioc saga. Source: Gergen 2009: 40.
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Periods of state-creation and Central Asian states of exception
The state of emergency is the state of exception that according to Carl Schmidt andGeorgio Agamben is the defining characteristic of sovereign power. In other words, theability to declare and sustain a state of emergency is the main feature of a sovereign. Inthis study a pattern has emerged that suggests that the periods of state creation inCentral Asia were accompanied by states of emergency. The state of emergency ismeant to be an exception from the rule, a temporary suspension of normal politics andthe constitutional order. However, the practice of declaring and sustaining a state ofemergency as the routine mode of government is not uncommon.
Hosni Mubarak ruled over Egypt for thirty years under the declaration of a state ofemergency, which has lasted even longer (since the 1967 war with Israel). TheEmergency Law was introduced as a temporary measure to deal with a crisis in thecountry, but has since been institutionalised with the People’s Assembly extending itevery two to three years. One of the main demands of participants of the popularprotests on the Tahrir square that culminated in resignation of President Mubarak onFebruary 11 was an end to the emergency rule. The state of Israel has been in a constantstate of emergency since the War of Independence in 1948. The Israeli Knesset extendsthe state of emergency on a yearly basis. Similarly, Syria has been ruled under a state ofemergency since the Baathist coup of 1963. Authoritarian post-colonial states seem tofunction under a permanent state of emergency.
However, it is not only governments in the Middle Eastern states that use states ofemergency to expand the powers of the executive and limit civil liberties and humanrights of their subjects. The United States also has been in a continuous limited state ofemergency for over thirty years declared by several presidents for various reasons. Allstates of emergency were declared as a response to the perceived threats to nationalsecurity. The most prolonged one started with the Iran hostage crisis in 1979 but wasextended due to the perceived terrorist threat to the peace process in the Middle East,and again after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. While the government andthe constitution on the whole have not been suspended, the executive branch’s powershave been substantially expanded and civil liberties curtailed as a result. There isnothing more permanent than the temporary, it seems.
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The October revolution in tsarist Russia and the subsequent political upheaval inTurkestan, Bukhara and Khiva, which culminated in the national territorial delimitationof 1924-29 and creation of new states, was the period of emergency politics. The periodof the dictatorship of proletariat and civil war was the time when many competinggroups contested the right to speak on behalf of ‘the people’. This process wasconstitutive of the new identities that became the basis for creation and continuingexistence of state-like entities for groups designated in the process of delimitation as‘Uzbeks’ and ‘Tajiks’. These designations were not markers of some primordialessential identities, seeking to find self-determination through Soviet nationalities’policies. Rather, Uzbekness and Tajikness emerged as the result of the attempt todetermine who the relevant ‘people’ were under the complex conditions of emergency.
The second period of state creation that was precipitated by the union-wide movementdemanding greater ‘sovereignty’ from the Centre, also culminated in an attempted coupd’etat by a group of communist hardliners calling themselves the ‘State EmergencyCommittee’ [Gosudarsvennyĭ kommitet po chrezvychaĭnomu polozheniĭu] who tried toprevent the devolution of power to the peripheries and possible shrinking or completedissolution of the USSR. Ironically, the August 1991 coup only accelerated thedissolution. For Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, this has meant a somewhat unexpectedpromotion from the status of a union republic to the recognition as independentsovereign states. Out of the multitude of voices speaking on behalf of Tajik and Uzbekpeople during the perestroika period emerged the authoritative discourse of theIdeology of State Independence in Uzbekistan and the Ideology of National Unity inTajikistan. Rather than the concrete issues of language and minority rights,environmental issues of the Aral Sea desiccation and political economy problem ofcotton monoculture, the governments have successfully depoliticised the dominantdiscourse of authority by presenting the government as the sole guarantors of theimplementation of the goals of the state unproblematically defined as ‘stability’,‘development’, and ‘peace’.
Historiographic work of the state-controlled academic institutions was tasked withfinding the roots of present statehood in the examples of past state-formations in the
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territory of the current state borders (in the case of Uzbekistan) or created by peoplesthat are imagined as direct genetic ancestors of today’s nation (Tajikistan). Thedissenting voices within this government-academic discourse are discredited as lackingin authority and basic expertise (the right to speak on the matter) since the issues ofethno-genesis and historiography of statehood are considered the issued that state-authorised scholars only are qualified to comment on. However, the debates regardingthe interpretations of history both by state-sponsored and independent analysis, spillinto the internet fora and such websites as CentrAsia.ru, Ferghana.ru, and many othersbecome the media for the expression of the competing narratives of selves and othersfor Central Asians.
This debate is not parochial as international scholars join the discussion and the newacademic and ideological idioms are adopted by the Central Asian scholars.Sovietological and constructivist vocabularies have found their way into the debatealbeit, it in hybrid forms that seek to discredit the other by pointing out the ‘artificiality’and newness of their identity and corresponding statehood, while insisting on ownidentity’s and statehood’s indigenous and ancient status. The ‘Sovietological’interpretation of the delimitation process as dictated by the divide et emperalogic iscalled upon by local scholars to make revisionist arguments regarding the properboundaries along which the political entities’ should had been drawn.
The methodology of ‘discursive encounter’ has proved to be reflective of the evolutionand subtle changes in discourse that occurs in reaction to the previous discursive moveby the interlocutor(s). It is this process of gradual adjustment of discourse that isreflected in mitigating/intensification of arguments, change in predicates, substitutionof referential signifiers and implicit assumption of continuous identity of people as aperson through different historical periods, that allows Möbian chains of signifiers to becompleted thus concealing the absence of the master-signified. In this study Isystematically deconstructed each of the component elements within the chain ofsignifiers constituting the ideas of state in post-Soviet Central Asian states of Tajikistanand Uzbekistan. Chapters One to Five reveal destabilising effects that designations of‘Tajik’ and ‘Uzbek’ have on one another, which is reflected in historiographic practicesand the perceptions regarding what constitutes the rightful national ‘homeland’. Tajik
188
nationalism can be described as ‘external-territory-seeking’, while Uzbekistan adheresto the ‘sovereignty-protecting’ state model within Lowel W. Barrington’s classificationof post-colonial nationalisms’ types (Barrington 2006: 16-25). However, there do notexist objectively existing coherent groups that inevitably seek self-determination withinthe territory of a concrete ‘homeland’. There are, however, individual people thatimagine themselves to be a part of a collective person, that come to impersonate andembody ‘the nation’, ‘the state’, or ‘the people’.
Each of the signs in the diagram above is itself unstable: its meaning based on binarypairs of conceptual opposites which necessarily exclude the empirical and conceptualambiguity and that defer their meaning to the next signifier within the chain. Thus theencounter with the master signifier is constantly discursively delayed, thereby hidingthe absence or profound ambiguity of a master signifier.
The research project presented in this dissertation of course has its limitations.Although the aim is to present non-Western accounts of ideas on sovereignty, statehoodand independence more sympathetically, to draw the picture of the ‘view from inside’,this study still in large part suffers from the exclusion of ‘subaltern voices’. The elitediscourse lent itself to the analysis within the scope of this dissertation due to thehigher degree of textual articulation. Further research that looks into popularperceptions of the issues discussed in this dissertation would be needed, that throughethnographic fieldwork, collection of folklore, personal oral histories and groupnarratives explores the issues of how state is made to work from day to day in CentralAsia.
Roghun as an ongoing case
The case of the Roghun controversy is still an ongoing one. As such, it is a dynamicelement of this thesis’s narrative of the state-creation process in Central Asia. At themoment of writing of this concluding chapter, the construction of Roghun HPP iscontinuing and Uzbek government continues to insist that independent internationalenvironmental and safety assessments of the project are undertaken. While thediscursive encounter analysis presented in this work helps us better understand the
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rhetorical devises and strategies behind the constructions of images of self and other,the motivations behind the arguments advanced by each side and the perceived stakesfor each side, it is not possible (and is not the desire of the author) within this analyticalframework, to make predictions regarding the course of future interactions andwhether the discursive clashes are likely to transform into armed confrontation.Neither was it within the ambition of this thesis to make policy recommendations to thepoliticians. I would like however, to schematically place this case within the broadercontext of global politics and the related discursive formations. As we saw in Table 7.3,periods of state emergence coincide with the states of emergency. The first period ofstate emergence in Central Asia (1920-30s) took place against the background of a greatrevolution and a civil war. Similarly, the second period of state emergence in 1990s wasaccompanied the states of emergency caused by the civil conflict in Tajikistan that led tosecuritization of politics in neighbouring Uzbekistan. ‘Discourses of danger’ thatdepicted any political conflict as inevitably leading to violence and state breakdownhave allowed both Uzbek and post-conflict Tajik governments to justify curtailment ofdemocracy and civic rights of the citizens and to consolidate authoritarian regimes.The second decade of independence in Central Asia has seen a different type of state ofemergency as the state-making condition. After the terrorist attacks of September 11,2001, the political and academic imaginings of the region became primarily associatedwith the military campaign in Afghanistan. The United States’ ‘war on terror’ set thenew trend of seeing the region as part of South Asia and the greater Middle East, ratherthan as primarily a ‘post-communist’ or ‘post-socialist’ state. This process has found itsreflection in the classificatory practices of such institutions as the US State Departmentand the Department of Defense.This global trend found resonance among Central Asian scholars and politicians as well,that have also partaken in the discourse of the ‘new Great Game’ that designated theregion as the ‘pivot’ of history and the ‘heartland’ of the battles for world dominationamong the great powers. In case of Uzbekistan, for example, the Great Game narrative isemployed when constructing post-colonial ‘discourses of danger’ portraying the greatpowers as striving to dominate the region. Thus, the wave of the ‘Coloured revolutions’in the post-Soviet space were interpreted by Uzbek leadership as an ideological attackby unnamed outside forces. In the wake of the events in Andijon in May of 2005, wherehundreds of people died allegedly as a result of government indiscriminate shooting of
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civilian protesters, Uzbek government articulated a ‘discourse of danger’ that linked thethreat of Islamic terrorism and extremism to the ‘Coloured revolutions’ promoted bythe hegemonic ‘West’ in the strategic interests of the ‘new Great Game’ (Suyarkulova2006).Thus, one observes the securitisation of politics in Central Asia. A securitisation processthat by definition calls for suspension of normal politics in the interests of existentialsurvival in the face of the perceived threats is a form of emergency politics. The seconddecade of independence in Central Asia is thus characterized by this new type ofconstant state of emergency that is sustained by the condition of the ‘war on terror’ andthe ‘discourses of danger’ set against the background of the geopolitical vision of theregion as the ‘heartland’ of Eurasia.
The Roghun case is illustrative of geopolitical thinking of the elites that perceive statesovereignty to be under threat posed by outside forces. Tajikistan and Uzbekistan seeksto assert their economic, energy and political sovereignty through their interactionswith one another. The state of permanent emergency is continued by securitization ofthe use of regional water resources as reflected in the case of Roghun controversy,whereby each side perceived it as a matter of state sovereignty and even survival ratherthan a set of technical solutions aimed at a pragmatic resolution of a concrete problem
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Table 6.2: State-creation periods and the state of exception within dialogical sovereignty articulation process
State-creation period Key events Discursive encounter Dominant narrative State of exception1920-1930sCreation of Soviet CentralAsian republics
The Great October Revolution1917National territorialdelimitation of Central Asia(1924-36)Civil war (Basmachimovement)
Hujum
AnthropologyEthnographyLinguisticsIdentifying the in-groups andthe out-groups andestablishing the connectionbetween ethnicity andterritoriality
Liberation, self-determinationand modernisation Delimitation as a ‘work inprogress’/topornyi razdelRevolutionary suspension ofnormal politics (dictatorshipof proletariat) as a result ofthe redefinition of ‘the people’as the proletariat (in CentralAsia ‘MuslimSoviets’/national-communists)
1980-1990sSovereignisation process andindependence
The Cotton AffairPerestroika and glasnost’National civic pro-reformmovementsViolence in Almaty, Ferghana,Osh, DushanbeAugust Coup 1991Belovezhskaia pushchaagreement and dissolution ofUSSRIndependenceProtests and civil war inTajikistanUzbekistan’s intervention inTajik civil war1998 explosions inUzbekistan (IMU)
HistoriographyGrounding claims forsovereignty andindependence in the pastexamples of ‘statehood’ basedon either ethnic or territoriallogic
Ideology of NationalIndependence/Unity(statehood as a normativevalue)Discourses of danger(external and internal other)
State of emergencyintroduced during ethnicviolence episodes, during theAugust coup 1991, before andduring the Tajik civil war. InUzbekistan the ‘state ofemergency’ is not allowed butauthoritarianism is justifiedas necessary to prevent‘Afghanisation’/’Tajikscenario’
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Appendix A
Methodological notes
Textual selection
This thesis identified two case studies (or discursive encounters) which arerepresentative of dialogical narrative identity articulation along the temporal(historiography) and spatial (geopolitics of water use) dimensions. A wide range ofsources was consulted and included secondary and primary sources produced inEnglish, Russian, Uzbek and Tajik. The reading was guided by selection of sourcesbased on the authority of the writers and institutions that produced the texts, how oftenthose texts were cited by others (both implicitly and explicitly). I also asked the peoplewho I interviewed to recommend readings on the subject.1 Some sources were given tome by the interviewees. Others were found in the National Library of Uzbekistan andthe Library of the Academy of Sciences (Tashkent) and the National Library ofTajikistan (Dushanbe), as well as the Lehman Library of the Columbia University (NewYork). Internet-based research through databases and search engines as well as anumber of the most common Central Asian websites was very important in the textualselection process for the purposes of discourse analysis in this thesis.
Below is the textual selection matrix for this research based on the criteria proposed byLena with some modifications to include the spatial dimension of the research designfor this study (Hansen 2006: 83):
1 Some interviews were conducted with academics and policy makers in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan insummer 2008. I decided, however, not to treat interviews as a primary data source. Some of the reasonsfor doing so are discussed in this appendix.
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Textual selection matrix: primary sources
Temporal location
Time of study (1991-2010) Historical material
General
material
Three criteria:
 Clear articulations of
identity/difference
 Widely read and
attended to
 Formal authority
 Books by the
presidents
Rahmon(ov) and
Karimov, their
statements and
interviews
 Official speeches,
documents, websites
of the ministries and
government news
agencies’ reports,
university manuals,
academic works
 National laws and
international legal
documents
(constitutions,
treaties, agreements,
etc)
 Conceptual
histories
 Genealogies of
sovereignty
 Soviet concept of
“limited sovereignty”,
national self-
determination and
Brezhnev Doctrine
 Soviet nationalities
policies
Key
texts
 Primary reading of
broader set of sources
 Digital search engines
 Selected texts by
Karimov,
Rahmon(ov)
 Newspapers, news
websites, blogs
 NGOs’ and IOs’
reports
 Interviews
 Conceptual
histories
 Quoted in
contempora
ry debates
 Republished
 Stalin’s concept of
nations/nationality
 “The Tajiks” by
G’ofurov and “History
of Crude Division” by
Masov, history
polemics
Spatial dimension
General
material
Three criteria:
 Clear articulations of
identity/difference
 Widely read and
attended to
 Formal authority
 Books by the
presidents
Rahmon(ov) and
Karimov, their
statements and
interviews
 Official speeches,
documents, websites
of the ministries and
government news
agencies’ reports,
university manuals,
academic works
 National laws and
international legal
documents
(constitutions,
treaties, agreements,
etc)
 Conceptual
histories
 Mackinher’s
Geographical Pivot of
History
 Bzezinski’s Grand
Chessboard
 Lev Gumilyov’s
Passionarnaya teoriya
etnogeneza
 Soviet discourse on
hydraulic mission
 Late soviet
nationalistic
environmentalist
discourse
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Key
texts
 Primary reading of
broader set of sources
 Digital search engines
 Karimov,
Rahmon(ov)
 Newspapers, news
websites, blogs
 NGOs’ and IOs’
reports
 Interviews
 Conceptual
histories
 Quoted in
contempora
ry debates
 Republished
 Regional scholar’s
works on geopolitics
and hydropolitics
Auto-ethnography: Telling the Othered Story of the Self
Making my own voice heardMany authors have recently commented on the exorcism of personal human voice fromwriting in IR (Doty 2004, Brigg and Bleiker 2010, Neumann 2010, Lowenheim 2010).The named authors object to the writing practices that create an illusion of objectivityby distancing the author from the observed objects of enquiry, thus implicitly conveyingthe image of a sovereign omniscient, infallible, godlike narrator devoid of humanpassions. Carol Cohn in her study on the use of ‘techno-strategic’ discourse withinnuclear policy circles commented that the language which is “abstract, sanitised, full ofeuphemisms ... makes it possible to be radically removed from the reality of what one istalking about” (Cohn 1987: 24). Similarly, Lowenheim (2010) reflects on the ability ofthe discourse prevalent in the IR writing to dehumanise and sanitise the discussions ofwar, shifting attention from human suffering to the behaviour of states as the mainreferents (1039). There have been calls therefore to introduce the authorial voiceexplicitly into the IR writing to replace the superhuman sovereign author.
Such an authorial move is justified as (1) a means of gaining insights into theinternational through individual experiences of the author; (2) a means of disclosure ofauthorial decisions on the choice of the subject matter, arrival at the theoreticalframework and methodological tools; (3) a means of reflecting on how the internationalhas affected the author as an individual and how those effects influenced his work as anIR scholar, a teacher and a political activist; (4) as a stylistic decision aimed at evokingreader’s emotions, empathy and reminding of the common humanity of the reader andthe author; (5) and finally, as a means of resistance to the dominant disciplinarypractices (Lowenheim 2010, Brigg and Bleiker 2010, Dauphinee 2010).
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I, too, felt the need to talk of my personal experience in this dissertation in order tomake the process of research more transparent and not to hide behind the sovereignself of the author. The erasure of the back-and-forth process of my personal narrativeidentity articulation and my theorising of sovereignty would be an act of dishonesty.The process of writing this dissertation therefore was in part a sense-making exercisefor me. My authorial voice helps to separate the subject of the analysis (other authors’accounts) from my reflection on these voices. Also this ties in with the postcolonialliterature (Spivak et al.) and its demand to make the voices of the subaltern heard. As ascholar of Central Asia, being from the region, I have always felt the need to explain mymotivation for making a career out of the accident of my birthplace. It might appearparochial or even nationalistic to choose the region you are from as the object of one’sintellectual pursuits. I think that, apart from a selfish sense-making narrative exercisemy interest in the study of Central Asian politics has grown with frustration with someof the prevailing existing accounts of the region that I read as a student at the AmericanUniversity of Central Asia. Through the eyes of the outside observers places that werefamiliar to me from my childhood became unrecognisable. Such incongruence of livedexperience and theoretisation found in the literature motivated me to theorise on theinternational relations of Central Asia.
To some extent my research question in this thesis was driven by personal experienceof ‘being there’, and growing up in a family, which was very involved in politics of thetransition period. When in 1993 my mother decided to take me and my brother toBukhara most of the rest of the extended family remained in Dushanbe, where theylived through the civil war and the post-war reconstruction years. One of my extendedfamily members, Otahon Latifi, was involved in the peace process on the side of theUnited Tajik Opposition. He was assassinated on September 22, 1998 – a year after thepeace accord was signed. In what follows I discuss the roots of my research questionand how theoretical issues of nationality, ethnicity, immigration and sovereignty foundexpression in my lived experiences of ‘being there’.
Belle of Shiraz, grant me but love’s demand,
And for your mole- that clinging grain of sand
Upon a cheek of pearl – Hafiz would give
All of Bokhara, all of Samarkand ...
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Growing up, Bukhara was a place not far removed from my imagination. After all, wehad family there. It was where my maternal grandparents came from as young peopleto study medicine in Dushanbe. We were identified as Bukhori in Dushanbe. When Iwas nine or ten through a conversation with my adopted sister (who together with herbrother came to live with us in Dushanbe from Tashkent) that I realised for the firsttime that Bukhara was in another country, Uzbekistan, hopelessly removed from myworld, not belonging to me. It came as a shock, since in my imagination Bukhara andSamarkand were part of the magic world of Persian culture, depicted in the fairy-talefilms like the Tales of Shahrezada, where the above lines by Hafiz Shirazi were quoted.But like for Shirazi, Bukhara and Samarkand were never mine to give away, yet I feltloss and resentment.
My first understanding that Uzbek and Tajik stand in irreconcilable antagonism camefrom within the family. Unfortunately, one of my maternal uncles once removed is aTajik supremacist. For him, Uzbeks are barbarians who stole Tajik cities, usurped Tajikculture and history. Later, I read the book by Rahim Masov, History of Crude Division(1991). The book was an expose of the inconsistent implementation of the Sovietnationalities policy in Central Asia and the unjust division of territories during thenational territorial delimitation in the 1920s, as a result of which Samarkand andBukhara were included in the territory of Uzbek SSR. Reading that book was at once arevelation and a poisoning experience. The book’s message in a few words can besummarised as “Uzbeks are to blame for everything”. It was only years later -- whenmy mother, brother and I escaped the war-torn Tajikistan and found a new home, firstin the home-town of my maternal grandparents, Bukhara and later in the Uzbek capital,Tashkent -- that I started realising that those emotions were based on a limitedunderstanding of Central Asian cultures, that assigned people unchangeable geneticdifferences, based on assumptions of one group’s cultural and racial superiority.
The first realisation that Samarkandi and Bukhari culture was neither Uzbek nor Tajikcame from conversations with my maternal great grandmother bibi kalon, or Bibijon aswe called her. She lived most of her long life in Bukhara. Born in 1912, she spoke Tajikas all Bukhori city-dwellers, gave Arabic (Quran reading) lessons to children in theneighbourhood and performed the duties of otin-oyi (a female religious leader) in thecommunity. She spoke to us, children, in Russian, however, since we grew up going to
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Russian-language medium kindergarten and then Russian school in Dushanbe. Whenmy mom asked Bibijon whether she considered herself Tajik or Uzbek, great grandmaresponded: “Man uzbechkaman, bachem” [I’m Uzbek, my child]. This instantly became acatchphrase in the family, because, within one sentence, not only different languageswere combined, but the absurdity of having a grandma, who spoke Tajik yet consideredherself Uzbek, while her son and his children were recorded and considered themselvesTajik was captured perfectly.
However, as it turned out later from conversations with my mother, not everything wasstraightforward in the matter of the recorded ethnicity of my family. My maternalgrandfather was recorded (as his mother, Bibijon) Uzbek, because he loved Tashkentand all his life hoped to persuade my grandma to move there. His wife, my grandma, thefirst female professor of paediatrics in Tajikistan, who only saw her future life andcareer in Tajikistan, was recorded Tajik. Apparently in her family all boys wererecorded Uzbek and all girls Tajik. Accordingly, my mother, the older daughter, wasrecorded as her father Uzbek, but her younger sister was registered with the state asTajik. My grandfather’s dream of moving to Tashkent was not to come true until muchlater in his life, and then it was due to unfortunate circumstances. At some point it wasdecided that their lives would be connected to Tajikistan and granddad became Tajik asdid my mother. During the perestroika years, when it was first allowed to change familynames from Russified forms into the traditional ones, my aunt got rid of the ‘-ova’ending and added ‘-zade’ to the root of the family name. Everyone else in the familykept the old last name.
At a very young age I became a witness to a number of important historical events. Iremember the fear of the first days of the August putsch in 1991 and the elationfollowing that when the statue of the ‘Iron Felix’, Felix Dzerzhinskii, the founder ofNKVD (the Soviet internal security service) signalled the fall of the USSR. Soon Ipersonally witnessed the demolition of the stature of Lenin in Dushanbe. Verdery(1999) writes that statues, are sacred representations of the ‘dead bodies’ cast in stoneand as such their ‘political lives’ mark historical watersheds. The toppling of statues(especially of those of the once powerful and famous dead) has become the standardiconography for the dramatic political change. The ‘deportations’ of statues in the post-Soviet countries since 1989 can be analysed in terms of the ‘politics of the dead bodies’
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(Verdery 1999), whereby the statues (as well as corpses) are moved and replaced as apart of the transition period, when people and states redefine their worlds of meaningsand seek new sources of legitimacy. Both tearing down of the old statues and erectingnew ones signify the changes in the dominant culture that existed under the SovietUnion; it means de-sacralisation of the previously powerful signifiers of authority,identity and memory and (re)sacralisation of the “dead bodies” that symbolise identitiesand values hitherto excluded from the prevailing narratives (Verdery 1999: 5). The actof removing a statue reorganises the public space and ideas of time, it excises a certainfigure not only from the landscape, but also from the past.
Amid opposition protests and demands for the resignation of the republic’s communistleadership, crowds gathered on one of the main squares of Dushanbe in September1991. Unlike the violent outburst of public discontent that happened in February 1990,these demonstrations were well-organised and had a clear political agenda of removingthe leadership implicated by their life-long involvement in the Communist Partystructure and compromised by their tacit support of the August coup.
President Mahkamov eventually had to resign under the pressure from the oppositiongroups (Rastokhez, the Democratic Party of Tajikistan, the Islamic Renaissance Partyand La’li Badakhshon). On the 27th of August 1990, Davlat Khudonazarov, a famous filmdirector and then a people’s deputy of the USSR’s Supreme Council, accused theleadership of Tajikistan of involvement in the putsch reading out several codedtelegrammes which were received by the Tajik Communist Party (CP) apparatus fromthe State Committee of Emergency Situations (Nazriev & Sattorov 2002: 17). OtahonLatifi, accused Mahkamov personally of involvement in the events of 19-21 August,saying that there was an audio recording to prove that (Nazriev & Sattorov: 21). Havingthus been completely discredited, Mahkamov announced his resignation on August 30.The Appeal of the Extraordinary Session of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic ofTajikistan to the Congress of People’s Deputies of the USSR and to the Supreme Soviet ofthe RSFSR issued on the 3rd of September 1991 condemned the coup (rather belatedly)and called for resignation of Kahhor Mahkamov, who failed to react promptly andseemed to had supported the putsch. The democratic forces in Tajikistan gained highmoral ground over the conservative CP after the August coup failed in Moscow. TheSupreme Soviet passed a resolution that banned the Communist Party and seized all its
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assets. The same resolution ordered the removal of the statue of Lenin in the mainsquare.
I remember my brother, his friends and I watched the process of the removal,snackingon tasty pumpkin pastries that my mom made that day. We lived not far from thecentral square so could observe the end of the long process of demolition. Although thiswas simply the implementation of the resolution adopted on the wave of elation afterthe failure of the coup, it was still perceived as sacrilege by many, who grew up lovingthe image of Lenin as almost a saint, a person with no fault and of incredible genius ashe was depicted in the Soviet iconography. Yurchak writes that Lenin performed thefunction of the master-signifier in the Soviet authoritative discourse (Yurchak 2006:15). It is therefore not surprising that the desecration of his statue was called ‘an act ofvandalism’ by the communist forces and the Higher Council (Parliament) of Tajikistandeclared a state of emergency, rescinding the ban on the Communist Party andprohibiting the opposition’s demonstrations. Aslonov, the acting head of government,who ordered the demolition had to resign over the matter, saying that threats had beenmade against him and his family (Schoeberlein 1994: 29). It was later ruled for thestatue to be re-erected; those who dismantled it were to be forced to pay the costs.2 Thestate of emergency, therefore, was the Communist Party’s way of claiming the sovereignpower. The symbolic power of the Lenin’s ‘dead body’ served as the justification for thesuspension of politics.
When the Tajik civil war started I was eleven. We lived in the centre of Dushanbe and
my brother and I went to School №1 located opposite from the House of Press building in which my mother worked for the daily newspaper. Shortly before the ‘events’ mymother started a cooperative with a group of fellow journalists publishing twonewspapers. She was involved in the presidential campaign supporting the oppositioncandidate a Pamiri film director Davlat Khudonazarov. This was probably the period of
2 Due to events that followed, Lenin’s statue was never re-erected. Instead, the statue of Firdausi wasraised up in the square, which was later replaced by the towering figure of Ismoil Samoni, “the founder ofthe first Tajik state”. In Uzbekistan, the statue of Lenin on the main square of the capital was replaced in1991 by a temporary (as it was initially envisaged) Monument of Independence, a rather abstractrepresentation of the new state’s emergence on the global map; while the statue of Karl Marx in thenearby park was replaced by a horseback statue of Amir Temur (Tamerlane), a historical figure, whosesignificance for the new Uzbeks state has been reinterpreted to become the central symbol of a strongruler and a founder of a powerful state.
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the highest hopes for democratisation of Tajikistan. The atmosphere on the squarewhere the opposition demonstrations took place was uplifted, with the icons of Tajikculture, poets like Gulruhsor Sofieva and Bozor Sobir reading poetry, the crowd singinga beautiful revolutionary song in Tajik calling the people to rise up (I still remember therefrain “Hezeraton, hezeraton, hezeraton, hez!”, and the chanting of the crowd “Ozodi!Iste’fo!” [Freedom! Resignation!]). My mom would take us to the demonstration to listento the speeches, observe and interview people. We took a camper bed and someblankets to donate to the protesters. I remember reading an article my mother wrotefor an opposition newspaper called Adolat (Justice). The most memorable part of thearticle for me was my mother questioning the rhetoric of the government, saying that‘the people’ were against the protests. “Aren’t these ‘the people’ too?” asked my motherin her article, meaning the crowds on the square. This was probably my first realisationof how important the definition of ‘the people’ is in politics.
The presidential elections in November 24, 1991 were, however, lost by the oppositionand the conservative candidate, Nabiev became the first president of independentTajikistan. The opposition alleged election irregularities and in March 1992, the anti-government demonstrations calling for parliamentary elections resumed, despite theban on protests and restrictions on the freedom of press introduced by the newgovernment earlier. The government orchestrated a rival demonstration in the nearbycentral square, literally several hundred meters away from the opposition protests. The‘administrative resource’ was used to bus people into Dushanbe from Kulob. Afteralmost two months of demonstrations, Nabiev made the fateful decision that ultimatelytriggered the civil war. Using his emergency powers, given to him by the parliamentthree days prior, he created a ‘Presidential Guard’ from among the Kulobi supporters onthe square and distributed weapons to them on May 2, 1992. The next day, SafaraliKenjaev, whose resignation the opposition passionately demanded, was restored aschairman of the Supreme Soviet signalling to the opposition that there will be no morenegotiations or compromises. In a desperate move, the opposition tried to capture thepresident and the next day they took over the television broadcasting. I remember thatfrom then on the change of power was indicated by who was talking at us from the TVscreens. As my mother put it, “the journalists undertook the revolution, where thepoliticians failed”. Journalists have often been blamed since for fermenting the passions
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and ultimately causing the bloodshed of the civil war (Panfilov 2003). The importanceof journalism was great indeed, but to claim that journalists were the sole instigators ofviolence is a statement loaded with implications prohibiting free speech in societieswhere supposedly ‘ethnic hatreds’ lie dormant until the magic power of a written wordraises them from their slumber.
Gradually, normal life faded away. The city was under a state of emergency withcurfews imposed after 5pm. At nights, and then later during the days as well, we wouldhear shooting on the streets. During the siege of Dushanbe, there was constant shootingjust outside our windows, there were even snipers on the roofs of the nearby buildings.Because we lived in the city centre, the cityscape became the terrain for militaryoperations. My school was converted into a hospital. There were bullets lodged into thewall on our veranda just above the fridge, now empty because there was no food intown. The food supplies could not reach the city as the railroad was destroyed and thecity was under siege. Soon you could not buy milk any more. We had to get up at 4amand walk in the dark to join the endless lines outside the bread factory. Sometimes,however, the gates would not open at nine, or ten or even eleven in the morning. Welearned to make ‘cake’ out of stale bread croutons [sukhari in Russian].
We learned to blackout our windows, to crawl on the floor between the rooms duringthe heavy shooting periods. We would all congregate in the only tiny room which wasprotected by two walls on each side – all of the neighbours on the floors. We learned todistinguish the sounds of different weapons and even children knew the names of thevarious war-machines. During the periods of calm, my mother and brother would golooking for food and I would be left in the apartment and instructed to barricade thedoor from the inside and tell the people who asked which region we were from that wewere Bukhori.
Somehow this conflict turned from an ideological one into hunting down andexterminating people from certain localities, assuming their loyalty to one politicalgroup or another from the stamp in their passports or their accents. During this periodwhen over 50,000 people died and hundreds of thousands displaced, the pro-Comministforces became identified as Kulobi (lead by the Popular front with former convict andmurderer Sangak Safarov) as well as ‘Uzbeks’ (including Turkic-speaking Central Asian
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‘Arabs’, Loqais, and Qarluqs) from Qurghonteppa and Tursunzade/Hissor regions; whilethe opposite side were mainly people from the Pamir (Badakhshan), Karategin andGharm (Shoeberlein 1994: 39). Both sides committed horrendous crimes as the viciouscircle of blood spilt and blood avenged continued between 1992 and 1993. Thisexperience is in large part responsible for my interest in politics and IR. I went into thestudy of IR to make sense of why wars happen and to ‘master my fear of war’(Lowenheim 2010: 1038).
We missed a year of school. My mother lost the source of her income. Journalists werebeing killed and blamed for starting the civil war. So she decided to take us to Bukhara,to bibijon, to normal life where we would not live in want for bread anymore and couldgo to school. By the end of February 1993 relative quiet returned. We took a train toBukhara using a short window of opportunity. Althouogh our relatives stayed hopingfor normalisation of life, my mother’s reasoning was: “Look at Afghanistan, they havebeen at war with one another for over a century now”... I did not go back to Dushanbeuntil my doctoral fieldwork in the summer of 2008, fifteen years later.
Doing fieldwork ‘at home’
Most fieldwork is conducted by Western scholars in ‘exotic’ and ‘foreign’ places. Assomeone who has spent first ten years of my life in Tajikistan and the following yearsbetween Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, the United States and finally Scotland, going to ‘field’was a return ‘home’. It was going home to Tashkent, where my immediate familyresided and whom I had not seen for two years prior to the trip; and it was also goingback home to Dushanbe, where I was born and grew up and where most of my extendedfamily lives. Yet, the experience of doing fieldwork at ‘home’ was ambivalent as mydouble-absence from ‘homeland’ made me a stranger in many respects. My prolongedperiods of studying abroad have removed and distanced me from the native culture andsociety. As a result, despite the relative advantages of having family and otherconnections to the site of fieldwork, there were certain emotional, cultural and logisticalchallenges associated with conducting fieldwork ‘at home’. Some of these challengesappear to be common to people doing research on their native societies and others
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could well be idiosyncratic to my particular case. In what follows I am going to analysemy initial expectations of what the fieldwork would be before I went there and theactual lived experience.
Planning the fieldtrip to Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, I wrote a note on research methodsand organisation of the fieldwork.
Fieldwork in Tashkent, Uzbekistan and Dushanbe, Tajikistan (June –Sept
2008)
The fieldwork this summer will consist of two methods of data collection: 1)collection of textual and visual data (books, pamphlets, periodicals, policydocuments, legal documents, photos, maps), and 2) interviewing of relevantpeople in policy circles, academia, mass media, etc. Interviewing part of the fieldwork does not seek to cover a representative sample of respondents. Rather, theinterviews are intended to be a guide for other means of data collection as wellcomplementary source of primary data, rather than the main means of datacollection. When using interviews as data for discourse analysis one shouldremember its performative nature, whereby both the interviewer and theinterviewee are concerned with performing their roles as an authoritativeprofessional and/or a responsible respondent. Interview data, therefore, will beused cautiously, bearing in mind the ‘artificiality’ of interview setting and rolesperformed by both parties.
Theoretical and snow-ball sampling
This field work will utilise two types of sampling of theparticipants/interviewees. Firstly, theoretical sampling, whereby the selection ofparticipants will be driven by research findings as they develop, will be used. Iwill simultaneously collect and analyse data and constantly compare data and itspossible meanings by using the developing analysis to decide what data to collectnext and from where to get that data. Secondly, snow-ball sampling will be usedin combination with the theoretical, whereby each interviewee will be asked to
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refer me to one or more people to interview. This allows to build on the socialnetworks of the interviewees as well as diversify the sample through combiningsnowballing with theoretical sampling.
In-depth unstructured interviews
In-depth unstructured interviews will be used as a qualitative technique forgathering rich, detailed accounts of the interviewees’ opinions, ideas andexperiences. I will not use a structured list of pre-prepared questions in aquestionnaire format. Instead I will use a topic guide, such as a list of themes orquestions relevant to the research. In this way, in-depth interviewing canprovide detailed information and insights about people’s thoughts on the subjectthat cannot be accessed through rigidly structured questionnaires. This will beused in conjunction with other research methods as a means of supplyingadditional or supporting data.
The interviews will be recorded through a combination of audio (DigitalDictaphone) recording and note-taking in order to avoid data loss due totechnical issues. Where permission is not granted for audio recording, thereporting of the interview will be based solely on the interview form.
The interview form consists of three parts: the factsheet, the topic guide and thepost-interview comments sheet. The factsheet is used to record factualinformation such as time, date, and place of the interview. Also, any specialconditions or circumstances that may affect the interview are recorded.Demographic information about the interviewee is noted on the factsheet aswell. The actual interview questions, probing questions or statements, andanticipated follow-up questions comprise the second part of the interview guide.A column alongside the questions is used for observations made duringquestioning. The final part of the interview guide provides a place to write notesafter the interview that detailing my feelings, interpretations, and othercomments. After the interview I will provide the interviewee with my contactdetails in case they have some follow up comments, thoughts or questions.
Ethical concerns
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Informed consent will be sought by explaining the nature of the research beforethe interview. No signature of a consent form will be sought, as people in CentralAsia are reluctant to sign any papers that could implicate them afterwards. Nonames will be recorded and the interviewees will be informed of theanonymisation procedures.
The main ethical concern is the safety of the interviewees. I will make sure thatthe location of the interview is safe and the interviewee feels comfortable talkingthere.
The actual experience of fieldwork turned out to be rather different in regards to someof the initial expectations that I had. Doing fieldwork in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan wasrather challenging in several regards. First of all, I had to get a visa to travel toTajikistan from Uzbekistan. At the time I was still a ‘person without citizenship’ andwas applying for Russian citizenship through the Embassy in Tashkent. So there was thematter of limited time and having to submit to various bureaucratic institutions atcertain times during that summer. When I was studying for the MLitt degree at StAndrews, my family’s Uzbek citizenship was revoked as a result of a curious andKafkaesque bureaucratic mistakes, misinterpretation, and misapplication of citizenshiplaw in Uzbekistan. We therefore became ‘people without citizenship’ with a curiousdocument in a grey cover – people which are neither here nor there, neither insidersnor outsiders.
We became stateless due to the quirks in citizenship law. Neither Tajikistan norUzbekistan recognised us as their citizens as we were not yet in Uzbekistan at themoment of adoption of the law in 1992 and already out of Tajikistan at the time whenthey adopted theirs. We lived in a permanent ‘state of exception’, as homo sacerembodying this ‘inclusive exclusion’, constituting the border of the new nation-statethat refused to accept us as its citizens (Agamben 1998: 17). We were not included inthe independent Uzbekistan’s definition of ‘the people’. So while doing my PhDresearch I went from being a Uzbek citizen to a person not recognised by any state astheir national to being a Russian citizen through the naturalisation programme of ‘thereturn of the compatriots’ initiated by the Russian government. This meant inability totravel freely as well as necessity to go through multiple immigration hurdles both to
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continue my studies in the UK and to gain necessary documents in Tajikistan andUzbekistan.
Since there is no air link between the two capitals since 1992, I had to travel by landand then cross the border on foot. My mother was very worried about my safety andthe rules of propriety that do not allow a young unmarried woman to travel alone, somy aunt and her son came along on the trip, despite my history of travelling and livingabroad alone for five years prior to the trip. Since my aunt had to be back at work aftertwo weeks, I could not stay longer, as originally planned. My relatives in Tajikistan,many of whom had not seen me since I was ten years of age, wanted my time andattention. I stayed at one of my great aunts’ house. However, the other great aunt wasgravely offended that I did not stay at her place. I had to navigate the hidden stones ofold family feuds and sometimes complicated relations rooted in stories that I was notaware of. I had to spend a lot of time visiting relatives rather than at the Nationallibrary or meeting people. Therefore, my lived experience did not match the perfectimage of a competent and independent researcher who autonomously decides on thecircumstances, duration and conditions of their stay in the field. I was constrained by anumber of factors including migration and documentation regimes, family concerns andrules of propriety for a young unmarried woman.
At the same time, family was an invaluable resource when it came to introducing me topeople, finding sources and simply as ‘informants’. My great aunt, who is a professor atthe National University serves on the committee of the Academy of Sciences introducedme to almost all the people I interviewed in Tajikistan. She was the judge of who was tobe trusted and generally worthy of interviewing. The interview dynamic, therefore, didnot follow the performance of “a authoritative professional and responsiblerespondent” roles as I anticipated. Rather, I was cast as a “student in need of guidance”in front of a “respected member of academic/policy circles”.
Just like the Malawian anthropologist, Alister Munthali, while doing my fieldwork inTajikistan and Uzbekistan I felt like ‘a foolish person asking silly questions, because Iwas expected to know the answers’ since I came from the same culture (Munthali 2001:114). While I was trying to make sense of Central Asian politics, was also being judgedby people that I met. I was perceived as a young female student in need of guidance, a
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potential marriage material for one’s male relatives, an outsider and an insider at thesame time.
Positionality and objectivity
Even though I was from the places I was studying I was estranged from ‘home’ by longabsence from Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, by my changing nationality status, my bi-linguality (English being my professional language) and the choice of career andlifestyle, which all de-familiarised me from the things I was supposed to be familiarwith. Since 2002 I have been studying and living abroad, in essence changing me from alocal in Uzbekistan into a guest of sorts. Munthali writes that the anthropologies doingresearch ‘at home’ can rarely be considered as ‘full insiders’:
...most native researchers stay away from their homes when they are undergoing training andonly return after several years to study their own people. This defamiliarisation ... allows theobjective study of one’s own culture. During the time he is away the native anthropologist attainsa new status, an occupation, a new residence and a new way of thinking which in most cases isradically different from his ‘fellow natives’’ (Munthali 2001: 131).Immigrant scholars like Edward Said and Shahram Khosravi (2010) report a feeling ofhomelessness, or a certain feeling of estrangement or ‘exile’ from both their ‘home’ and‘recipient’ cultures and communities. Khosravi writes that on his return to Iran toattend to his dying father: “I felt that I was both insider and outsider” (2010: 86). He feltthat his ‘home’ was fading away, his long absence making him ‘alien in the country of mychildhood’ (88). This distance and alienation are also reflected in the linguistic inabilityto express oneself fully in either of the languages, with whole domain vocabulariesmissing from both (89). I have also felt the same linguistic impotence at times as I havebecome bilingual during my studies. Edward Said once said on the issue of bilingualism:
Everyone lives life in a given language; everyone’s experiences, therefore, are had, absorbed andrecalled in that language. The basic split in my life was the one between Arabic, my nativelanguage, and English, the language of my education and subsequent expression as a scholar andteacher, and so trying to produce a narrative of one in the language of the other – to say nothingof the numerous ways in which the languages were mixed up for me and crossed over from onerealm to the other – has been a complicated one (Said 1999: xi-xii).I share this sense of never really being able to express myself fully in either Russian orEnglish and that my life experiences can only be ever narrated in some kind of
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combination of these two languages. Still, I think this being an ‘insider/outsider’ gaveme a certain sensitivity for the languages which to some extend allowed a morenuanced understanding of the discourses that I analysed in this thesis. Moreover,contrasting the use of language between my first, second, and third language may allowme insights that native speakers without foreign language skills do not have. There aresome cultural differences that were reflected in language idiosyncrasies that I couldperhaps pick up on better than non-native speakers of the region. But there is also achance that they remained unarticulated in some instances exactly because I perceivedthem as natural and common-sensical. Being an insider as well as outsider language–wise gives you a degree of objectivity that cannot be achieved without this particular setof language skills. To some extent also my fading mother tongue has played a role inhow the interviewees and I performed during the interviews.
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Appendix B
Note on transliteration
I used American Libraries Association and Library of Congress (ALA-LC) system ofRomanisation for Russian Cyrillic text. For transliteration of Uzbek Cyrillic, I used thelatest version of the Romanised Uzbek alphabet. As Tajik script is based on Cyrillic buthas some special characters, I used Allworth (1971) system of transliteration, which isstraightforward and does not require use of many special symbols. However, Allworth’ssystem for transliteration of Cyrillic-based Tajik text differs from the ALA-LC system forRussian Cyrillic. The original transliterations were preserved when quoting otherauthors’ texts. Proper nouns are spelled according to the accepted English norms(where they exist), unless spelled otherwise in the original quoted text.
Letter ALA-LC Russian Allworth (1971) Tajik Romanised UzbekA (a) A (a) A (a) A (a)
Б (б) B (b) B (b) B (b) 
B (в) V (v) V (v) V (v) 
Г (г) G (g) G (g) G (g) 
Ғ (ғ) - Gh (gh) G’ (g’)
Д (д) D (d) D (d) D (d) E (e) E (e) Ye- -e- Ye- -e-
Ё (ё) Ё (ё) Yo (yo) Yo (yo)
Ж (ж) Zh (zh) Zh (zh) J (j) 
З (з) Z (z) Z (z) Z (z) 
И (и) I (i) I (i) I (i) 
ӣ (ӣ) - Ī (ī) -- 
Й (й) Ĭ (ĭ) Y( y) Y (y)
Қ (қ) - Q (q) Q (q)
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К (к) K (k) K (k) K (k) 
Л (л) L (l) L (l) L (l) 
М (м) M (m) M (m) M (m) 
Н (н) N (n) N (n) N (n) O (o) O (o) O (o) O (o)
П (п) P (p) P (p) P (p) P (p) R (r) R (r) R (r)C (c) S (s) S (s) S (s)
T (т) T (t) T (t) T (t) 
У (у) U (u) U (u) U (u) 
Ў (ў) - Ū (ū) O’ (o’) 
Ф (ф) F (f) F (f) F (f) X (x) Kh (kh) Kh (kh) X (x)
Ҳ (ҳ) - H (h) H (h)
Ц (ц) Ts (ts) Ts (ts) S- (-ts-) 
Ч (ч) Ch (ch) Ch (ch) Ch (ch) 
ӣ(ӣ) - J (j) -
Ш (ш) Sh (sh) Sh (sh) Sh (sh) 
Щ (щ) Shch (shch) - - 
Ъ (ъ) “ “ ‘ 
Ы (ы) Y (y) Y (y) Y (y) 
Ь (ь) ‘ - - 
Э (э) E (e) E (e) E (e) 
Ю (ю) Ĭu (iu) Yu (yu) Yu (yu) 
Я (я) Ĭa (ia) Ya (ya) Ya (ya) 
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